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ABSTRACT 
Many comparisons have been made between Chemical detectors (C), between 
Biological (B) detectors, and between Radiological detectors (R), providing 
insights to the best C, B and R equipment for a given purpose. However, no 
comparison has been made between C, B and R systems to appraise how C, B 
and R detectors perform against each other and where capability gaps lie. The 
dissertation generates a method to achieve an inter-comparison between C, B 
and R detection capabilities and identifies where to invest resources to achieve 
a more effective overall CBR detection architecture.  
The inter-comparison methodology is based on an operational analysis tool 
(SMARTS). The overall CBR detection architecture is illustrated through detect 
to warn and detect to treat mechanisms across the timeline of a realistic scenario. 
The scenario has been created to be non-prejudicial to C, B or R incidents, 
deconstructed into four frames to accommodate SMARTS. The most suitable 
deconstruction is into early warning, personnel security screening, initial 
response and definitive identification frames. The most suitable detector Key 
Performance Characteristics (KPCs) are identified for each frame. SMARTS is 
performed by analysing the current performance of the C, B and R detection 
systems drawn from the literature and the target requirements determined by 
defensible logic. The desire to improve each capability from its current state to 
target requirement is subjectively determined by the author. A sensitivity analysis 
is applied to mitigate the effect of a limited pool of opinion.  
Applying the methodology to published CBR detection capability data and the 
author’s appraisal of the target requirement reveals that B detection requires the 
greatest development and R the least, and that detection in the security screening 
and initial response frames falls short of capability compared to early warning and 
definitive identification frames. Selectivity is a challenge across a broad range of 
frames and agents.  
This work provides a methodology that is modular and transparent so that it can 
be repopulated should new data or alternative perception arises.    
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1 : INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Chapter Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the research. It outlines the 
motivation of the research, and the objectives and methodologies involved in 
achieving the aim. This chapter also summarises the dissertation by simplifying 
the proposed methodology in a chronological fashion. 
  
1.2 Research Motivation 
Sensing has always been a pivotal aspect in Chemical, Biological and 
Radiological (CBR) defence architecture. Especially since the onset of post 9-11 
incidents, several government agencies [1, 2], independent laboratories [3], 
commercially interested companies [4], and independent researchers have been 
studying and analysing detection technologies within each of the CBR domains. 
These studies seem to always anchor on a specific domain (C, B or R), and 
leverage on the subject matter experts’ experiences and knowledge in an attempt 
to close the gap between the current capabilities and the ideal situations. None 
of these efforts seem to have a direct comparison between C, B and R detection 
capabilities. This comparison may be crucial in providing a holistic understanding 
of the current CBR detection as a subject, and potentially could identify the main 
gap in a comprehensive manner. Coupled with a good comparison methodology, 
this analysis may also point to a research direction that requires more attention.  
 
1.3 The Research Objectives 
The objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of the 
current CBR detection capability gap, and to provide future potential research 
focal points with the aim to develop a more effective overall CBR detection 
architecture, aligned with the operators’ needs and requirement.  
 2 
In order to achieve the aims and objectives, the main tasks for this work are: 
- Development of a sound methodology as a platform to compare the C, B 
and R detection capability. 
- Preliminary comparison and analysis of the C, B and R detection 
capability. 
The methodology discussed in this dissertation involves subjective judgements 
in several aspects of the C, B and R detection capabilities. Unless explicitly stated 
in the dissertation, the analysis on the C, B and R capabilities are purely based 
on the author’s perceptions and interpretation of the current technological 
strength and limitations.  
 
1.4 Methodology Summary 
This section provides an overall summary of analysis approach, and aims to give 
the reader a concise expectation of this dissertation. The strategy for the 
comparison is presented in a chronological fashion in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary of comparison methodology. 
Steps Description Chapter 
1 Defining the scenario 
A realistic scenario comprising four discrete frames of detection 
architecture is created. 
7 
2 Selection of C, B and R representative agents 
The comparison of C, B and R detection capability is aimed to be 
as encompassing as possible, but due to the time limit of this 
dissertation, certain criteria are compared by representative agents 
of the C, B and R domain. The agents are selected via Analytic 
Hierarchy Process, a decision modelling tool.   
6 
3 Defining the Key Performance Characteristics 
The KPC of a detection system are discussed and selected. 
3, 7 
 3 
4 Defining the hierarchy 
The comparison is modelled as a hierarchy tree with the goal of 
ranking the relative C, B and R detection capability in terms of their 
detection system criteria. The overall comparison is modelled using 
SMARTS method. 
4, 5 
5 Define the target value of each criterion 
The ideal target of each criterion for the CBR detection systems in 
each frame of the overall scenario is rationalised. 
7 
6 Defining the current performance for each detection system in each 
frame 
The current performance of each criterion is discussed.  
3 
7 Criterion performance measurement 
The desire of each criterion to be improved from its current value to 
the ideal target is compared for each C, B and R detection system.  
8 
8 Deriving weights of criteria in each frame 
The weights of the criteria in each frame are derived using the same 
method.  
8 
9 Deriving the weights of frame towards the success of overall 
detection architecture 
The importance of each frame towards achieving the goal is 
discussed.  
8 
10 Summation of weights 
The weights of the criteria are normalised and summated for the C, 
B and R systems to derive an overall ranking for the capability.  
8 
11 Analysis 
Sanity checks are performed, and the results are discussed.  
9 
1.5   Report Structure 
The dissertation is structured into 10 chapters as follows: 
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Literature Review 
Chapter 2 – CBR Sensing Capabilities 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to C, B and R agents and the overall CBR 
defence strategies. 
Chapter 3 – Detection Architecture 
Chapter 3 discusses the CBR detection architecture by decomposing them into 
their different elemental components. 
Chapter 4 – Multi Criteria Decision Analysis 
Chapter 4 introduces the application of multi criteria decision analysis to complex 
problems, and discusses some critical models that are used in this dissertation. 
Methodology 
Chapter 5 – Methodology Discussion 
Chapter 5 describes the overall strategy and procedure to compare the C, B and 
R detection capabilities.  
Chapter 6 – Selection of a Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agent 
Chapter 6 summarises the selection of a specific C, B and R agent via one of the 
decision analysis models. These agents are required in the comparison of the 
capabilities with respect to specific criteria.  
Chapter 7 – Scenario Planning and Analysis of Scenario 
Chapter 7 details the analysis of the four frames that directly impact the success 
of the specific scenario in this dissertation.  
 
 
 
 
 5 
Results 
Chapter 8 – Results Generation 
Chapter 8 details the generation of the results using the proposed SMARTS 
method. 
Chapter 9 – Results and Discussion. 
The results are analysed, and sanity checks are performed in Chapter 9. 
Discussions on the framework approach and recommendations are also detailed. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 10 – Conclusion 
Chapter 10 summarises the dissertation, covers the conclusions that have been 
reached and indicates the potential for further studies. 
  
 
 
 6 
2 CBR SENSING CAPABILITIES  
 
2.1 Chapter Summary 
This Chapter introduces the different CBR threats, and discusses the CBR 
warfare from a historical perspective. It then sets a prelude for detection 
technology concepts (Chapter 3) by elaborating on the overall CBR defence 
architecture.  
 
2.2 Chapter Introduction 
In the First World War1, chemical threats are used to incapacitate and intoxicate 
enemy forces. In Second World War, the Japanese considered the large-scale 
usage of biological warfare, where tests were performed in laboratories with 
prisoners as the subjects to study the outbreak of cholera and typhus. Although 
there were not many incidents of large-scale intentional radiological attacks, 
several civil accidents has demonstrated the physical and social impacts 
radiological fallouts could have in the event of a deliberate release. For instance, 
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in 1986 released radiation that is 
estimated to cause 27,000 deaths due to cancers [5], and more than half of the 
adult population in Ukraine appeared to be still concerned about the radiation 
consequences 17 years on [6].  
While state actors’ continued research and possession of CBRN agents pose an 
undeniable threat to the world today, increasing efforts were also diverted to 
counter CBRN operations from non-state actors. These include terrorist 
organisations capable of inflicting economic and social damages through small 
and unpredictable covert operations. One such example is the notorious Sarin 
attack in Tokyo Subway [7], where 12 fatalities and 50 casualties occurred. It is 
                                            
1
 Chemical attacks were dated even before the First World War. An example is the Chlorine 
attacks by the Germans in Ypres. [226] 
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evident that such non-state actors target social morale and economic impact 
rather than catastrophic physical damages. For instance, the white powder 
incident where Bacillus anthracis dispersed in the form of powders through the 
US post office mail delivery system, caused immediate and long lasting effects of 
fear, and response cost yielding in excess of hundreds of millions of dollars [8]. 
Despite signing the treaty to ban research and production of nuclear warfare 
facilities, North Korea continued to pursue their desire of offset threats from South 
Korea and US in numerous nuclear studies [9].  
The evolution of CBR threats from conventional to asymmetric theatres heightens 
the potential of increased widespread. Perpetrators leverage on the relatively low 
cost of weaponisation and high availability of these agents to send psychological 
messages to the rest of the populace into thinking that they might be next [10].  
 
2.3 CBRN vs CBR 
CBRN differs from CBR with the inclusion of nuclear (N) threats. The term CBRN 
has often been used loosely to describe any incident that has chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear elements. However, the effects and 
consequences of N differ significantly from that of CBR. In the case of a nuclear 
incident (intentional or accidental), it is often catastrophic and on an extreme 
scale. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear power plant accident in Japan was 
described by many as a disaster, affecting tens of thousands of a displaced 
population and resulting in an economic loss of $250 to $500 billion [11]. In 
intentional nuclear conflicts, the overwhelming blast effects of the nuclear bomb 
almost brings the destruction level several tiers above that of CBR effect, 
requiring responses similar to massive scale natural disasters [12]. However, the 
effects of C, B and R vary according to the intent of the perpetrators and 
availability of agents, amongst many other factors. Especially in recent incidents, 
they are often seen in smaller scale attacks that cause more emotional and 
psychological harm compared to physical damages. Also, the reliance of 
detection systems in C, B and R differs greatly from that for N incidents. Often, 
C, B and R incidents are triggered by detection systems, because the latency 
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effects are generally not immediate, with the exception of some chemicals. Thus, 
there is a heavy reliance of detection systems in determining the nature of the 
attack, and also immediate response. However, for nuclear incidents, the effect 
is accompanied by visible nuclear fallouts and explosions, which trigger 
immediate death and panic. There is almost no need to detect nuclear incidents 
technologically; they are detected with our naked eyes. In addition, the detection 
architecture towards an N incident is categorically different from that of the CBR 
sensing. In the later, relatively similar emphasis is placed in all aspects of 
detection from early warning to on-site identification and confirmation. However, 
due to its severity, the former focuses unbalanced high efforts in post incident 
monitoring for the aftermath consequence management. The introduction of 
nuclear element into this dissertation brings the comparison to a different scale 
point, and unnecessarily complicates the validation of the methodology. 
Therefore, this dissertation focuses on the comparison of CBR detection 
capabilities. 
  
2.4 Chemical Threats 
2.4.1 Chemical warfare agents 
Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs) are chemicals manufactured with the main 
purpose of incapacitating, harming or killing in a warfare setting, most of which 
have modest or no use in industrial applications. The severity of the resulting 
injuries depends on the type of chemical, the amount and the length of exposure. 
The most common chemical categories are simplified in Table 2, but they could 
also be referenced to in several literatures [13, 14].  
These agents were typically delivered in vapours and liquid form, but can also be 
disseminated in sprays of aerosols, resulting in an inhalation hazard. These 
agents are of great concern not only due to their lethality, but also because of 
their ease of manufacture with modest laboratory equipment. The level of threat 
from perpetrator attacks depends on the toxicity of the agent, the technical 
expertise, the means of delivery, ease of acquisition and the current counter-
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measures against them. As detailed in Section 6.3, it is analysed that Sarin, 
amongst all other potential candidates, has the highest perceived risk of 
deployment in covert operations.  
2.4.2 Toxic industrial chemicals 
One huge incentive to use chemicals as the preferred mode of attack is the 
relative ease of acquisition. There is a wide array of Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
(TICs) that can easily bring about the same level of harm as their CWA 
counterparts when used in moderately high concentrations. To qualify as a TIC 
the chemical must have a lethal dosage concentration of less than 100,000 mg-
min/m3 and be produced at more than 30 tons per year at a single production 
facility [15]. As of 1998, an estimated 25,000 commercial facilities worldwide 
produce and stockpile chemicals that has potential for dual usages [16], and 
these figures are increasing to meet the demand of the growing industries over 
the century.  
History has documented the deliberate use of TIC to inflict loss on a massive 
scale. In 1984, an employee in an Indian pest production facility added excessive 
water into one of the reactor plants to cause a massive explosion of methyl 
isocyanate release. According to the density of the population surrounding the 
vicinity, more than 10,000 fatalities were observed, and 30,000 to 50,000 
casualties were reported [17]. Another notable series of TIC attacks was 
illustrated in Iraq, where chlorine attacks began as early as 2006, with reports of 
300 deaths in a series of recent attacks in 2014 [18]. While such common TICs 
are generally 100 to 1,000 times less toxic than traditional CWAs, they are often 
stored in quantities 1,000 times larger. The overall package is enticing to 
perpetrators in their attempt to deliver a cheap and straightforward attack. 
Table 3 illustrates the list of TICs employed by NIST2 in accordance to the hazard 
level.   
                                            
2
 National Institute of Standard and Technology. 
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Table 2: Summarised description of different chemical warfare agents. 
Types Nerve Agents Blood Agents Choking Agent Blister Agents 
Mode of attack Disrupts chemical 
communication through the 
nerve systems 
Prevents exchange of oxygen 
and carbon dioxide from the 
blood to the body cells. 
Attacks lung tissue, irritating the 
bronchi, trachea, larynx and pharynx. 
Disrupts nervous systems by 
blocking acetylcholinesterase.  
Dissemination Aerosol, vapour, liquid Aerosol, vapour Vapour Aerosols, liquid 
Effect Incapacitates at low 
concentrations. Lethal if 
inhaled or absorbed through 
the skin 
Incapacitates at low 
concentration, lethal if inhaled at 
high concentration 
Incapacitates at fairly low 
concentration, seldom lethal, unless 
at extremely high concentration. 
Temporary blindness, 
incapacitates at low concentration. 
Lethal at moderate concentration.  
Rate of action Very rapid by inhalation, 
slower by skin absorption 
Rapid Rapid  Rapid for sulphur mustard and 
lewisite 
Persistency Moderate Low Low High 
Symptoms Pupil contraction, involuntary 
urination, fits, sweating, 
vomiting, confusion, coma. 
Rapid breathing, convulsion, 
death 
Choking No early symptoms for nitrogen 
mustard. For Lewisite and sulphur 
mustard, searing of eyes, stinging 
of skin, blisters development.  
Common Agents GA, GB, GD, VX Cyanogen Chloride, HCN, 
Arsine 
Chlorine, Phosgene, Diphosgene Nitrogen Mustards, Sulphur 
Mustards, Lewisite 
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Table 3: List of TICs in accordance to the Hazard Index [19]. 
 
2.5 Biological Agents 
Biological agents are organisms that cause disease in humans, animals or crops, 
derived from pathogens and toxins found naturally. There are several incidents 
of biological weapon uses but the most notable in recent history is the post 911 
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incident, where purified Bacillus anthracis powder was mailed through the US 
Washington post office to government officials, causing disease to 22 individuals 
and 5 deaths [20]. Although biological agents have far more potential of mass 
destruction due to their toxicity, there is significantly less cases of such incidents 
compared to their chemical counterparts. One possible justification is due to the 
difficulty in dissemination of the agents in their viable state accounted by the small 
range of temperature that the biological agents can effectively thrive in. Another 
reason may be due to their difficulty of acquisition/reproduction compared to 
chemical threat. 
Bioagents can cause infection and even death at extremely low doses compared 
to the chemical domain. Table 4 shows the ID503 of typical bioagents.  
Table 4: Toxicity of options in terms of ID50 [21, 22, 23, 24] 
Biological Agents ID50 (Spores/organisms) 
Bacillus anthracis 10,000 Spores 
Yersinia pestis 10 organisms 
Francisella tularaemia 10 organisms 
Smallpox virus 5 organisms 
Marburg virus 100 organisms 
The Centre of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has classified potential 
bioagents into three priority tiers, as illustrated in Table 5. Category A has the 
highest priority, and it includes organisms that pose the highest risk to national 
security in terms of its dissemination ability, transmissibility and lethality. 
Category B has moderate risks, while category C denotes emerging risks [25]. 
Similar to the chemical agents, the risk of each biological agent being deployed 
in an attack is estimated based on various factors such as the availability, 
lethality, ease of acquisition and many others.  As evident in Section 6.4, Bacillus 
                                            
3
 ID50 refers to the infectious dosage that is administrated, causing approximately death in 50% 
of the exposed population.  
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anthracis is perceived to be of the highest risk to be deployed in a biological 
incident.  
Table 5: Classification of Bioterrorism Agents / Diseases. 
Category A Category B Category C 
Bacillus anthracis Brucella species Nipah virus 
Clostridium 
botulinum toxin 
Clostridium perfringens Nipah virus 
Yersinia pestis Salmonella Other emerging diseases 
Variola major Burkholderia mallei  
Francisella tularensis Burkholderia pseudomallei  
Filoviruses and 
arenaviruses  
Chlamydia psittaci  
 Coxiella burnetii  
 Ricinus communis  
 
2.6 . Radiological Agents 
According to historical records of WMD, radiological threats are seemingly less 
common compared to biological and chemical counterparts, but since the 1990s, 
there has been heightened concerns about illicitly obtained nuclear and 
radiological materials from the dissolved Soviet Unions for use in perpetrators 
acts [26]. The most recent notable radiological attack is the poisoning and death 
of Alexander Litvinenko [27], who was poisoned by Polonium-210, a strong 
emitter of alpha particles.   
Although all chemical, biological and radiological threats cause disruption and 
destruction, the route of effect for radiological threat is dissimilar to its chemical 
and biological counterparts. The real threat of the radiological material comes not 
from the radiological particle, but from the radiation that is emitted, damaging the 
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biological cell in the body. The damage is proportional to the type and intensity of 
the radiation received, which is influenced by the radiological particle. Radiation 
emissions are a consequence of an attempt of the radioactive isotope to obtain 
stability, resulting in the emission of particles or energy such as alpha and beta 
particles, or gamma energy. The three forms of radiation differ in their ionising 
and penetrating power, with alpha radiation having the strongest ionising power 
and weakest penetrating power, and gamma radiation on the opposite end. As 
such, external exposure to gamma radiation poses the highest threat, while 
inhalation or ingestion of alpha particles is more lethal.  
The biological effects of ionising radiation can be categorised as being either 
deterministic or stochastic [28]. Stochastic effects are independent of the 
absorbed dose, and observed to have no threshold, often associated with 
increased risk of developing cancerous cells. Deterministic effects occur beyond 
a certain threshold, and occur more quickly and severely with the increase in 
amount of radiation absorption. Clinical significant effects of acute radiation 
syndrome occurs at a dose greater than 1 Sv [29], although mild syndromes like 
nausea and headache may occur at as low as 0.3Sv [30]. 
Radiological fallouts can also be released during a nuclear attack, such as the 
massive Hiroshima atomic bomb incident. However, such an incident requires 
planning and skillsets of a much higher level, of which many may be beyond the 
means of a non-state sponsored organisation [31].   
Of all the possible radiological agents that could be utilised in a dispersed aerosol 
attack scenario, it is perceived that Cobalt 60 poses the highest threat. The 
derivation is discussed in detail in Section 6.5. 
 
2.7 Counter CBR Concept of Operation 
Figure 1 shows the intimate relationship between the five critical components of 
a successful CBR defence operation. A successful CBR defence architecture 
encompasses all the five elements, and because of their strong interdependency, 
a balanced developmental and deployment effort must be achieved to ensure the 
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robustness of the architecture. This concept resonates with the US Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive, which states that the essential pillars of their (bio) 
defence program are: Threat Awareness; Prevention and Protection; 
Surveillance and Detection; and Response and Recovery [32]. The detailed 
studies of each element are required to gain understanding of the entire CBR 
operational spectrum, but this is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
 
Figure 1: Principle components to a successful CBR defence architecture. 
2.7.1 Proliferation control 
In FY13, the UK spent two million pounds on supporting projects to reduce the 
threat of weapons proliferation [33]. This included CBRNE4 intelligences updates 
and policing services to understand incidents involving CBRNE materials, 
emerging threats, trends, trafficking routes and methods [34]. In addition, there 
are treaties and conventions in place that outlaw production, stockpiling and use 
of WMD to curb and reduce usage of such CBRN agents [35, 36, 37]. These 
treaties bind the rallied countries with mutual interests in conforming to the 
contract, and to exert further confidence, they are often subjected to regular 
verifications and enforcement inspections. The result is a reduction in weapon 
proliferations. 
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2.7.2 Protection 
In a counter response to a CBRN attack, protection for the first responders and 
equipment are deemed critical for the continuity of the mission. It is also vital that 
the correct type of Individual Protective Ensemble (IPE) is presented to the 
individual faced with a different kind of threat. There is currently no one-size-fits-
all solution, as different forms of barriers are required to counter each CBRN 
domain. Even within the chemical domain, there are various protection postures 
that can be adopted, and the selection to upgrade / downgrade the protection is 
assessed on the ground, after the chemical agent and its concentration are made 
known. Usually the responder enters the hot zone in a fully encapsulated suit in 
response to an unknown threat. Such protection posture exert extremely high 
heat stress to the wearer, and without proper ventilation, the operator would not 
be able to endure a 45-minute operation [38]. On the other hand, there are not 
many choices for IPE in a biological incident, as the operator needs to be 
constantly in an airtight suit to prevent exposure to airborne particles. IPE is 
almost5 non-existent in a radiological scenario. Gas masks are always required 
as part of the IPE, to prevent inhalation of gases and aerosol particles. They work 
on HEPA6 filtration basics, and can stop particles efficiently, only if they are well 
fitted to the wearer’s face.  
Collective protection or critical infrastructure protection employ the same concept 
– to create an area devoid of contaminants for the safe protection of unprotected 
inhabitants within it. Such protection is necessary in a military context where 
soldiers operating in IPE are required to recover during shift rotations, and where 
victims are subjected to decontamination in a hot or warm zone environment. In 
a civilian context, such protection is necessary for the continued survival in the 
presence of outdoor contaminants. While the science on protection is profound, 
the key takeaway is the need for efficient filters or barriers in both personnel and 
                                            
5
 There have been few companies demonstrating success in IPE that provide full body protection 
against gamma radiation.  
6
 High Efficiency Particulate Arrestance 
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infrastructure protection, and such filter considerations are varied dependant on 
the type of threat presented.   
2.7.3   Decontamination 
This element supports the requirement to neutralise and remove chemical, 
biological and radiological contaminants from the victims (primarily) and 
equipment. Personnel and equipment decontamination is usually performed as 
soon as practically possible after zonal segregation to reduce the risk of 
contamination, whereas terrain and infrastructure decontamination can take 
place at a much later phase. The need for speed of decontamination operations 
is also dependant on the type of CBR agent presented in the intentional release, 
where chemical agents present a need for more rapid decontamination due to its 
fast medical effect. While distinct methods are established dependant on the 
domain and type of agents, the general idea of such an operation is to remove 
any residual contaminants from the naked body to prevent cross contamination 
and further intake of the agent. Liquid decontamination in the form of soap and 
water are the most generic method for personnel, equipment and terrain 
decontamination. Other decontamination methods such as gas and water spray 
scrub the air and neutralise aerosols. Decontamination procedures and protocols 
must be standardised and communicated across the different agencies involved 
to ensure efficiency under chaotic and stressed conditions set upon by the 
release of such agents.   
2.7.4   Medical countermeasure 
As mentioned, the priority of the counter CBRN operation is to save life and 
reduce injury. One important aspect of life saving is the direct intervention through 
medical countermeasures, which arrives in the form of antidote treatment and 
supportive care. It is elementary to note that treatments are often specific to 
different contaminants, and thus accurate identification of the agents is crucial 
before administration of the antidotes. In all situations, life support therapy is 
always required to provide immediate relief to the incapacitated victims. 
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2.7.5   Detection 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the detection and warning element spans across all 
phases and aspects of an overall CBRN mission, and thus is considered most 
critical to its overall success.  In the early phases, an early warning capability is 
required to alert any incoming threat to the protected infrastructure in order to 
adopt a defensive posture. Constant monitoring of the situation also provides 
updates on the changing ambient environment, providing clues of impeding 
attacks. Upon the incident, detection systems must be in place to classify the 
attack and identify the threat. Confirmation of the attack requires high definition 
and quality of the identification process, and this is crucial to the down streaming 
evidence collection and potential prosecution. Such identification processes are 
usually performed in the national established laboratories with appropriately 
sophisticated equipment to meet the demand of high accuracy and precision. 
In all, an effective CBR detection architecture will ensure CBR materials are 
rapidly detected, identified, monitored and safely managed at all levels of 
incidents [39, p. 18].  
 
2.8   Chapter Conclusion 
The threat from CBR has evolved dramatically since World War II, as more 
terrorist groups are openly expressing willingness to use weapons of mass 
destructions, and declaration of CBRN acquisitions [40]. The need to understand 
and explore all the possible routes of interventions is apparent, and the route to 
a successful CBRN countermeasure is to couple the knowledge of CBRN agents 
with a successful framework of defence architecture.  
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3 DETECTION ARCHITECTURE 
 
3.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discusses the overall CBR detection architecture by breaking it down 
into distinct detect-to-warn and detect-to-treat frames of a scenario. It introduces 
the concept of Key Performance Characteristics (KPC) of a detection system, 
and its influence towards the success of the depicted scenario. The performance 
of the current dominant C, B and R detection systems in terms of the KPC will be 
discussed. 
 
3.2 Chapter Introduction 
In response to the demanding needs of a detection system, a careful 
consideration of the detection architecture is required to ensure a robust 
implementation of the multistage detection. The detection mechanisms required 
differs at the three distinct stages of the incident. The initial phase before the 
incident requires both constant monitoring and deliberate screening at key 
intersection points to act as early warnings. Detection systems are required 
during the actual happening of the incident as a means of attack notification and 
extent of the release. Lastly, detection systems are required after the event to 
provide confirmatory evidences for treatments and prosecutions. The core 
functions of detection systems revolves around these stages, and should be 
examined in detailed. As such, the following sections of the chapter (and 
subsequently chapters) deconstruct the architecture into four distinct frames as 
follows, where each frame represent progressive phases through the timeline of 
a general CBR scenario. 
(i) Early Warning Frame (Before) 
(ii) Security Screening Frame (Before) 
(iii) Initial Response Frame (During) 
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(iv) Definitive Identification Frame (After) 
In general, the Key Performance Characteristics (KPC) of the detection system 
evolves as it progresses into the different frames of the operation. In the early 
stages, the reactive responses towards a successful detection is more forgiving 
towards a less sensitive result, but requires a high speed of detection, while the 
responses in the later stages would choose sensitivity and specificity over speed. 
The shift of emphasise may be due to the consequences of the actions following 
the detection results. A multistage detection assessment will mandate the 
inclusion of several different detection technologies into the overall defence 
architecture to build in an increasingly accurate understanding of the nature of 
the attack. 
The following sections highlight each of the key frames and the current 
capabilities within an efficient detection architecture. The KPC selection 
considerations are elaborated in section 5.4. In general, the main KPCs of a 
detection system are sensitivity, selectivity, response time and range. In Chapter 
7, the efficacy of the KPCS of current detection systems in each C, B and R 
domain will be analysed. 
 
3.3 Frame 1: Early Warning Capabilities 
For all CBR operations, there is a need for early warning, especially so in 
situations where avoidance and protection of key infrastructure is key in the 
overall defence strategy. This detect-to-warn system aims to provide ample 
warning to personnel and potentially infrastructure, preventing exposure and the 
need for subsequent treatment. The nominal defence concept hinges on the 
ability to sense a threatening cloud as far upwind as possible in the fastest 
possible time before they reach the defended perimeter. Early warning of CBR 
agent infiltration is thus deemed as the most critical key to effective avoidance 
and protection against any form of contamination. Such capabilities are 
instrumental in the contamination avoidance scenario. Early warning generally 
comes in two forms, standoff and remote detection.  
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There are several definitions [41] of “standoff” detection, but loosely, it refers to 
the capability to be alerted to a potential attack without physical contact, from a 
distance away. The general consensus is that deployment of such a C, B or R 
standoff sensor7 should result in providing ample time to the commanders to 
perform certain preventive measures of contamination prevention to the potential 
targets. These actions are often highly dependent on the type of scenario at hand, 
and also the confidence level in the sensors used in the detection. Coupled with 
the accepted inherent limitations of high false alarm for all CBR early warning 
capabilities, the actions associated with the triggering of the alarm is often limited 
to low regret and low logistical burden actions, such as: 
a. Initiation of further monitoring 
b. Initiation of sampling 
c. Isolation of HVAC for key infrastructure 
d. Deployment of mobile response vehicle to site 
e. Increase alert status for first responders 
High regret and high logistical burden actions such as full evacuation of building 
and total turnout of response forces are avoided due to the relatively low 
confidence of the results provided. Standoff capabilities are often equipped with 
sensors that sense further from the point of deployment, with a much wider field 
of view. This implies the deployment of a lesser number of sensors, and thus 
benefitting from prudence in both a financial and resource sense. In addition, 
such sensors are usually placed on higher ground, usually right on top of the 
potential target. Apart from having a line-of-sight, all-round elevated coverage, 
such deployment is away from public scrutiny and limits access to theft and 
mischief. 
On the other hand, a remote detection system is often associated with having an 
array of point detectors that are networked within the array. These sensors are 
deployed upwind with reference to the potential release sites, and they usually 
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 A standoff sensor in this section, refers to a C, B or R equipment that responds in a form of 
alarm, to the presence of C, B or R threat in the environment. An example of a chemical standoff 
sensor is Rapid Plus by Bruker.  
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have a smaller range and field of view. Since the possible release sites are 
numerous, it implies that a higher number of sensors will then have to be 
deployed at the different locations. Especially in an urban setting, it may be 
difficult to decide on where to deploy the fleets of sensors. Deploying arrays of 
remote sensors also comes with the problem of signature and theft, unless the 
sensor can be secured to higher grounds. Lastly, wireless sensor networking 
technology, which serves to interlink the sensors together, may be off-the-shelf 
but is definitely not a plug and play solution yet. Together with other technological 
challenges [42], the technology may not be seen fielded in the coming years.  
In the derivation of the methodology for CBR detection capability comparison in 
this dissertation, the study of early warning capability will be limited to standoff 
solutions.  
While this concept of early warning (standoff) is conventional and often applied 
for C and B defence architecture, such a tactic is not mature for radiological 
defence, and its success is heavily dependent on the type of dissemination 
method the perpetrator chooses to adopt. Firstly, nearly all detection technologies 
for radiation require sufficient energy to reach the sensor before analysis and 
subsequent alarm is triggered. This means that if an operator holding a handheld 
radiation detector were to receive warning from his sensor, he himself would 
already have received the radiation, and this intensity is as high as what the 
detector had prompted. In a similar sense, if enough intensity were to trigger the 
sensor placed over the roof of the stadium, it may well indicate that the same 
intensity of energy would be presented to the spectators in the stadium. Next, 
early warning would not be so applicable in a point release scenario far away 
from the intended target, because any perpetrator with the intention to carry out 
an R attack should minimally understand the basic theory behind radiation 
exposure. The intensity of the energy radiated by the radioactive source 
diminishes at magnitudes according to the inverse square law and attenuated in 
air according to the Beer Lambert law. Even neglecting attenuation, a source with 
an initial intensity of 1 mSv/hour at 1km away would yield only 1 x 10-6 mSv/hour 
when it reaches the target, barely sensed by the most sensitive radiation sensor. 
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To readily affect a target population, the distance between the source and the 
target must be minimised. To readily find a source that is intense enough to be 
effective at 1km away would be a challenge in all aspects, and even if the source 
was obtained, the perpetrator must then derive a plan to shield the source and 
attenuate the energy during the transportation. Since radiation dissipates in all 
directions, the perpetrator must also devise a method to release the source when 
he is further away from the source than the intended target. With all the 
implausible constraints, it is said with confidence that a point release of 
radioactive source would not be feasible for a standoff event.  
However, it is possible for the perpetrator to aerosolise radioactive material and 
disperse it from a distance upwind from the target. The smaller radioactive 
particles would then drift down with the wind, unnoticed by the naked eye. Such 
dispersion would require a general aerosol particle counter for preliminary 
detection, but it is also noted that this method is a crude method, and could give 
rise to multiple false alarms.  
3.3.1 Chemical standoff sensing 
In this kind of long range scenario, the agents are most likely to be released in 
the form of aerosol or vapour, whereby it travels downwind towards the intended 
target. The detection system senses the incoming aerosol / vapour, characterises 
them, and subsequently alarms the use while tracking the plume direction. Such 
detection of plumes is dominated by Long Wavelength Infrared (LWIR) Fourier 
Transform Infrared (FTIR) detection technology [43, p. 18], where the chemical 
agents absorb characteristic wavelengths of the incident infrared. Detailed 
explanation of the technology is not within the scope of this dissertation, but they 
are well documented in literatures [43]. The incident radiation, when in active 
mode, is emitted by a transmitter such as a hot filament or laser. Passive sensors 
make use of surrounding blackbody radiation acquired from sources like the sun, 
landscape or a huge body of water. Most of the LWIR sensors in the market adopt 
passive sensing, as they are not reliant on artificial line-of-sight sources, and thus 
have the ability to acquire coverage of a larger area [44, p. 87]. The chemical 
agent, depending on the electric dipole moment of the molecule, absorbs specific 
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energy within the infrared radiation. Table 6 lists some of the important chemical 
agents of concern and their detectable range of wavelengths in the infrared 
region. It is evident that most of the agents of concern lie within the LWIR (8 to 
15 µm), hence alluding to the fact that most detectors employ only LWIR as part 
of the detection algorithm.  
Table 6: CWAs, TICs that can be detected in specific spectral region [45]. 
Descriptions Agents 
9 – 11.5µm (LWIR) 
CWAs Lewisite, nitrogen mustard, sulphur mustard, 4-Dithiane, 
Diisopropyl methylphosphonate, dimethyl methyl phosphonate, 
isoamyl alcohol, methylphosphonic difluoride, cyclosarin, sarin, 
soman, tabun, VX, triethyl phosphate,  
TICs Ammonia, arsine, boron trichloride, ethylene oxide, nitric acid 
4 – 9 µm (MWIR) – Mid Wavelength 
CWAs Mustard, sulphur mustard, 4-dithiane 
TICs Boron trifluoride, carbon disulphide, formaldehyde, hydrogen 
cyanide, hydrogen sulphide, nitric acid, phosgene, sulphur 
dioxide, tungsten hexafluoride 
2.5 – 4  µm (SWIR) – Short Wavelength 
TICs Hydrogen bromide, hydrogen chloride, hydrogen fluoride 
 
Figure 2 shows a pictorial representation of the theory behind a passive FTIR 
sensor. The sensor scans the environment for the normal background emittance, 
and detects for thermal contrast, indicating a potential absorbance. The incoming 
radiation is then fed through an interferometer, where it is deliberately split and 
recombined by a fixed and a moving mirror, resulting in an interference pattern, 
which is then analysed via Fourier transform principle into a spectrum of high 
signal to noise ratio. The spectrum is then referenced to the inbuilt library of toxic 
gases to determine the presence (absence) of the agent. The library can 
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theoretically store a limitless number of experimentally determined spectrums of 
chemical agents.  
 
Figure 2: Principle of FTIR [46]. 
3.3.1.1 Sensitivity 
Sensitivity of a LWIR standoff detector is often measured in units of ppm-m8 or 
mg/m2, which is a resultant of the product of the concentration of plume and path 
length. Thus, this is dependent on the wind direction and the location of the 
sensor. As the pathlength increases, the concentration required decreases. A 
typical chemical standoff sensor (Secondsight by Bertin) has a sensitivity of 
100mg/m2, equivalent to 16ppm-m [47]. This figure is obtained in a laboratory 
environment, and in reality, it is reasonable to include a 50% factor of uncertainty. 
This is aligned with the experimental measurements derived by L. Halasz et al 
[48, p. 52].  
3.3.1.2 Selectivity 
Most chemical standoff sensors work on a specific band of infrared energy for 
detection of chemical plume. The reliance of only one specific band brings about 
higher resolution and lesser need for power requirement. The chosen band is 
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 A sensor having a sensitivity of 100 ppm-m means that it can detect concentration as low as 
1ppm, provided that the IR light travels a total distance of 100m through the plume. 
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almost always LWIR, since it covers the widest range of chemical agents that are 
of threat. However, this alludes to the inability to detect a few selected lists of 
CWAs and TICs, as shown in Table 6. Evidently, prominent and possible agents 
such as hydrogen chloride, phosgene, ethylene oxide and sulphur mustard, 
amongst others, are not detectable in LWIR. Furthermore, chlorine, as a 
homonuclear molecule, cannot be detected using infrared absorption techniques 
[49]. In addition, the large poly atomic nature of several CWAs results in several 
peaks, and thus the use of a wider range of infrared is applicable. This increases 
the chance of encountering interferent absorption within the same range, 
resulting in a high false alarm situation. Figure 3 illustrates an example of possible 
false alarms due to similar spectrum from an interferent.  
 
Figure 3: IR-absorption spectra of VX and potentially interfering species, butyl 
acetate [45, p. 3]. 
3.3.1.3 Response time 
The standoff sensor works by performing a scan in the horizontal and vertical 
direction to cover the desired area coverage. As such, the sensor may not be 
able to acquire the agent upon its release. The time taken for the sensor to 
acquire the plume within its field of view, denoted as the reaction time, plus the 
processing time of the sensor to alert the operator, is the effective response time 
of the system. Philipe et al suggested a method based on field surface scanning 
rate of the detector to derive the reaction time of different commercially off the 
shelf standoff sensors, which ranges from 2 seconds to 145 seconds [50]. 
Assuming that the plume is only detected at the end of the scan (worst case), and 
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including a processing time of approximately 60 seconds, the appropriate 
response time of a current standoff sensor can be estimated at 200 seconds.  
3.3.1.4 Range 
Conservatively, a typical chemical sensor can detect up to a range of 3km9, with 
relatively good resolution and response time. 
3.3.2 Biological standoff sensing 
Unlike chemical agents, biological agents lack distinctive signature that can be 
detected from a distance, complicating remote monitoring of the potential 
biological threats. The current technology for standoff biological detection 
provides only discrimination of biological and non-biological particles at best.   
The dominant technology for standoff biological detection is active UV laser 
induced fluorescence LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging). The theory and 
setup of the equipment are discussed in several literatures [51, 52]. In summary, 
the transmitter uses a laser source capable of transmitting pulsed ultraviolet 
lasers of 266nm or 355nm, or a combination of both. Such laser beams are 
targeted at biological aerosols that absorb the laser, and re-emit them at different 
(longer) wavelengths. The receiver then collects the re-emitted laser, and filters 
them in attempt to collect the specific wavelengths in different photomultiplier 
detectors (PMT) [53, p. 12]. One of the PMT is designed to collect the scattered 
light at 266nm, which determines the particle’s size. With a transmittance of 
266nm, the second PMT detects UV light in the 300-400nm range, distinct of 
emittance from tryptophan10, a signal of protein presence in bioaerosol. In a 
system where 355nm is transmitted, the third PMT collects visible light from 400 
to 600nm to sense presence of NADPH11 typically of living bioaerosols. Although 
such methods are unable to provide the ideal specificity required, it serves 
                                            
9
 This range was chosen as a conservative figure. Tests from several institutions [50] [228] used 
3km as the base requirement for standoff detection experiment or verifications.  
10
 Tryptophan is a standard amino acid found in all biological cells. The presence of tryptophan is 
indicative of only cells of biological origin, but it cannot discriminate between living and dead cells. 
11
 NADPH is the reduced form of NADP (Nicotinamide Adenine Dinucleotide Phosphate). When 
cells die, NADPH is oxidised to NADP. By detecting NADPH, it allows a distinction between viable 
and non-viable cells. 
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adequately as an early warning system to indicate an abnormal plume of 
biological agent organisms approaching the target.  Figure 4 illustrates the basic 
principle of biological agent standoff detection.  
 
Figure 4: Principle of LIDAR system [54, p. 8]. 
3.3.2.1 Sensitivity 
Similar to the chemical standoff sensor, the sensitivity of a biological standoff 
system is measured by the product of the concentration and path length. For a 
biological system, the unit of sensitivity is often recognised to be ppl-m (particles 
per litre of air) or ACPLA-m (Agent Containing Particles per Litre of Air). A trial 
conducted by DRDC [55, p. 41] suggested that the sensitivity of SINBAHD 
((Stand-off Integrated Bioaerosol Active Hyperspectral Detection) is 144 kppl-m 
(144 ACPLA12) [56] at a range of 1.2km. In another, the US army revealed that 
the JBSDS (Joint Biological Standoff Detection System) has a sensitivity of 3000 
ACPLA-m (assuming pathlength of 1m) at 3km [57]. On the conservative side, 
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 Assuming that the ratio of viable aerosols to total particles in air is 10% [158].  
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the later shall be assumed as the sensitivity of current biological standoff 
detection system.  
3.3.2.2 Selectivity and false alarm 
In the detection of specific emittance by biological particles in the air, the receiver 
also detects other sources of infrared from the sun, moon reflectance, and 
scattered lights. A narrow band of filter is thus required to reject these interferents 
in the night, but an even narrower band is required for the daytime. In addition, 
unlike chemical detection, the biological standoff detection has no ability to 
discriminate between harmless biological background aerosols such as fungi 
spores and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons [58, p. 21], and biological agents of 
concern. Charles [58, p. 19] also suggested that the total number of background 
aerosols can exceed the target biological agent by orders of many magnitudes. 
This causes exceptionally high false positive alarms due to the innocent triggers. 
With the high aerosol background, there may also be potentials of false 
negatives, where the biological aerosols are masked by the interferents.  
3.3.2.3 Response time 
The response time of a typical biological standoff sensor can be calculated in a 
similar fashion as the chemical system. S. Buteau et al  proved that the field of 
View (FOV) of SINBAHD is calculated to be 1.34 x 10-3 deg2 [55, pp. 6,7]. With a 
pulse repetition rate of 250 Hz, the field scanning rate is calculated to be 0.335 
deg2/sec. With the assumption of 3km range and 1.5km width, the total FOV of 
392 deg2 is required. Thus, the total scanning time calculated is approximately 
20 minutes. Assuming that the plume is only detected at the end of the scan 
(worst case), and including a processing time of 60 seconds, the appropriate 
response time of a current standoff sensor can be estimated at 21 minutes.  
3.3.2.4 Range 
Conservatively, a typical biological standoff sensor can detect up to a range of 
3km [59].  
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3.3.3 Radiological standoff sensing 
There is currently no radiological standoff capability that can be fielded with much 
success. The closest to analysing a radiological plume dispersal would be 
utilising the same LIDAR technology (as the biological standoff sensor) to 
visualise the increase in concentration of dust particles in the environment. A 
small pulse of laser light is shone within the field of view towards the environment, 
typically from NG:YAG laser. In normal ambient conditions, the backscatter from 
air and insignificant dust particles are measured as background noise. In the 
event of a release of unexpected plume, the Mie backscatter increases and is 
reflected via the photomultiplier tube within the LIDAR system; this increases the 
backscatter coefficient, and the plume is immediately tracked.  
This system is flawed with uncertainties leading to high false alarm rates. 
Communications with other agencies are required at every alarm, and such 
information sharing systems enhance the understanding of the plume nature, 
reducing false alarms.  
3.3.3.1 Sensitivity 
Such an aerosol tracking system has a typical sensitivity of 1000ppl-m at 5km 
[60, p. 56] 
3.3.3.2 Selectivity and false alarms 
As expected, this kind of system alerts the operator to any form of aerosol 
plumes, ranging from haze, soot, industrial releases, and CO (carbon monoxide) 
emission, to even chemical and biological releases. It does not differentiate the 
radioactive plume from other non-radioactive plumes, making it non-ideal in terms 
of selectivity. While the false negative alarms are as frequent as those in the 
chemical and biological systems, the false positive alarms are much more 
frequent, even after information sharing from other agencies.  
3.3.3.3 Response time 
The response time of a typical radiological standoff sensor can be calculated in 
a similar fashion as the chemical or biological system. Referenced from [61], the 
FOV of a typical LIDAR system is calculated to be 3.27 x 10-5 deg2. With a pulse 
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repetition rate of 5000 Hz, the field scanning rate is calculated to be 0.16 
deg2/sec. With the assumption of 5km range and 1.5km width, the total FOV of 
238 deg2 is required. Thus, the total scanning time calculated is approximately 
24 minutes. Assuming that the plume is only detected at the end of the scan 
(worst case), and including a processing time of 60 seconds, the appropriate 
response time of a current standoff sensor can be estimated at 25 minutes.  
3.3.3.4 Range 
While many [60, 61, 62] have claimed that the range of such a LIDAR system can 
reach between 5 to 55km, it is uncommon for deployment at such distances. 
Therefore, we can assume the worst case of a maximum range to be typical of 
5km.  
 
3.4 Frame 2: CBR Personnel Security Screening Capability  
Security screening of personnel and vehicles for illicit CBR agents are highly 
regarded as an essential means to counter immediate threats. Such detection is 
aimed at individual or covert attacks, and often performed at cross-boundary 
areas or prior entrance to a highly secured infrastructure.  As will be described in 
Chapter 7, this dissertation will emphasise on personnel screening to key events.  
Security screening for humans is a difficult subject because with the increase in 
screening, the throughput is generally reduced. This generates another set of 
security problems because of the increase in human traffic before the security 
point, providing opportunity for attacks. In addition, while CBR threats are 
consistently mentioned in many literatures on security screening [63, p. 124, 64, 
65], most security screening efforts at such events have not been specially 
adapted to CBR concern [66]. X-ray machines are deployed mainly for countering 
conventional weapons such as knives, guns or even grenades, although they can 
also discover and screen for liquid / powders that potentially can be a chemical 
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or biological threat. In furtherance, detection of chemical13 and biological 
substances is challenged by the difficulty in identifying target substances in the 
midst of structurally related substances in the environment. The EU Commission 
has also recognised this as a threat to the public security, and has since 
performed studies to adopt best practises for background checks and security 
vetting [67]. 
At the checkpoint, all bags and personal belongings will be screened through the 
X-ray machines for metal detection. The analysis of the X-ray technologies are 
not within the scope of this dissertation, but it is sufficient to know that X-ray 
technologies such as conventional transmission imaging, dual energy X-ray, 
scattering imaging and 3D imaging [68], allow for detection of liquids and 
powders. The person is then required to walk through a metal detector, and is 
subjected to physical search in case of a positive alarm. The bags are also 
subjected to random scrutiny and detailed checks. At this stage, it is evident that 
the speed is equally as important as the actual security check itself, and the 
concern for a slower throughput is the heightened risk for potential target of a 
perpetrator attack. A study [68] revealed that rapid screening for faster turnover 
and inadequate human attention are the top two reasons for screening failure. 
3.4.1 Security screening for Chemical and Biological (CB) threats 
As mentioned, human security screening lacks proper and efficient procedures 
for CB checks. The current practise for chemical threat screenings is the usage 
of conventional X-ray machines with backscatter technology in search of liquid. 
Occasional bag searches increase the probability of finding hidden CB agents, 
but this is limited often again by the intention of increasing throughput. In addition, 
a perpetrator would deliberately disguise threats that can easily fool the eyes of 
an inadequately trained security officer. For instance, liquid agents can be 
disguised in milk for babies, while powdered agents can be placed in cosmetic 
pouches. CB point sensors are always only on standby, and only utilised on rare 
                                            
13
 Although there are easily measurable indicators for chemical agents like pH changes, they are 
highly unstable and prone to false alarms, thus seldom deployed. 
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occasions because such procedures will reduce the throughput time, and 
signatures of such spraying devices would be easily picked up by the X-ray 
machines.   
3.4.1.1 Sensitivity 
The sensitivity of the current CB security screening is limited to the ability of the 
X-ray system to pick up liquid and solids in powder form. Even with the successful 
detection of the suspect, the overall success of the detection of CB threat is 
dependent on human intervention. This dependency on humans to resolve the 
alarm is definitely not the most desired and sensitive method.   
3.4.1.2 Selectivity and false alarm rates 
The current X-ray systems visualise the objects within the bags according to the 
density, atomic mass on the screen, and leaves the human operator to interpret 
the results.  
Any liquid or powder of adequate quantity and size is alerted to the operator, 
prompting him to conduct the secondary human intervention at his own discretion. 
This non-ideal selectivity also results in high false alarms, as most of the liquid 
and powders are brought in for legitimate reasons. This is also a classic example 
of the catastrophic effects of false alarms; the operators get complacent or lose 
confidence in the detection, and often perform low standards of post inspection. 
3.4.2 Security screening for radiological threats 
It is common for radiological portals [69] to be deployed at ports to screen for 
increase in radiation beyond background. Such technologies are often found at 
human screening points. These are passive devices that capture any radioactive 
emission. In addition, radiation sensors are also placed near the bag checking 
areas, where any increase in radiation will trigger alarms for further inspections. 
At certain events, personnel may also walk through a metal detector, coupled 
with beta and gamma radiation detectors. Common detection technologies 
employed includes scintillation counters and the Geiger Muller (GM) detector. It 
is not practical for one to smuggle in alpha particle emitted radioisotopes. Such 
isotope poses no risk to external exposure due to its weak penetrating power, 
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and although it is an exceptional inhalation hazard, to deploy such an attack 
would require an accompanying spraying device, which is detectable by X-ray 
machines.  
3.4.2.1 Sensitivity 
The measurable range of typical radiation portal monitors starts from 0.1mSv/hr.  
3.4.2.2 Selectivity and false alarm 
The radiation portal is only selective to pick up gamma (and neutron) emission, 
because of its relatively high penetrating power. However, this does not have 
significant influence on the false negative alarm rates, due to the low possibility 
that the perpetrator will attempt to bring across the checkpoint alpha and beta 
emitters as a form of attack. More often, the alarms are due to legitimate and 
innocent sources of radiation from medical isotopes.  
3.4.2.3  Response time 
As with all radiation detectors, the reaction to an increase in radioactive dosage 
is instantaneous.  
 
3.5 Frame 3: Initial Response to CBR Incident Capability 
When detect-to-warn fails, the CBR defence architecture is exposed to attacks. 
Responders face a lot of challenges when they arrive at the scene of a deliberate 
terrorist release. The primary challenge is the ascertaining and distinguishing 
between the CBRN releases. The presumptive identification of the agents in this 
scenario takes a two-phased approach. The first phase is aimed at narrowing the 
scope of detection to the specific regime. Situation awareness and on the spot 
elimination is of high importance here, where the responder on site surveys 
around for immediate casualty, and distinct smell and colour. A chemical attack 
has the greatest potential of displaying observable clues, due to their inherent 
physical properties. For instance, common chemical warfare agents such as 
Tabun has a distinct fruity smell, while toxic industrial chemicals like chlorine, 
ammonia and sulphur each have their distinguishable odour. Most chemicals 
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achieve at least the incapacitating effect at fairly low concentrations, and the 
latency period is often faster compared to biological and radiological attacks. On 
the other spectrum, biological and radiological aerosols or particles are often 
colourless, odourless and cannot be seen by naked eyes. For biological agents, 
the latency period varies, but rarely felt immediately. Effects of radioactive 
isotopes are only felt immediately (deterministic effect) with high dose in excess 
of 1 Sv, and it should be noted that in most perpetrator radiological incidents, the 
radiation exposure levels will be far lower than those shown to have an immediate 
latency effect [70]. That being said, the visual observation of the situation would 
allow the commander to preliminarily rule out the potential of a biological and 
radiological event should one of the following observations be made. 
1. Distinct or unexplained odour 
2. Distinct colour of vapour, liquid 
3. Perception of ‘oily’ atmosphere 
4. Immediate casualty  
This is however, just a preliminary result that temporarily discards the possibility 
of biological and radiological incident due to time constraint, and efforts to revisit 
these areas must not be undermined, shall detection of chemicals fail.  
3.5.1 Chemical detection capability in an initial response scenario 
There are many technologies in the market that can be adopted in such a detect-
to-treat scenario, and they rely on specific physiochemical properties of the target 
analyte for a qualitative or at best semi-quantitative analysis.  
One of the most common technologies used is that of the IMS (Ion-Mobility 
Spectroscopy) technology. To date, several established equipment such as 
RAID-M-100, CAM and GID-3 are based on IMS technology to respond 
selectively and accurately to the toxic chemical vapours. It is not the scope of this 
dissertation to detail all the various technologies deployed in the sensors, but 
their implementation, advantages and disadvantages can be easily referenced to 
several open sources [71, 72, 73].  The various sensors in the market that 
incorporate such technologies can be sourced online [19]. 
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IMS technology classifies the chemical agents according to their ion mobility 
within the drift tubes. The air samples are absorbed into the sample chamber, 
where the radiation source (commonly used is Nickel-63 [74]) bombards the 
sample with beta emissions, thus ionising it, and breaking them into their 
individual components. The components drift down the drift tube at various times 
depending on their weight and such drifting induces electrical activities, which are 
characteristic of the chemical.   
Another technology that is commonly used is that of Flame Photometry 
techniques. In such a technique, the air samples (or solid samples in other cases) 
are fed into the inlet of the detector, where a hydrogen flame of 2000 to 5000 Deg 
C decomposes all organic compounds into ions, emitting photons of different 
wavelengths. In such a detector, the optical filter is selected to only filter photons 
emitted from excited phosphorous and sulphur containing compounds, and the 
signals are relayed through the photomultiplier tube to generate an alert in the 
presence of such elements.  
 The cheapest and most widely used detection system in a detect-to-treat 
scenario is the colorimetric detection method. The detectors are filled with 
substrates that are impregnated with certain colorimetric reagent specific to the 
target of interest. When the target is present in the sample, chemical reaction 
occurs, causing a change in colour of the sorbent. This change is detected 
visually. Such detectors range from simple strips of paper for conventional 
warfare agents like Sarin and Sulphur mustards, to tubes impregnated with 
adsorbing reagents for more diverse ranges of chemicals.  
There are many other technologies that can be easily adopted to answer to the 
needs for immediate response, but each has their own limitations. The concept 
of use for these detectors must be outlined clearly, so that the advantages of the 
different technologies can be leveraged accordingly.  
3.5.1.1 Sensitivity 
Different technologies yield different sensitivities, depending on the intrinsic 
physiochemical properties of the target and the performance of the detector itself. 
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Independent tests conducted by the US Department of Defence (DOD) on various 
detectors suitable for such scenarios showed that most of these detectors could 
at most detect at IDHL14 level when exposed to Sarin gas. Table 7 showed a 
compilation [75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81] of these tests in terms of the detector 
sensitivities. Since IMS is one of the most common instruments used, the 
common sensitivity of detectors found in these scenarios can be assumed to be 
approximately 0.03 mg/m3.  
Table 7: Sensitivity of various point detectors. 
Detector Model Technology Used Sensitivity to 
Sarin (mg/m3) 
Response 
Time (Sec) 
RAID-M IMS 0.037 8 - 41 
APD2000 IMS 0.021 16 - 20 
IMS2000 IMS 0.03 8 - 41 
AP2C Flame Photometry 0.02 6 - 72 
SAW MiniCAD SAW 0.4 158 - 301 
HazmatCAD SAW 0.3 186 – 209 
DCT15 Colorimetric Technology 0.02 400 
Nextteq Civil Defence Kit Colorimetric Technology 0.1 450  
3.5.1.2 Selectivity and false alarm 
Most technologies for chemical detection are selective towards specific agents. 
For instance, flame spectrometry is only able to detect chemicals with sulphur 
and phosphorous elements, which excludes common TICs like chlorine, ethylene 
oxide, ammonia and many others. IMS has a potential of detecting a wide 
spectrum of chemicals, but due to the limitation of its resolving power, most of the 
commonly available MS detectors can only classify between nerve, blister, blood, 
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 Immediately dangerous to health level. The IDHL for Sarin is 0.1mg/m3. 
15
 Draeger Colorimetric Tube 
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and choking agents, with very limited selection of TICs. The colorimetric 
technology is even more limited by the availability of the various reagent tubes 
on the scene, and definitely cannot cover all the possible chemical agents that a 
perpetrator will use. This is not ideal for a detect-to-treat scenario, where the 
agents used are unknown and limitless. In addition, IMS detectors are relatively 
low resolution and prone to false positive alarms when innocuous chemicals in 
the ambient air has similar ion mobility and may be misidentified as an agent of 
concern. Commonly found urban chemicals also include insecticides, which are 
an interferent for flame photometry. Orthogonal detectors in the market utilise 
different technologies to target different physio-chemical properties of the 
spectrum, and thus reduce false alarms. However, not all countries or first 
responders use this equipment because they are often bulkier and more 
expensive. Instead, most response forces resort to using the technology in 
combinations to eliminate false positive alarms and increase selectivity. For 
instance, the SAW technology provides more accuracy but lacks sensitivity. On 
the other hand, IMS and Flame Photometry provide the ability to detect at low 
concentration, but are prone to false alarm. When used in combination, the 
technologies complement each other and achieve better results.  
3.5.1.3 Response time 
Table 7 also shows the response time for each detector to detect their respective 
minimum detectable concentration. Although it is seen that IMS can typically 
detect the agents at less than 30 seconds, such technology requires a warm-up 
and setup time of approximately 3 to 4 minutes. Thus, the effective response time 
of a typical chemical detector can be estimated as 5 minutes. 
3.5.2 Point detection for biological threats 
Technologies for biological point detection are the least matured of the three. The 
technologies of biosensing in such detect-to-treat mechanisms can be found in 
several open sources [82, 83], but in general the range of devices for field 
detection is narrower, and most of them do not work in real time. In this scenario, 
where time is of the essence, the first responders do not have the luxury of 
deploying equipment that require 30 minutes or 1 hour to give a reading, and thus 
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have to rely on a simple test that yields fast results. Where the output may not be 
as fruitful as the chemical sensing, it provides a means to affirm a biological 
attack, where a complete series of tests could be performed at the laboratory 
before a confirmative identification can be made [84].  
Point detection of bioaerosol often begins with sampling, and most point sensors 
couple their mechanism with simple sampling devices. Sophisticated samplers 
such as gravity devices, impactors and suction samplers are normally reserved 
for dedicated samplers, which feed directly to confirmative identifiers [84]. Simple 
aerosol collectors found in point detectors include swabs, wipes and sponges 
moisture with buffer solutions [85].  
The actual biological detection for an initial response scenario consists of point 
and handheld sensors that target the different biological aspect of a bacterial or 
virus cell. Simple, one-time use of handheld immunoassay technology relies on 
the different molecular responses towards specific antigens. Most fielded 
immunoassays come in strips of a pass-fail test (Figure 5). The air samples are 
collected and concentrated in small amounts of liquid buffer, and lined against 
the dye labelled antibodies that targets specific biological threats. If the sample 
antigen is positive of the suspected biological agent, the affinity of the antigen 
and antibody induces the appearance of control lines, confirming the presence of 
the agent.   
Bioluminescence based detection targets the presence of Adenosine 
Triphosphate (ATP), a test of living cells, but they are unable to confirm the 
identification of the agent. With the presence of luciferin and luciferase [86], the 
increase in bioluminescence is captured and the intensity reflects on the 
concentration of the target agent. Such a test has low limit of detection as 
compared to other assay methods, but it lacks selectivity. 
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Figure 5: An Illustration of a suite of immunoassay detection kit. (Source: 
http://www.environics.fi/product/envi-assay-system/) 
3.5.2.1 Sensitivity 
Table 8 extracted from a market survey [3] performed by Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory shows the sensitivity of various detectors towards detection 
of Bacillus anthracis.  
Table 8: Sensitivity of common biological detectors. 
Model Technology Limit of Detection 
(spores/ml) 
Response Time 
(minutes) 
Haztech WMD Kit Immunoassay 100,000 10 
Biothreat 1 Agent Immunoassay 15,000 to 83,000  15 
RAID 5 / RAID 8 Immunoassay 100,000  15 
BBI Detection Immunoassay 10,000  15 
New Horizon 
Diagnostic 
Immunoassay 100,000  15 
Prime Alert Bioluminescence 100,000 to 1million  15 
Profile 1 ATP Test 2,000 to 10,000  15 
The average sensitivity of a typical biological detector for initial response is 
assumed from Table 8 to be 100,000 spores/ml. Assuming that 1ml out of 5ml of 
buffered sample solution is used in the analysis, in order for a successful analysis, 
the buffered solution must contain 500,000 spores. Assuming that the sample 
collector has an efficiency of 50%, 2 minutes of sampling will sample 400L 
(assuming an effective sampling collection of 200 L/min) of contaminated air, 
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which should contain 1,000,000 spores. Therefore the sensitivity of the biological 
detector in terms of the contamination air is extrapolated to be 2.5 million 
spores/m3. 
3.5.2.2 Selectivity and false alarm rate 
Such a generic biological test is non-selective, as it is not targeted at specific 
biological agents, but detects the presence of all biological molecules in the air. 
This also leads to high false alarm rates due to the potential interferents in the 
ambient air. The antigen-antibody based detection is more specific, but currently 
there are only solutions for common biological agents. Furthermore, it is 
uncommon and impractical for responders to perform sampling to cater to 
individual tests for the wide range of biological agents.  
3.5.2.3 Response time 
From Table 8, the response time for a typical biological detector for the initial 
response capability is estimated to be 15 minutes. 
3.5.3 Point detection for radiological threats 
While the perpetrator can easily disperse chemical agents that yield immediate 
visible injuries, such an outcome is not easily achievable for radiological incident. 
In addition, in most cases the populace exposed would most likely be able to walk 
away from the source before being administered with lethal doses, since the 
primary damages are likely to be only stochastic effects. 
In such event of a radiological incident, identification of the source could be 
performed at a later stage to initiate the specific treatment. At this frame, it is 
crucial to confirm the radiological nature of the attack to ensure subsequent 
identification can be performed at the laboratory with much higher precision. This 
is made more tedious than the chemical scenario because unlike chemicals, 
radiological particles are odourless and colourless, and the only way to initiate a 
radiological detection response is the suspicions aroused by unusual parcel or 
powders floating in the air.  
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Exact identification of the isotope does not provide additional value to the decision 
at this stage. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that any form of radiation 
is deemed unnecessary and hazardous to exposed victims, and exposure and 
subsequent contamination to the public must be avoided at all cost.  
Radiation detectors generally fall into two categories, gross counters and energy 
sensitive. The former type of systems detect each emission as a count regardless 
of the energy emitted, and thus the output will be proportional to the number of 
emission events, without identification of the radioactive isotope. The latter 
system is normally more sophisticated and analyses the radioactive isotope’s 
distinct energy emission and, based on the resolution of the technology, the 
source can be identified with varying confidence. This technology, as will be 
elaborated in the next section, is generally more costly and requires additional 
training to optimise the performance. The immediate first responders thus may 
not always have the luxury of being equipped with such field equipment. More 
viable solutions come in the form of gas filled detectors. These technologies 
provide readings in counts per minute, which reflects generally the amount of 
activity, and in some cases, the types of activity. 
The principle behind gas filled detectors lies in the ionization of the gas within the 
detector, inducing current that is analysed to provide the output reading. The fast 
moving radiation in the form of alpha, beta and gamma passes through the gas, 
and depending on the ionisation energy of the radionuclide, the gas molecules 
are ionised, forming an electron and a positively charged molecular ion. The ions 
move toward the electrodes at extreme ends of the detector, producing an 
electrical signal. The numbers of ion pairs are dependent on the (i) type of 
radiation presented, and (ii) the potential applied across electrodes. The different 
potential applied reflects on the different types of gas filled detectors, which are 
well documented in different literatures and texts [87, pp. 171-182, 88, 89, 90], 
and summarised in Figure 6 
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Figure 6: Different potential applied results in different applications for radiation 
detector. 
 
Of these, the most common and applicable detection system in such a scenario 
is the Geiger Muller (GM) counter. Unlike the ionization chamber and proportional 
counters, the GM counter requires very high potential across the electrodes. As 
the potential increases, the acceleration of the ion towards the anode increases, 
and this increased energy results in multiple collision with the neutral gas 
(normally argon), resulting in further ionisation. Due to the secondary ionisation, 
the electrical signals are often amplified by factors of 108. Distinctively, each type 
of emission produces different magnitudes of primary ionisation, but with the high 
gas amplification, they cannot be easily distinguished from the output electrical 
signal, as depicted in Figure 6. 
3.5.3.1 Sensitivity 
In general, a GM detector displays radiation detection in terms of counts/second 
(cps) or counts/minute (cpm), but based on the detector probe area and the 
specific nuclide of interest, this reading can be internally calibrated to reflect 
radiation in mSv/hr or mGy/hr.  Table 9 shows the specification of a typical Geiger 
Muller probe [91] that is capable of measuring all alpha, beta and gamma 
radiation.  
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Table 9: Typical sensitivity for a radiation detector for initial response. 
 Sensitivity of 
Probe 
(cps/Bq) 
Sensitivity of 
Probe (cps 
per µSv/hr) 
Measurement 
Range 
Minimum16 
Detectable 
Dose / 
Exposure 
Co-60 
(Gamma) 
- 6.4 1 – 9999cps 0.1 µSv/hr 
Sr-90 (Beta) 0.65 - 1.53 Bq/m3 
Am-241 
(Alpha) 
0.12 - 8.33 Bq/m3 
 
3.5.3.2 Selectivity and false alarms 
A typical GM counter, intrinsically, is unable to differentiate between alpha, beta 
and gamma emission. Due to the different penetrating power of the different 
emissions, different probes are required to target the different emissions. An 
alpha or low energy beta probe usually has a wide sampling area with a thin mica 
window to permit the entry of particles with such low penetrating power. For the 
detection of gamma radiation, no windows are required due to the higher 
penetrating power. Although there are also probes that can accommodate the 
detection of all alpha, beta and gamma radiation, it comes at the expense of 
sensitivity. In addition, even with a ‘all-in-one” R detection system, it is physically 
challenging to detect alpha particulate in an aerosol dispersion scenario, since 
alpha particles have low penetration power, and may not be easily detectable in 
the open environment. 
A different approach to false alarm is adopted in a radiological environment, as 
opposed to a chemical or biological scenario. Before the event, the background 
radiation around the area is measured and tabulated to understand the required 
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 Assuming minimum range is 1 cps. Area of probe is approximately 15cm2. Therefore, minimum 
detectable exposure is calculated to be 1 / (sensitivity*0.000015m2) 
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threshold, eradicating the notion of background radiation as a form of 
interference. The next level of innocent alarms comes from medicinal isotopes, 
which are irrelevant in this scenario, where victims and un-related personnel are 
ushered away from the inspection area. Therefore, this infers that there are 
negligible sources that will cause false positive alarms to the radiation detector.   
3.5.3.3 Response time 
The GM counter offers real time reading without appreciable start-up time.  
 
3.6 Frame 4: Definitive / Confirmative Identification 
While rapid and prompt qualification of either C, B or R agents are life-saving and 
essential, accuracy and sensitivity are often compromised. Where more detailed 
analysis of the agents is required, definitive identification of the agents are 
performed. None of the field analytical instruments described in Section 3.5 could 
be substitutes for a full scale laboratory analysis. Definitive identification pure 
from any doubts is performed in the laboratories or mobile facilities, where more 
sophisticated equipment will yield results with magnitudes of improvement in 
accuracy. Samples are collected from various sources, be it washdown from the 
decontamination process, the personal belongings, or ambient air samples taken 
from various locations downwind. The results of the identification will be coupled 
with a full incident report submitted to the higher authority for decision of 
subsequent actions regarding the sports event. These actions may include 
decision support, evidence collection for legal prosecution17, investigation of 
agent sources, contamination monitoring, and other actions leading to normalcy 
restoration. For radionuclide identification, the identification of the isotope also 
aids in the aftermath decontamination protocols. 
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 The gold standard for any courtroom evidence is laboratory analysis [243].  
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3.6.1 Chemical definitive identification 
The detection methods and protocols used in the previous frames for chemical 
detections are at most presumptive identification, where the information serves 
extreme importance for immediate decisions in casualty management, especially 
since chemical threats, when administrated in appropriate doses, would yield 
immediate observable results. However, even with the high resolution mass 
spectrometry sensors, mistakes can still occur in the identification of unknown 
analyte with complex molecular structures. Considering the latency of chemical 
agents, it is vital that a confirmative identification of the agent be performed to 
dismiss any ambiguity in the presumptive identification stage. This is especially 
so, since certain antidotes18 are in itself toxic, and may cause deadly side effects 
to the normal population [92]. Confirmative identification will give the green light 
to administrating such antidotes to incapacitated, but not life-threatened 
casualties. 
The current gold standard for definitive identification of chemical warfare agents 
is the Gas Chromatography Mass Spectrometry (GCMS) method. Such method 
is also particularly important to detection and identification of nerve agents, which 
readily hydrolyse into products such as alkyphosphoric acids. Several references 
for GCMS exists [93, 94], but in summary, it is an instrumental technique, 
comprising a gas chromatograph coupled to a mass spectrometer, and in the 
process vapour samples are separated and identified in a quantitative manner. 
The sample is sent to the laboratory, where it is pre-processed into a vapour 
before feeding into the GC inlet. The vapour is carried through the GC column by 
an inert gas such as helium, where it interacts with the stationary phase in the 
GC column. The rate of interaction influences the elution rate out of the column. 
As such, the samples are separated by the different retention time, characterised 
by a chromatogram, with peaks of different compounds in the sample reflecting 
the intensity. Such separation technique provides insight to the compounds within 
the sample, but it is unable to determine the confirmation of the presence of target 
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 For instance, atropine to nerve agents. 
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agents. The separated compounds are then fed into the inlet of a mass 
spectrometer, where they are ionised into fragments of characteristic 
mass/charge ratio, commonly by means of interactions with beams of highly 
accelerated electrons.  These fragments are captured by the analyser at different 
times and intensities, forming another spectrum. The two spectra are analysed 
on a single 3-D graph, providing a high-resolution chromatogram that is matched 
to the library spectra to reveal the identity of the agent. 
GCMS equipment typically comprises several bulky components that at best 
could be easily transported in mobile laboratories. While there are miniaturised 
and field portable GCMS systems19, these systems generally lack the resolution 
required for real confirmative identification.  
3.6.1.1 Sensitivity 
It has been claimed [95, 96, pp. 61,64] that such a sophisticated laboratory 
instrument is capable of measuring Sarin in parts per trillion (ppt) in air. Taking a 
conservative estimation of 100 ppt, the minimum detectable concentration of 
Sarin for a GCMS is 5.7 x 10-4 mg/m3.  
3.6.1.2 Response time 
It is claimed [97, pp. 173, 160, 283] that typical GCMS laboratory equipment has 
a start-up time of 1 hour, and a reaction time of 30 minutes. Therefore, the 
effective response time is thus estimated to be 1 hour 30 minutes.  
3.6.2 Biological identification 
With the relatively longer incubation and thus latency periods, first responders 
have more time to confirm the identity of the biological agents. However, field 
identification of biological agents is mostly serving the purpose of a yes/no 
response, and thus heavier reliance is placed on the laboratory identification of 
the agents.  
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 Hapsite ER by Inficon [247] 
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A common method of confirmation for Bacillus anthracis is that of Polymerase 
Chain Reaction (PCR) using real-time Taqman assays [98]. The sample is first 
subject to a thermal cycling under 95oc for 2 minutes for denaturation of the 
sample’s double-stranded DNA. A Taqman probe is then made to attach to the 
DNA and as the single stranded DNA grows, the receptor of the Taqman is 
cleaved, giving a fluorescence signal as a result. As the PCR progresses, the 
number of DNA amplifies, and thus the fluorescence intensity increases. This 
fluorescence is captured and monitored, and it reflects the presence of the target 
species.  
3.6.2.1 Sensitivity 
This method of definitive identification is reported [98, p. 288] to have a sensitivity 
of 49 spores/m3.  
3.6.2.2 Response time 
The Taqman PCR process takes approximately 1 hour [99] to complete.  
3.6.3 Radiological identification 
Radiological detection and confirmation is the most advanced amongst the three 
classes. By using different techniques of spectrometry, confirmative identification 
of all alpha, beta and gamma radioisotope can almost be done on the field, in 
order to develop the spectra analysis for the radioactive sources. These field 
analytic equipment are, however, expensive and thus not always available in 
incidents as “first tier” asset [66, p. 245]. 
Of these, the most established is that of gamma spectrometry using a High Purity 
Geranium (HPGe) semiconductor detector. The principle behind this technology 
is similar to that of the gas-filled detectors, but instead of gas as the medium, a 
high purity geranium semiconductor fills the void of the HPGe detector. Gamma 
radiation passes through the semiconductor, and deposits its energy to create 
electron-hole pair. HPGe is chosen as the gold standard of gamma spectrometry 
as it requires extremely low energy to create an electron pair, and with this, it has 
a better resolution compared to other semiconductors. Depending on the energy 
of the gamma radiation emitted on the spectrometer, each pulse of radiation 
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creates different numbers of electron-hole pairs, thus generating different 
intensities of electrical signal. This signal is displayed on a spectrogram, and the 
intensity reflects the type of gamma radiation.  
The gold standard for alpha and beta spectrometry is the solid scintillator 
technology. In such a system, a fraction of the alpha and beta particles interacts 
with the medium, usually plastic polystyrene or polyvinyl toluene [100], causing a 
molecular fluorescence (scintillation). The photons emitted then pass through a 
thin window towards the photomultiplier tube, where they are amplified before 
being captured as an electrical signal. The size of the output signal is proportional 
to the energy dissipated by the incident radiation, which is characteristic of the 
alpha or beta particles.  
3.6.3.1.1 Sensitivity 
For gamma spectrometry, a typical HPGe spectrometer is reported to have a 
sensitivity of 0.10 µSv/hr [101, p. 276], while that for a typical alpha-beta 
spectrometer is 5.6 Bq/m3. 
3.6.3.1.2 Response time 
In order to perform a definitive identification of the isotope of concern, on-site 
sampling must be conducted. This process, depending on the flowrate of the 
sampler, usually takes approximately 10 minutes. An additional 10 minutes of 
waiting time is required for the short-lived radon product from the background to 
decay. The spectrometry process takes around 10 minutes to complete. 
Therefore, the total response time is estimated to be 30 minutes. 
 
3.7 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the four frames within a specific scenario in a detection 
architecture. In each frame, the current performance of the detector is defined 
within the selected characteristic of the detection system.  A full study of all the 
scenarios cannot be achieved within the timeframe stipulated for this dissertation, 
but it is expected that each unique scenario requires the same amount of analysis 
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to derive the frames and the detector characteristics that are paramount to the 
success of the scenario. The KPCs of the C, B and R detection systems 
contribute to the success of each frame within the scenario, and must be 
thoroughly analysed to understand the limit of the current capability. 
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4 MULTI CRITERIA DECISION ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter reviews the Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) and its 
applications. The two most common methods of MCDA will be compared and its 
application to this dissertation will be discussed.   
 
4.2 Chapter Introduction 
Decisions for a complex problem are often related to plurality of points of views 
from different stakeholders [102, p. xxi] arising from the multiple competing 
criteria imposed by the problem. Without a properly structured analysis, the 
decision makers are often misguided into decisions that are debatable in their 
logic. It is vital that the problem be structured into logical components, often 
decomposed into their fundamental criteria before a thorough analysis is 
performed. Such method resides within Operational Research (sometimes known 
as Operational Analysis), where military commanders have been using 
operational decision tools to aid staff planning, war gaming and logistic relief 
since World War II [103]. Since then it has been widely acknowledged that 
sciences are often inadequate in providing quantifiable relationships between 
many causes and effects, and expert judgement is required to objectify a 
subjective problem [104]. 
Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is one of the most established modelling 
tools for studying such multifaceted problems [105]. Belton and Stewart 
described MCDA as “a collection of various approaches that seek to take explicit 
account of multiple criteria in helping individual or groups explore decisions that 
matter” [106, p. 343]. However, it is noted that these methods and tools are often 
not available in a readily off the shelf form that can be easily adopted for 
supporting decision making, especially for complex and multi-dimensional 
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problems. Therefore, components of such techniques are adopted and modified 
by analysts to derive a decision support system for the specific problem [107].  
There are four basic steps in most MCDA models. First, a hierarchy system or 
value tree is constructed. The tree systemically breaks down the goal into the 
various criteria and sub criteria, down to the elemental criteria, showing the inter 
relationship and dependency to the goal. Next, the relative importance of each 
criterion is determined via prescribed methods. The accuracy of the decision 
model is heavily reliant on the different methods used in constructing these 
criteria’s scales and weightages. Concurrently, the options are scored against the 
criterion via a subjective or objective scoring model. Lastly, the net score is 
derived via integration of the scores and weightages, summing up to the overall 
goal.  
In regard to this dissertation, the understanding of the current C, B and R 
detection capability performance gap can be modelled as a MCDA problem. The 
goal is defined as identification of the CBR detection capability ranking. The 
comparison of C, B and R sensing capabilities involves multiple conflicting criteria 
that require an extensive array of studies to derive a quantitative decision. As 
mentioned, there are several techniques to derive the decision, and each 
technique yields different complications that will be discussed in the preceding 
sections.  
Two of the better-recognised methods residing within MCDA are the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Simple Multi-Criterion Rating Technique (SMART). 
The following sections describe the two methods in detail and recommend the 
appropriate method to be used in this dissertation.  
4.2.1 Analytic Hierarchy Process 
The AHP is a MCDA method developed by Thomas Saaty [108]. Since then, AHP 
has been widely used in almost every industry to solve problems in an objective 
manner, such as management decisions [109], supplier selection [110] and 
strategy selections [111], amongst many others. The most visible advantage of 
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AHP is its ability to model a problem with multiple conflicting and subjective 
criteria in a simplistic manner to facilitate decision-making.  
AHP allows judgements on intangible qualitative criteria alongside tangible 
quantitative criteria [112]. The options are placed at the lowest hierarchy for 
comparison with respect to each of the common elemental criterion. The criteria 
are then compared to their importance with respect to their higher criteria (if 
applicable) until they converge at the single goal set. AHP acts on the cognitive 
behaviour of human, and utilises their subjective experience to derive the relative 
ratio of performance or importance of the options or criteria respectively.  
The steps of the AHP are generally consistent with many other methods within 
the MCDA. First, the hierarchy tree is generated, with the overall goal at the top 
of the hierarchy. This goal is then decomposed into several criteria that directly 
determine the success of the goal. These criteria, depending on the complexity, 
are then further decomposed until each criterion can be judged independently 
with respect to other criteria. These elemental criteria form the last layer of the 
hierarchy [113].  
The key to AHP is the usage of pairwise comparison matrix to derive relative 
weights (importance) for different criteria. Compared to methods that are based 
on absolute scales, the pairwise comparison method ensures that the decision 
maker is deliberately placed in a situation whereby he must compare every single 
criterion to one another, instead of generalising the comparison across the 
criteria. This way, he is exposed to a comprehensive breakdown of the 
comparisons between each criterion, reducing judgemental error and providing 
complete justification for the ranking results based on the comparison [114]. 
However, pairwise comparison stresses the cognitive nature of a human and as 
the number of criteria increases, the judgement of the pairwise comparison 
generally deteriorates. As such, the number of pairwise comparisons in each 
hierarchy is recommended to nine [115], but there are instances where 
researchers limit the criterion to six or less [116].  
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The mathematical formulae to derive the weightages for each matrix are 
deliberately left out in this paper, but they can be referred to in several textbooks 
and references [115] [117] [118].  
As a summary, each matrix is an m x m matrix, where m is the number of 
evaluation criteria matrix. Each entry ajk of the matrix A represents the importance 
of the jth criterion to the kth criterion. Saaty [119] [120] has suggested that the 
following ratio scale in Table 10 be used, where the relative importance is 
measured accordingly from 1 to 9, with 2, 4, 6 and 8 representing the intermediate 
of the intensities.  
Table 10: Fundamental scale of importance [121]. 
Intensity Definition Explanation 
1 Equal Importance Two activities contribute equally to the 
objective 
2 Weak or slight  
3 Moderate importance  Experience and judgement slightly 
favour one activity over another 
4 Moderate plus  
5 Strong importance Experience and judgement strongly 
favour one activity over another 
6 Strong plus  
7 Very strong or 
demonstrated 
importance 
An activity is favoured very strongly over 
another, its dominance demonstrated in 
practice 
8 Very, very strong  
9 Extreme importance The evidence favouring one activity 
over another is of the highest possible 
order of affirmation 
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Reciprocals of 
above 
If activity j has one of the 
above non-zero 
numbers assigned to it 
when compared with 
activity k , then j has the 
reciprocal value when 
compared with k 
A logical assumption 
Measurements 
from ratio 
scales 
 When it is desired to use such numbers 
in physical application. Optionally, often 
one estimates the ratios of such 
magnitudes by using judgement 
The following rules apply: 
1. ajj = 1 
2. ajk. akj = 1 
Various methods for calculating the criterion weights from the pairwise matrix 
were proposed. Saaty  recommended the eigenvector method [108], while others 
estimated the principal Eigen vector of the positive reciprocal matrix or 
computationally simpler methods using geometric mean of the rows of the priority 
matrix [122] and column normalisation method [123]20.  
The method to be chosen in this dissertation is that of the column normalisation 
method, whereby weightages are obtained by normalising each column in the 
matrix and computing the average across each row of the matrix. 
Because of the cognitive nature of such comparisons, there is a need to quantity 
the inconsistency of the comparison results.  Saaty [115] defined a measure of 
inconsistency as shown in the equation below: 
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Prof. Poh 
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Equation 1: Measure of Inconsistency 
C. I. =
I − 	
N − 1
 
 
 
Where  
- C.I. = Consistency index 
- Imax= Eigen value 
- N = Dimension of the matrix 
 
A consistency ratio (C.R.) is calculated as the ratio of the C.I. to a Random Indices 
(R.I.). As shown in Table 11, the RI is related to the dimension of the matrix. A 
consistency ratio is less than 0.1 (10%) is acceptable as a consistent judgement. 
If the C.R. value is above 0.1, the decision maker is then required to relook into 
the judgments to ensure a consistent result.  
Table 11: Values of the Random Indices [115, p. 171]. 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
R.I. 0 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 
 
4.2.2 SMARTS 
As mentioned, the principles of MCDA can be implemented in several ways. 
SMART (Simple Multi-Criterion Rating Technique) is arguably the simplest form 
of them [124] [125]. SMART was introduced by W. Edwards [126] as a method to 
assess weights for each of the criteria in reflection of the relative importance to 
the decision. The weight assessment is often performed on a linear scale, with 
the criteria perceived as least important assigned with a crucial importance of 10. 
The next least perceived importance criterion is then assigned a number 
reflecting the ratio of relative importance to the least important criteria. This 
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process is then iterated until all criteria are assessed. The last step involves 
normalising to sum the weights to 1.  
Edwards and Barron [127] modified SMART to include the swing weight methods 
(SMARTS) in an attempt to fine-tune the criteria weightage assessment.  
The SMARTS method [126] implements steps that are similar to AHP. Firstly, the 
goals and stakeholders are defined. Next, the criteria and sub criteria are 
evaluated and placed in a hierarchy. While AHP utilises pairwise comparison 
matrix to derive the relative weightages of each elemental criterion to their parent 
criteria, the weights are derived via swing method [128], which garners responses 
from the decision makers from a different facet. Firstly, two benchmarks are set 
for each criterion; one representing a “best” or target value that the criterion 
should attain, and the other represents the “worst” or current value of the criterion. 
The decision maker is then tasked with ranking the criteria in terms of the desire 
to swing them from the worst to the best value. The criterion with the highest 
desire to swing would be given the highest score of 1(or any arbitrary number). 
The desire to swing for the rest of the criteria is then assessed, and rated relative 
to the first criterion. There may be instances where the score of a criterion is 0, 
indicating that there is no desire to swing as the criterion is currently performing 
at the target value. 
The output of this sub exercise is a weightage of the perceived importance for 
each criterion with respect to their parent criteria.  
4.2.3 Differences in the AHP and SMARTS 
Based on the descriptions above, it is apparent that the major differences 
between the two methods are the weight allocation in the criteria and the 
performance ranking in the options against the criteria.  
It is extensively cited that both methods yield their advantages and disadvantages 
[129, 130, 131], and the method chosen is heavily dependent on the 
circumstances. The pairwise comparison method is a heavily structured method 
that follows strong mathematical rationale to derive the weightages. It is useful in 
hierarchies where there are several layers of criteria before the elemental criteria 
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are reached. AHP thus provides the formal structure to ensure that every decision 
node is documented towards the selection of a particular option. Although this 
inevitably creates more mathematical steps than required to establish the 
weightages, by defining the compulsory steps it forces the decision maker to infer 
and analyse each decision node, including redundancy to ensure consistency. 
This leaves less room for subjectivity compared to the SMARTS method. 
However, AHP poses a risk of rank reversal, as described in numerous literatures 
[114, p. 396, 132].  With the addition of a new option or criterion, the ranking may 
be reversed for the options, impacting decisions especially when the options are 
similar. The need for consistency also poses a cognitive problem. While the 
inconsistency ratio highlights the logical rationale behind the subjective 
judgement, it introduces the potential for a circulative problem [133]. This problem 
relates to the famous rock-paper-scissor game, whereby there is no one absolute 
dominator in the game. Likewise, there may be a situation whereby option A 
favours over B, B favours over C, and yet C does not favour over A in a consistent 
fashion. If not within the tolerable range of the inconsistency ratio, this matrix will 
be flagged up for re-discussion. AHP has not catered sufficiently to such 
circulative scenarios. Lastly, there is a possibility that decision makers align their 
pairwise comparison toward the consistency ratio, at times by reverse-
engineering the problem to fit the answers within the tolerable range. Such 
practises allude to a consistent result within the AHP, yet an unrealistic fit to the 
selection of the options.  
While SMARTS do not face these problems, the simplicity of the framework often 
results in overlooking details amidst the complexity of the problem. By not 
introducing ‘redundant’ steps as in AHP, SMARTS leaves the logical judgement 
to the decision maker, and does not possess the means to prompt the user on 
any possible inconsistency. This problem, however, can potentially be resolved 
by active brainstorming, or by getting different stakeholders to challenge the 
collective answer in a holistic manner. In general, SMARTS has been found to be 
extremely robust for various applications [134]. 
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While AHP and SMARTS both pose different sets of pros and cons, the selection 
of the MCDA methodology is highly dependent on the relevancy of the method to 
this dissertation requirement. As iterated throughout this dissertation, the main 
objective is to compare the C, B and R detection capabilities in their respective 
environment. The success of such a comparison requires inputs from several 
facets, and thus with its successful implementation, it will require the involvement 
of several parties such as first responders, maintainers, purchasers, product 
analysts and technical researchers. The output of this comparison is the relative 
ranking of the C, B and R detection capabilities, and they are achieved by 
dissecting the goal into four different frames, each decomposed to two to four 
measurable criteria. This process is elaborated in the next section, but following 
the argument, a total of 12 elemental criteria are derived, and each elemental 
criterion is made as a subject of performance comparison for the three options 
(C, B and R detection capabilities). With the deployment of AHP, there will be 36 
(12 criteria x 3 options) similarly structured questions. The intent of such 
questionnaires is to bring clarity and consistency, but as the number of such 
questions increases beyond a cognitively acceptable limit [115], it brings about 
more confusion. Although the questions within the questionnaires are 
straightforward and simple, they pose undesirable cognitive challenges in 
providing the answers in a clear and concise manner. Comparatively, Brugha 
[135] analysed that questions set for swing methods in SMARTS are generally 
more welcoming in comparison to that for pairwise comparisons. He had staged 
several interviews, and suggested that AHP’s 1 to 9 scale caused difficulties 
leading respondents to constantly reconsider some of their answers. Brugha’s 
findings resonates with the informal interview and pilot run performed with two 
experts21 in the CBR field, where the experts were presented with a draft 
questions to solicit opinions via pairwise comparison methods. Both experts 
faced cognitive challenges in answering the AHP questions objectively. This 
affirms that the true usefulness of the MCDA method resides in the procedural 
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 Both reside in Cranfield as permanent staff. Pilot discussion held anonymous.  
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aspect, where ease of understanding is the key to a successful decision analysis 
involving discussion from different facets [136].  
With the apparent advantages of the SMARTS method, it is proposed that this 
method be employed for the C, B and R detection comparison. However, as will 
be discussed in Chapter 6, AHP will be employed in the selection of the C, B and 
R representative. 
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5 METHODOLOGY DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Chapter Summary and Introduction 
This chapter details the prescribed methodology in a chronological manner. It 
forms the skeleton of this dissertation, and the subsequent comparisons are built 
around the foundation. The subsections detail the procedures of the proposed 
methodology in a chronological fashion, providing an important outline to the 
entire methodology.  
 
5.2 Step 1: Defining the Scenario 
As articulated in Chapter 3, the detection architecture consists of detection 
mechanisms in various frames. In order to perform a holistic examination of the 
C, B and R detection capability, it is pivotal that essential frames of detection be 
analysed appropriately. While it is not feasible to perform an analysis to 
encompass every detection scenario and stage, the deliberate creation of a 
realistic scenario encapsulates the necessary detection phases and ensures that 
comparisons are performed on a similar platform to instil objectivity. The scenario 
creation is detailed in Chapter 7, but in summary, the scenario is set on the 
context of a covert urban dispersion of CBR agents during a high profile event. 
Such a scenario will encompass both detect-to-warn and detect-to-treat 
mechanisms. The first frame of the scenario discusses the CBR early warning 
capabilities and the second frame denotes the personnel security screening 
capabilities. This scenario assumes that the former two frames of the detection 
architecture fail to deny the perpetuator’s attempt. The third frame sets a platform 
to compare the CBR detection capabilities during an initial response, while the 
last frame discusses the CBR definitive identification capabilities.   
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5.3 Step 2: Defining the Selection of Agent 
The selection of a representative agent for each class (C, B and R) is detailed in 
Chapter 6. In summary, different agents within the same class respond differently 
to the detection system in place. It is impossible to compare the C, B and R 
detection capability taking into account the wide array of responses and effects 
expected from the different agents within the class. To set a constraint for 
meaningful comparison, a representative of chemical, biological and radiological 
agent is selected to participate in the comparison. This selection is done via AHP, 
and is based on several criteria that a perpetrator would consider before selecting 
an agent for attack. In summary, Table 12 shows the results of the AHP analysis 
performed in Chapter 6. 
Table 12: Summary of representative agents to be used in the comparison. 
Class Representative Agent 
Chemical  Sarin vapour / liquid aerosol 
Biological Bacillus anthracis aerosol 
Radiological Cobalt-60 particulate aerosol 
 
5.4 Step 3: Define the Key Performance Characteristics to be 
Examined 
The performance characteristics of each C, B and R detection system contributes 
to the success of the respective frame of detection. This performance can be 
measured in terms of various KPCs of the detection system. For instance, in 
frame 1, the response time of the detection system plays a crucial role in 
determining the success of the early warning capability as it directly impacts the 
time catered for contamination avoidance. On the other spectrum, sensitivity of 
the detection system in initial response capability determines the ability to detect 
the desired agents in minute concentrations, and thus is pivotal to the success of 
frame 3.  
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Some attributes of a detection system are more important than others in 
determining the success of the frame, and these KPCs must be explicitly captured 
in the hierarchy as decomposed elements of the individual frame. The KPCs that 
are not as influential are deliberately left out to simplify the comparison.  
On the other hand, all three C, B and R detection systems in a specific frame may 
have KPCs that have already met the ideal requirement. For instance, all three 
detection capabilities in the initial response frame are portable enough to be 
handheld (although there are some detectors that are slightly heavier). As such, 
all three C, B and R detection systems in the initial response frame will yield the 
same result when compared in terms of size and portability. In another instance, 
at the definitive identification stage it is also assumed that all the C, B and R 
identification systems possess the minimal requirement to distinctly differentiate 
the target agent from other interferences. As such, a comparison of this nature 
adds non-meaningful and unnecessary depth to the hierarchy.  
The selection of the KPC must also be stringent enough to sieve out 
complementary criteria with the aim of avoiding redundancy. For instance, a 
selective detector senses specific agents, but due to the selectivity, the detector 
may also face higher false alarms. As such, since false alarm is a consequence 
of selectivity, the two KPCs are complementary, and by including both of them in 
the comparison, problems of double counting may arise. Table 13 shows the lists 
of KPCs to be considered in the comparison. 
Table 13: KPCs selected for comparison. 
Frame KPCs to be considered for comparison 
Early Warning 
Capability 
Sensitivity, Selectivity, Response Time, Range 
Security 
Screening 
Capability 
Sensitivity, Selectivity, Response Time 
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Initial Response 
Capability 
Sensitivity, Selectivity, Response Time 
Definitive 
Identification 
Capability 
Sensitivity, Response Time 
 
5.5 Step 4: Defining the Hierarchy 
The value tree (Figure 7) allows for a visual decomposition of the problem. In this 
case, the goal of the analysis is the ranking of the current C, B and R detection 
capability. This goal is decomposed into the four distinct frames, all of which 
contribute to the successful detection in the overall C, B and R detection 
architecture. Each frame is then further decomposed into several critical KPCs 
that directly contribute to the success of the detection in the particular frame. 
Lastly, the performances of the current C, B and R detection capabilities are 
measured with respect to each of the KPC. 
 
5.6 Step 5: Defining the Target Value for each KPC 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, the SMARTS method requires the benchmarking 
of each CBR option against a predetermined threshold relevant to the KPC that 
it is measured against. The thresholds for each individual KPC are set to mimic 
the ideal target state of the KPC for the successful detection. The derivations of 
these targets are detailed in Chapter 7, but are summarised in Table 14. 
 
5.7 Step 6: Defining the Current Performance for each Detection 
System in each Frame 
The current performances of the C, B and R detection capabilities are sourced 
through several technical brochures and market surveys. These are detailed in 
Chapter 3, and summarised in Table 15. 
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Figure 7: Hierarchy tree for the CBR detection capability ranking.
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Table 14: Target values of KPCs for different C, B and R environment in different frames, extracted from Chapter 7. 
KPC Target Performance Value of KPC 
 Chemical Biological Radiological 
Scenario 1: Early warning capability 
Sensitivity 15 mg/m2 5.7 x 106 ACPLA-m 9.23 x 108 ppl-m 
Selectivity To be able to detect all forms of chemical 
plume. Acceptable to some false alarm.  
To be able to detect all forms of biological 
plume. Acceptable to some false alarm. 
To be able to discriminate between 
radiological plume from other plumes. 
Acceptable to some false alarm. 
Response 
Time 
1 minute 1 minute 2 minute 
Range 4 km 4 km 5 km 
Scenario 2: Security screening 
Sensitivity 10 mg/m3 10,000 spores 0.2 mSv/hr (γ) 
Selectivity To be able to detect all forms of chemical 
threat, and discriminate from interferents. 
Acceptable to very low false alarm. 
To be able to detect all forms of biological 
threat, and discriminate from interferents. 
Acceptable to very low false alarm. 
To be able to pick up sources that emits 
gamma radiation. Acceptance to very low 
false alarm. 
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Response 
Time 
1 minute 1 minute 1 minute 
Scenario 3: Initial Response 
Sensitivity 0.0001 mg/ m3 400 spores/ m3 13 Bq/ m3 (α) 
13 Bq/ m3 (β) 
0.11 µSv/hr (γ) 
Selectivity To be able to detect all forms of chemical 
threat, and discriminate from interferents. 
Not acceptable to any false alarm. 
To be able to detect all forms of biological 
threat, and discriminate from interferents. Not 
acceptable to any false alarm. 
To be able to pick up sources that emits all 
alpha, beta and gamma radiation. Not 
acceptable to any false alarm. 
Response 
Time 
1 minute 1 minute 1 minute 
Scenario 4: Definitive Identification 
Sensitivity 0.00003 mg/m3 40 spores/m3 13 Bq/ m3 (α) 
13 Bq/ m3 (β) 
0.11 µSv/hr (γ) 
Response 
Time 
1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 
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Table 15: Current C, B and R detection system performance in the four frames, extracted from Chapter 3. 
KPC Current Performance Value 
 Chemical Biological Radiological 
Scenario 1: Early warning capability 
Sensitivity 150mg/m2 3,000 ACPLA-m 1,000 ppl-m 
Selectivity Able to detect most chemical warfare 
agent and select TICs. Frequent false 
alarm due to interferent absorption.  
Unable to distinct between biological threat 
and harmless biological pathogens, leading to 
high false alarm. 
Unable to distinct between radiological 
plume and non-radiological plume, leading 
to undesirably high false alarms. 
Response 
Time 
3 minute 20 seconds 21 minutes 25 minutes 
Range 3 km 3 km 5 km 
Scenario 2: Security screening 
Sensitivity No capability No capability 0.1mSv/hr (γ) 
Selectivity No capability No capability Able to pick up sources that emit gamma 
radiation. Very low false alarm 
Response 
Time 
No capability No capability Immediate 
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Scenario 3: Initial Response 
Sensitivity 0.03 mg/ m3 2.5 million spores/ m3 8.33 Bq/ m3 (α) 
1.53 Bq/ m3 (β) 
0.10 µSv/hr (γ) 
Selectivity Unable to identify all agents with one 
system. Unable to discriminate from 
interferents. High false alarm rates. 
Most systems unable to discriminate between 
biological threat and harmless biological 
agents, leading to high false alarms. 
To be able to pick up sources that emits all 
alpha, beta and gamma radiation. Not 
acceptable to any false alarm. 
Response 
Time 
5 minute 15 minute Immediate 
Scenario 4: Definitive Identification 
Sensitivity 0.00057 mg/m3 49 spores/m3 5.6 Bq/ m3 (α) 
5.6 Bq/ m3 (β) 
0.1 µSv/hr (γ) 
Response 
Time 
1.5 hour 1 hour 0.5 hour 
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5.8 Step 7: Performance Measurement  
For each individual KPC, the performance of the options are measured based on 
the swing weight method (Section 4.2.2). The decision maker is asked to consider 
the current case where all the options are performing at their current capability in 
a specific frame. The option with the highest perceived desire to ‘swing’ from the 
current capability to the target capability is identified with a rating of 1. The next 
option with the higher perceived desire to swing to the target capability is 
identified, and the rating is referenced to the first option. The last option is rated 
with reference to the first option. During this process, the option that has met the 
target capability performance has a rating of 0, indicating that there is no added 
desire to improve the specific detector for that KPC. The entire process of 
performance measuring is iterated across the hierarchy for all the elemental 
criteria (KPCs).  
As mentioned, KPCs such as sensitivity, response time and range are often 
specific to agents, and to attain such values, it is sensible to select agents that 
are representative of the class.  
The performance measurement is detailed in Section 8.2 to 8.5. 
 
5.9 Step 8: Deriving Weights of KPCs in each Frame 
Weights are allocated to each of the KPC within each frame to reflect the 
importance of the KPC to the frame. To determine the weight, the option with the 
highest perceived desire to swing from current to target capability for each KPC 
within a scenario is placed in comparison. Similar to the procedure described in 
the previous section, the options with the highest perceived desire to ‘swing’ from 
the current capability to the target capability is identified with a rating of ‘1’. The 
other representative options are then rated with referenced to the first option. The 
details are reported in Section 8.6. 
After this exercise, the remaining options are normalised with their representative 
option in their frame in this exercise. The comparison takes into consideration the 
 72 
importance of each KPC in contribution to the success of the specific scenario. 
The output of this exercise is a single performance score for the options, with the 
incorporation of the weight importance of the respective KPCs.  
 
5.10 Step 9: Deriving Weights of Frame towards the Success of 
Overall Detection Architecture 
The four frames stipulated are the first criteria that directly contribute to the 
success of the ranking. At this phase, the relative importance depicts the different 
reliance of the success of the ranking exercise on each of the scenarios. This 
weightage is determined by comparing the KPC that resides within the highest 
rated KPC of each scenario. Subsequently, the other criteria are normalised and 
referenced to the selected option within the scenario. This is detailed in Section 
8.7. 
 
5.11 Step 10: Summation of Weights 
This bottom-up approach adopts intensive use of the swing method to incorporate 
perceptions from different facets. The first set of comparisons explores the 
individual performances of the option in terms of their current capability, and the 
availability and consequences of their target agents. The next tier of comparison 
incorporates the need to consider the impact of each KPC to the scenario in the 
respective environments. The last set of comparison sums up by encapsulating 
the relative importance of the scenarios in the overall defence strategy.  
The resultant output of this suite of comparison is the direct summation of the 
scores for each option under the elemental KPC. The highest scored alterative 
reflects on the highest perceived need to improve to the ideal situation, and thus 
regarded as the worst capability of the three.   
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6 SELECTION OF A CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND 
RADIOLOGICAL AGENT 
 
6.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter summarises the selection of a specific chemical, biological and 
radiological agent via AHP. A total of three AHP models were presented to select 
the agents based on the relevant criteria. The output denotes the respective 
agents that are likely to be used in a chemical, biological or radiological attack. It 
must be noted that full validation from all facets require analysis of a much more 
massive scale, such as incorporation of a detail risk analysis from political 
intelligence, and breakdown of individual bio-chem-physical traits of each agent. 
Such a study is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The selected agents are 
used as representations for comparisons in subsequent chapters. 
For this comparison, the pairwise comparison is performed with the author’s 
inherent knowledge on the CBR agents and their properties. The author has been 
working in the CBR community for seven years under a government organisation, 
in charge of the engineering procurement and subsequent operation support of 
selected CBR equipment in his country. During his course of work, he has 
performed studies on CBR agent characteristics and technology outlook in 
anticipation for adversary attacks. He attended several courses, including the 
basic CBR commander training in his country, and the CBRN Defence Course 
conducted in Cranfield University. His knowledge about CBR agents has granted 
him adequate credibility to perform the pairwise analysis in the AHPs, and the 
views are purely the Author’s perception based on his knowledge and other 
literatures. While AHP provides the objective platform required, it accommodates 
subjective and judgemental evaluation based on the relative importance 
perceived by the decision maker. In order to instil more objectivity, the Author 
incorporates statistics into the pairwise comparison whenever possible. 
It is relevant to note that the author acknowledges the presence of several 
sources providing differing quantitative measurement values of the same criteria 
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(e.g, lethalithy of C, B and R agents). Different sources may or may not result in 
different perception towards the weightages, however, this is beyond the scope 
of the dissertation.  
 
6.2 Chapter Introduction 
Different agents have specific properties or functional groups that respond to the 
detectors. The response of each chemical, biological and radiological agent to 
the C, B and R detector respectively varies. With so many complexities and 
variables, it is impossible to compare chemical detection, biological detection and 
radiological detection in a generic manner. For instance, when comparing C vs B 
sensing capability in terms of sensitivity, it would be a challenge to put down a 
numeric figure for the detection capability as it ranges from 0.01mg/m3 (Nerve 
Agents) to 50 mg/m3 (Blood agents), or for biological agents, 3x105 spores of 
Bacillus anthracis to 6x106 colonies of Yersinia pestis. To avoid generalisation, 
the next best alternative is to select a chemical, biological and radiological agent 
that is representative of their class. This selection sets the constraints for the 
comparison, and limits comparisons to derive quantifiable comparison.  
The selection is based on AHP, where the outcome depicts a typical agent that 
has a good possibility of deployment by the perpetrators. Three AHPs are derived 
for the selection of agents from the three different classes, each selection having 
different criteria as considerations. Five agents from each class are selected 
based on the threat level perceived in several literatures. The five options are 
then placed in pairwise comparison with respect to each criterion, whose 
weightages are predetermined, also via pairwise comparison. The selected 
agents are used as representations for comparisons of the different detection 
capabilities in subsequent chapters. 
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6.3 Selection of the Chemical Agent 
6.3.1 The hierarchy 
The hierarchy consisting of the goal and elemental criteria is depicted in Figure 
8.  
 
Figure 8: Hierarchy for the selection of chemical agents. 
6.3.2 The criteria 
As seen from Figure 8, the criteria chosen are availability of the agents to the 
perpetrators, toxicity of the agents selected, resistance to antidote for the agents, 
and the rate of effects of the agents. The author perceived that availability is the 
most important criteria in the selection of the agent as the perpetrator would likely 
choose the agents that are easily available in large quantities. The toxicity of the 
agent selected also plays an important role if the main intent of the perpetrator is 
to deliver lasting emotional blow to the target, as the toxicity of CBR weapons are 
pivotal to ensure that the unrest in citizens are multiplied. The rest of the criteria 
are ranked in order perceived by the author, as seen in Table 16. As shown in 
Table 16, the upper diagonal shows judgement comparison of the row criterion 
with respect to the column criterion, i.e. Availability (row) is as important (rated 
as ‘1’) as toxicity (column); availability is 3 times as important as resistance to 
antidote (column); availability is 5 times as important as rate of action (column). 
The lower triangle matrix (shaded is grey) is the reciprocal of the upper triangle 
matrix. This method of organising the judgemental comparison is 
consistent throughout the AHP analysis in this dissertation.   
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Table 16: Pairwise comparison of elemental criteria in the selection of chemical 
agent. 
 
The weightages of the elemental criteria are estimated using the column 
normalisation method. The calculation for the derivation of weights in this matrix 
is detailed as an example. The subsequent calculations of the same nature 
are omitted in this dissertation.  
First, each column of the matrix is normalized as shown in Table 17. The 
weightage of each criterion is computed by averaging across each row of the 
matrix. 
Table 17: Normalised matrix for the elemental criteria in the selection of chemical 
agent. 
  
6.3.3 The options 
Three of the five options are listed in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapon 
Convention (CWC) [137]. One of the agent Sarin has been extensively published 
online since the Tokyo Subway Attack [138], and thus making it accessible to re-
invent the wheels. VX was chosen mainly due to its extreme toxicity amongst all 
the chemical agents. The third agent chosen is Sulphur Mustard (HD), a blister 
agent that has received similar attention in literatures due to its high toxicity, rapid 
rate of actions, stability in environment and wide publications on its usages in 
history [139].  
Phosgene is listed in Schedule 3 of the CWC, and considered to be less toxic 
compared to chemicals and precursors listed in Schedule 1 and 2. However, they 
Availabilty Lethality
Resistance to 
Antidote Rate of Action Weights
Availability 1 1 3 5 0.4225
Lethality 1 1 2 2 0.3089
Resistance to Antidote 1/3 1/2 1 2 0.1630
Rate of Action 1/5 1/2 1/2 1 0.1056
Availabilty Lethality
Resistance to 
Antidote
Rate of 
Action Weights
Availability 0.395 0.333 0.462 0.500 0.4225
Lethality 0.395 0.333 0.308 0.200 0.3089
Resistance to Antidote 0.132 0.167 0.154 0.200 0.1630
Rate of Action 0.079 0.167 0.077 0.100 0.1056
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are produced in large quantities and easily sourced in industries. Phosgene has 
an estimated annual production of 5 to 6 million tons [140], and it is produced in 
various industries, some with low security. A chemical of similar concern is 
Chlorine, whose annual production in 2006 is estimated to be 65 million tons 
[141]. Chlorine is easily manufactured on a laboratory scale by mixing 
concentrated hydrochloric acid with an oxidising agent such as potassium 
permanganate solution, leaving perpetrators with an option to reduce signatures 
of obtaining toxic industrial chemicals. 
6.3.4 Comparison of options with respect to availability 
Table 18 shows the pairwise comparison for the options with respect to the 
availability of the agents. VX and HD are perceived as equally (un)available as 
they and their precursors are listed in Schedule 1 of the CWC, and none of them 
are featured in any industrial application22. It is difficult to acquire them, and the 
only way is to steal them from highly secured national laboratories, or to 
synthesise them in their own laboratories, both of which are posed with 
abnormally high difficulties. Although Sarin is listed under Schedule 1 of the 
CWC, due to extensive effort poured into research during the Aum Shinrikyo 
attack on the Tokyo Subways, it may still be possible to retrieve information from 
online sources or through their own organisational networks. As a reference, it 
has been made possible23 by Aum Shrinrikyo cult to produce at least 70 tons of 
Sarin within 40 days in a fully setup plant with proper distillation columns and 
established laboratories [142]. Toxic industrial chemicals, on the other hand, are 
easily available and do not require great expertise to be adapted into chemical 
weapons. It is obvious that phosgene and chlorine is widely available due to their 
vast industrial applications, with chlorine’s availability edging over that of 
phosgene due to its higher annual production. 
                                            
22
 Although the said agents have no industrial application, the precursors (for example, 
thiodiglycol (for HD) and dimethyl methylphosphonate (for Sarin) have heavy industrial usages. 
However, as technical knowledge is required for the actual synthesis of the agent, and the 
availability of the precursors are one of many factors that determine the overall availability of the 
agent, and is thus not considered in the comparison.  
23
 Projected figure. 
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Table 18: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to availability.  
 
6.3.5 Comparison of options with respect to toxicity 
Table 19 shows the pairwise comparison for the options with respect to the 
toxicity of the agents. The comparison is made directly with their statistical value 
as derived from literatures, as shown in Table 20.  
Table 19: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to toxicity.  
 
Table 20: Toxicity of options in terms of LCT50 (mg-min/m3) [143, 144, 145]. 
Chemicals LCT50 (mg-min/m3) 
VX 100  
HD 1500 
Sarin 100 
Phosgene 3200 
Chlorine 6000 
The toxicology data shown in Table 20 depicts the typical LCT50 value of the 
options, and in general, the lesser the LCT50 value, the more toxic the chemical, 
and lesser amount is required to kill 50% of the population exposed. As seen from 
the table, VX and Sarin have the highest LCT50, and as expected, the toxic 
industrial chemicals in comparison to the chemical warfare agents, require a 
larger amount to intoxicate the exposed population. For instance, in comparing 
VX HD Sarin Phosgene Chlorine Weights
VX 1 1 1/4 1/5 1/8 0.0488
HD 1 1 1/4 1/4 1/9 0.0493
Sarin 4 4 1 1/3 1/5 0.1418
Phosgene 5 4 3 1 1/3 0.2374
Chlorine 8 9 5 3 1 0.5227
VX HD Sarin Phosgene Chlorine Weights
VX 1.00 15.00 1.00 32.00 60.00 0.4729
HD 0.07 1.00 0.07 2.13 4.00 0.0315
Sarin 1.00 15.00 1.00 32.00 60.00 0.4729
Phosgene 0.03 0.47 0.03 1.00 1.88 0.0148
Chlorine 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.53 1.00 0.0079
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the toxicity of VX (LCT50 = 100 mg-min.m3) vs HD (LCT50 = 1500 mg=min/m3), 
VX is 15 times (1500/100) as toxic as HD, while VX is “as toxic” as Sarin (it takes 
the same amount of VX and HD to kill 50% of the exposed population). 
6.3.6 Comparison of options with respect to resistance to antidote 
While the chemicals listed in this section all proved to be harmful, antidotes have 
been developed to counter the effects that these agents created in our biological 
systems. For instance, nerve agents inhibit the active site of acetylcholinesterase 
(AChE), a key enzyme breaks down acetylcholine, responsible for controlling 
several functions within the nerve systems. Without the control, acetylcholine 
floods and overstimulates the nerve systems. Atropine and pralidoxime focuses 
on blocking the acetylcholine receptors to alleviate further damages [146].  
However, not all agents have specific treatment measures, and many rely on 
symptomatic treatment that eases the symptoms without addressing the basic 
cause of the disease. Sulphur mustard poisoning consists of decontamination 
and symptomatic treatment that includes life support and blood transfusion. Such 
treatment emphasises on superficial relief of the victim’s pain and most often do 
not assist in countering the true effect caused by the agent.  
Treatment of victims and saving lives remain the most critical aspect of CBR 
countermeasures. [147] On the other extreme, the ability and resource required 
for treatment is an aspect that perpetrators will consider whilst selecting a suitable 
agent for dissemination. An agent poisoning with high treatability utilising low 
resources are deemed to exert less damage compared to another on the other 
end of the scale. Table 21 shows the pairwise comparison for the options in terms 
of antidote availability. As articulated, VX and Sarin have specific treatment and 
thus ranked lower over HD, phosgene and chlorine. HD on the other hand faces 
higher fatality rates when exposed to the LCT50 concentration, compared to 
phosgene and chlorine. 
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Table 21: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to antidote availability.  
 
6.3.7 Comparison of options with respect to rate of action 
Table 22 shows the pairwise comparison of the options with respect to the rate 
of actions of the agents. This comparison is reference directly to Table 23, which 
depicts the time to onset of symptoms of the agents. 
Table 22: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to rate of action. 
 
Table 23: Rate of actions for selected agents [148, 149, 150, 151]. 
Chemical Rate of Action 
VX Very rapid, ~15 minutes 
HD Delayed, dependant on concentration24 
Sarin Very rapid, ~ 15minutes 
Phosgene Delayed, dependant on concentration25 
Chlorine Rapid for high concentration 
 
                                            
24
 Under field conditions (without protection), symptoms only developed gradually after a few 
hours, and it also depends on the mode of exposure [151].  
25
 Low dosages can damage the lungs in 24 – 48 hours. 
VX HD Sarin Phosgene Chlorine Weights
VX 1 1/7 1 1/2 1/2 0.0753
HD 7 1 7 4 4 0.5560
Sarin 1 1/7 1 1/2 1/2 0.0753
Phosgene 2 1/4 2 1 1 0.1467
Chlorine 2 1/4 2 1 1 0.1467
VX HD Sarin Phosgene Chlorine Weights
VX 1 3 1/3 7 3 0.2590
HD 1/3 1 1/5 1 1/3 0.0680
Sarin 3 5 1 7 5 0.4854
Phosgene 1/7 1 1/7 1 1/3 0.0540
Chlorine 1/3 3 1/5 3 1 0.1336
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6.3.8 Selection of the chemical agent – Results  
The output of the pairwise comparisons denotes the weightages of the options 
when weighed against the criterion. The weightages are then compiled in a matrix 
as shown in Table 24. The agent with the highest score after the matrix 
multiplication between Table 24 and Table 16 is the agent that is perceived to be 
representative of the chemical domain, and will be used in subsequent chemical 
sensing capability comparisons.  
Table 24: Matrix of options vs elemental criteria to derive quantitative score.  
 
Sarin is the most likely chemical threat perceived as a result of the comparison 
exercise. Sarin, although not as easily available as the usual toxic industrial 
chemicals, has detailed recipes that could be referenced from several online 
publications [152] and even from perpetrators organisations that have perform 
detailed studies on its production. Although Chlorine is ranked closely to Sarin in 
terms of the threat possibility, there are payload issues when mounted on 
lightweight drones (Section 7.5) that complicate the logistical burden of the attack. 
The properties of Sarin are tabulated in Table 25. 
Table 25: Properties of Sarin [143, 144, 145] [148, 149, 150]. 
Properties Description 
Common Name Sarin 
Chemical Formula (CH3)2CHO]CH3P(O)F 
Military Classification Nerve Agents 
Form in which the agent is likely to be 
disseminated 
Vapour, Aerosol or spray 
X
Availabilty Lethality
Resistance to 
Antidote Rate of Action Total Weight
VX 0.0488 0.4729 0.0753 0.2590 0.2064 Availability 0.4225
HD 0.0493 0.0315 0.5560 0.0680 0.1284 Lethality 0.3089
Sarin 0.1418 0.4729 0.0753 0.4854 0.2696 X Resistance to Antidote 0.1630
Phosgene 0.2374 0.0148 0.1467 0.0540 0.1345 Rate of Action 0.1056
Chlorine 0.5227 0.0079 0.1467 0.1336 0.2613
Score
VX 0.2064
HD 0.1284
= Sarin 0.2696
Phosgene 0.1345
Chlorine 0.2613
Matrix of Options Matrix of Elemental Criteria
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Boiling Point 158 Deg C 
Melting Point -56 Deg C 
Physical State at room temperature and 
pressure 
Liquid 
Vapour Pressure 2.10 mm Hg at 20 Deg C 
Solubility Soluble in all organic solvents, but 
immiscible in water. Rapid uptake through 
skin. 
LCT50  100 mg-min/m3 
ICT5026 75 mg-min/m3 
Rate of effect Usually very rapid, within 15 minutes 
 
6.4 Selection of the Biological Agent 
6.4.1 The Hierarchy 
The hierarchy consisting of the goal and elemental criteria is depicted in Figure 
9.  
 
Figure 9: Hierarchy for the selection of biological agents. 
                                            
26
 Dosage required to incapacitate 50% of the exposed population. 
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6.4.2 The criteria 
The criteria chosen are the potential for P2P (person to person) transmissibility, 
toxicity of the agents selected, availability of the agents to the perpetrators, 
difficulty of weaponisation of the agent, and the antidote availability. Similar to 
chemical agent selection, the availability of the biological agent is perceived to be 
of upmost importance. This is followed by P2P transmissibility over toxicity of the 
biological agent, as a transmissible disease will strain more technical, financial 
and human resources in the clean-up of the situation27, and warrant more 
attention compared to a non-transmissible one. Weaponisation in this case refers 
to the ease of disseminating the biological aerosols as weapons, and is perceived 
to be as important as toxicity. Without a workable plan or device to execute the 
attack, an agent of highest toxicity would not have a chance to be released in the 
most efficient manner. On the other hand, an executable plan to release an agent 
with low toxicity would not cause considerable damage to achieve the intended 
outcome. While antidote availability is important as a consideration, it is placed 
as the least importance relatively as the fear and message that perpetrators 
wanted to convey could have been carried across with a harmful, transmissible 
and weaponisable biological weapon, even if antidotes are available to facilitate 
the recovery of the patients. Table 26 shows the pairwise comparison of the 
importance for the elemental criteria. 
Table 26: Pairwise comparison of elemental criteria. 
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 If a disease is contagious, additional human and financial resources must be deployed for 
patient isolation and quarantine. In addition, more emphasis must be placed in both social and 
medical health consequence management.  
P2P 
Transmittability Lethalithy Availability Weaponizability
Antidote 
availability Weights
P2P Transmittability 1      2        1/3 2      5      0.2302
Lethalithy   1/2 1        1/5 1      3      0.1250
Availability 3      5      1      3      5      0.4610
Weaponizability   1/2 1        1/3 1      1      0.1113
Antidote availability   1/5   1/3   1/5 1      1      0.0725
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6.4.3 The options 
The five options  (Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis, 
Variola major and Marburg Virus) chosen for the selection are all Category A 
pathogens that poses the highest risk to US national security and public health 
(cited by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [153]).  
6.4.4 Comparison of options with respect to P2P transmissibility 
Table 27 shows the pairwise comparison for the options with respect to P2P 
transmissibility. Bacillus anthracis and Francisella tularaemia are not known to be 
transmissible from human to human, while Yersinia Pestis, smallpox and Marburg 
virus are most frequently transmitted from an infected person via direct deposition 
of large, infective airborne droplets of saliva onto the nasal or oral mucosal 
membrane during face to face contact. As such, transmissible diseases are given 
a score of 5, while the non-transmissible are given a score of 1. 
Table 27: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to P2P transmissibility. 
 
6.4.5 Comparison of options with respect to toxicity 
Table 29 shows the pairwise comparison for the options with respect to toxicity 
of the biological agents. The comparison is made with their statistical value as 
derived from literatures, as shown in Table 28. 
 
 
Bacillius 
anthracis Yersinia pestis
Francisella 
tularaemia Smallpox Marburg Virus Weights
Bacillius anthracis 1        1/5 1        1/5   1/5 0.0588
Yersinia pestis 5      1      5      1      1      0.2941
Francisella 
tularaemia 1        1/5 1        1/5   1/5 0.0588
Smallpox 5      1      5      1      1      0.2941
Marburg Virus 5      1      5      1      1      0.2941
 85 
Table 28: Toxicity of options in terms of ID5028 [21, 22, 154, 155]. 
Biological Agents ID50 (Spores/organisms) 
Bacillus anthracis 10,000 Spores 
Yersinia pestis 10 organisms 
Francisella tularaemia 10 organisms 
Smallpox virus 5 organisms 
Marburg virus 100 organisms 
While it distinctly shows that the number of spores required to achieve ID50 for 
Anthrax infection outweighs that for the rest, this value must only be taken at a 
superficial value. It is difficult to determine the exact number of spores required 
to cause an infection, let alone decipher the number required to cause 50% of 
the population to get infected. (ID50). The values depicted in Table 28 are 
estimations, and these estimations vary amongst the different literature. For 
example, it was mentioned by Simpson LL that the ID50 for Bacillus anthracis 
ranges from 8,000 to 25,000 [156], while another research claimed to measure it 
at over 60,000 [157]. In addition, the possibility of inhaling 10,000 spores, 
logically, would not be much lower compared to inhaling 10 organisms within 10 
minutes of exposure given the sheer physical size; inhaling 10,000 spores of 
Bacillus anthracis may be as possible as breathing in 10 organisms of other 
bacteria and virus. 
Table 29: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to toxicity.  
 
                                            
28
 Infectious dose. 
Bacillius 
anthracis Yersinia pestis
Francisella 
tularaemia Smallpox Marburg Virus Weights
Bacillius anthracis 1        1/3   1/3   1/5   1/3 0.0690
Yersinia pestis 3      1      1      1      1      0.2261
Francisella 
tularaemia 3      1      1      1      1      0.2261
Smallpox 5      1      1      1      1      0.2527
Marburg Virus 3      1      1      1      1      0.2261
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6.4.6 Comparison of options with respect to availability 
Certain biological agents are more available to the perpetrators compared to 
others. For instance, Bacillus anthracis strains are found in abundance in soil and 
all sorts of domestic animals. They could also be cultured from a single spore, 
retrieved from infected patients or animals, or even contaminated soil. In addition, 
there are over 1,200 strains of Bacillus anthracis collected in the world [158]. 
Comparing to the other bacteria, Bacillus anthracis can be considered available 
to the perpetrators, and this is even more apparent when compared to Smallpox 
and Marburg virus. There is only one strain of Marburg virus occurring naturally 
[159], while smallpox was considered eradicated in 1980 [160]. Table 30 shows 
the pairwise comparison for the options with respect to the availability. 
Table 30: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to availability. 
 
6.4.7 Comparison of options with respect to weaponisability 
Table 31 shows the pairwise comparison of the options with respect to their 
weaponisability. Apart from the ability to retrieve and grow the cultures of 
biological agents, the ease of weaponisability is paramount to the success of the 
attack. The effective delivery of a biological agent poses more problem than its 
production by a perpetrators group, as it requires detailed formulation of the 
delivery systems and the optimal amount of agent to casualty ratio over the target 
area, all of which needs killed personnel and sophisticated equipment. The 
mechanical stress in optimising the aerosol sizes must be carefully managed to 
maintain the required efficiency of the agents. This knowledge required in 
effective delivery can be acquired by experience, or lessons learnt from the past. 
For instance, Bacillus anthracis and smallpox have been documented as 
weapons used in the past, and relevant information may be available as a guide 
for the perpetrators. In this aspect, Bacillus anthracis scores the highest due to 
Bacillius 
anthracis Yersinia pestis
Francisella 
tularaemia Smallpox Marburg Virus Weights
Bacillius anthracis 1      3      3      5      5      0.4603
Yersinia pestis   1/3 1      1      1      5      0.1778
Francisella 
tularaemia   1/3 1      1      1      5      0.1778
Smallpox   1/5 1      1      1      1      0.1179
Marburg Virus   1/5   1/5   1/5 1      1      0.0662
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its recent (2001) anthrax letter attack. While Francisella tularaemia and Marburg 
virus has been studied [161], there were only claims of stockpiling, but it was 
never used in any form of attacks, limiting the perpetrators from gaining any 
additional information. 
Table 31: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to weaponisability.  
 
6.4.8 Comparison of options with respect to antidote availability 
Similar to chemical agents, not all biological agents have antidotes. Agents that 
offer no forms of recovery therapies are preferred by the perpetrators in the 
overall scheme of the attack. Although Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis 
infections have specific antidotes, they are required to be administered early 
before the symptoms manifest. Till date, there is no specific antidote for Small 
pox and Marburg virus, and all treatments are symptomatic therapies, where the 
best that can be offered to the patient infected is supportive therapy plus 
antibiotics as indicated for treatment of occasional secondary bacterial infections 
[162]. Table 32 shows the pairwise comparison for options with respect to 
antidote availability. 
Table 32: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to antidote availability.  
 
6.4.9 Selection of the biological agent – Results  
The output of the pairwise comparisons denotes the weightages of the options 
when weighed against the criterion. The weightages are then compiled in a matrix 
as shown in Table 33. The agent with the highest score after the matrix 
Bacillius 
anthracis Yersinia pestis
Francisella 
tularaemia Smallpox Marburg Virus Weights
Bacillius anthracis 1      3      5      5      5      0.4837
Yersinia pestis   1/3 1      3      3      3      0.2305
Francisella 
tularaemia   1/5   1/3 1        1/2 1      0.0780
Smallpox   1/5   1/3 2      1        1/3 0.0898
Marburg Virus   1/5   1/3 1      3      1      0.1180
Bacillius 
anthracis Yersinia pestis
Francisella 
tularaemia Smallpox Marburg Virus Weights
Bacillius anthracis 1      3      5        1/3   1/3 0.1618
Yersinia pestis   1/3 1      3        1/5   1/5 0.0788
Francisella 
tularaemia   1/5   1/3 1        1/7   1/7 0.0400
Smallpox 3      5      7      1      1      0.3597
Marburg Virus 3      5      7      1      1      0.3597
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multiplication between Table 26 and Table 33 is the agent that is perceived to be 
representative of the biological class, and will be used in subsequent chemical 
sensing capability comparisons. 
Table 33: Matrix of options vs elemental criteria to derive quantitative score. 
 
Bacillus anthracis is the most likely biological threat, considering all the different 
performances with respect to each criterion, perceived as a result of the pairwise 
comparisons. Unlike smallpox or Tularaemia, anthrax is not contagious. 
However, it is easy to cultivate and easily available for production. As the 
bacterium exists as hardy spores during the production phases, it can withstand 
the mechanical stresses of the aerosolisation process, and such spores can 
remain viable for decades [163]. Table 34 shows a summary of the properties of 
Bacillus anthracis.  
Table 34: Properties of Bacillus anthracis [164, 165, 158, 161]. 
Properties Description 
Bacteria Bacillus anthracis 
Disease Anthrax 
Medium Domestic and wild animals, soil and human transmission. 
Form in which the 
agent is likely to be 
disseminated 
Aerosol 
X
P2P 
Transmittability Lethalithy Availability Weaponizability
Antidote 
availability Weights
Bacillius anthracis 0.0588 0.0690 0.4603 0.4837 0.1618
P2P 
Transmittability 0.2302
Yersinia pestis 0.2941 0.2261 0.1778 0.2305 0.0788 Lethalithy 0.1250
Francisella 
tularaemia 0.0588 0.2261 0.1778 0.0780 0.0400 X Availability 0.4610
Smallpox 0.2941 0.2527 0.1179 0.0898 0.3597 Weaponizability 0.1113
Marburg Virus 0.2941 0.2261 0.0662 0.1180 0.3597
Antidote 
availability 0.0725
Sum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Score
Bacillius 
anthracis 0.2999
= Yersinia pestis 0.2093
Francisella 
tularaemia 0.1354
Smallpox 0.1897
Marburg Virus 0.1657
Matrix of Elemental CriteriaMatrix of Options
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ID50 8,000 – 20,000 spores 
Incubation period 1 – 6 days 
Symptoms Fever, chest discomfort, shortness of breath, dizziness, cough, 
nausea, headache and fatigue.  
Diagnosis X-rays or CT scans to confirm mediastinal widening or pleural 
effusion. Blood sampling for bacteria.  
Treatment Anthrax can be treated with antibiotics such as ciprofloxacin 
and doxycycline. However, they are only effective before the 
onset of the symptoms.  
 
6.5 Selection of the Radiological Agent 
6.5.1 The hierarchy 
The hierarchy consisting of the goal and elemental criteria is depicted in Figure 
10.  
 
Figure 10: Hierarchy for the selection of radiological agents. 
6.5.2 The criteria 
The criteria chosen are availability of the agents to the perpetrators, the total 
source activity, aerosol dispersibility of the agents, toxicity of the agents, and 
treatment availability to remove the agents from the body. The success of a 
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radiological event to perpetrators is heavily dependent on the amount and type 
of radiation dosage received by the victim, which is in turn reflective of the type 
of radioactive isotope selected for the attack.  
It is important to relate the risk of each isotope to the total number of sources 
manufactured worldwide and their typical activity. This may be the first 
consideration that the perpetrators may undertake to eliminate the acquisition of 
certain isotopes. It is also crucial to couple these findings with the ease of 
obtaining the isotope from their manufacture or typical industries, as some 
facilities have inherently lower security measures compared to others, based on 
their applications. The author perceived these two factors as equally important 
criteria that would be examined at the initial planning stages, especially since 
stealing and buying off the black market are the only two plausible methods of 
obtaining the raw material for a radiological attack. These considerations take 
precedence over the consideration of converting the raw material into 
dispensable aerosols29 in the production process. Consistent with biological 
events, the author perceived that the importance of toxicity is not as apparent as 
the production considerations, and perpetrators would most likely lay their hands 
on easily available sources, as long as it emits enough radiation to initiate a 
pandemic response by the authority. The availability of antidotes to excrete the 
isotopes from the body is perceived as the least important in the selection of a 
suitable radioactive agent. Table 35 shows the pairwise comparison of the 
importance for the elemental criteria. 
Table 35: Pairwise comparison of elemental criteria.   
 
                                            
29
 To be consistent with the scenario, it is assumed that the intent of the attack will be via inhalation 
of aerosolised radioisotope. Although the radioisotope can also be released as a single point 
source, the external irradiation is never as deadly and effective as the internal contamination of 
tissues and organs in the body via inhalation.   
Availability Total Sources
Aerosol 
Dispersability Lethalithy
Antidote 
Availability Weights
Availability 1 1 3 4 5 0.3639
Total sources 1 1 1 4 5 0.2933
Aersol Dispersability 1/3 1 1 3 3 0.2034
Lethality 1/4 1/4 1/3 1 1 0.0729
Antidote availability 1/5 1/5 1/3 1 1 0.0665
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6.5.3 The options 
The five options chosen for the selection are Co-60, Cs-137, Ir-192, Sr-90 and 
Am-241. These five isotopes are listed in a paper published by Monterey Institute 
of International Studies [166] as five of the seven top radioactive isotopes that 
poses the greatest security threat in US, and they have been further validated by 
IAEA [167], where these radioactive sources are listed in category 130 from a 
radiation safety perspective, posing the greatest risk and typically containing 
activities in excess of thousand curies worth of radioactivity. Table 36 shows the 
summary of the radioisotopes and their properties. 
Table 36: Summary of selected radiological agents [166] [168]. 
Radioisotope Decay 
Mode 
Half-life Typical 
Specific 
Activity [Ci/g] 
Physical 
form 
Major application 
Co-60 Gamma 5.27 years 150 Metal slugs Irradiators, 
Teletherapy 
Cs-137 Gamma 30.17 years 20 Pressed 
power 
Self-contained 
irradiators, 
Brachytherapy, 
Calibrators 
Ir-192 Beta 74 days 500 Metal Industrial 
radiography 
Sr-90 Beta 28.9 years 140 Metal oxide Radioisotope 
thermoelectric 
generator 
Am-241 Alpha 432.2 years 3.5 Metal oxide Well Logging 
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 Am-241 is listed under category 2, but as an alpha emitter, it causes more damage per activity 
due to its high penetrating ability.  
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6.5.4 Comparison of options with respect to availability 
Table 37 shows the pairwise comparison for the options with respect to agent 
availability. The availability of the radioactive sources can be traced to the type 
their industrial, scientific and public uses, and the security measures in place in 
each of the facilities that houses the radioisotopes. Co-60 is the most widely used 
as a teletherapy source, and while the security in hospitals housing such 
radioactive sources are relatively less stringent than other government facilities, 
planning is still required to gain access through various security doors to the 
theatre. Removing the radioactive source from the machine (Figure 11) may also 
not be an easy task, as it involves certain technical expertise to reach out to the 
required source. It is equally tedious to remove a Cs-137 source from a 
brachytherapy machine since such machines are normally not portable. Other 
sources of Cs-137 are found in industrial irradiators, which also houses layers of 
security before access to the main irradiator room. 
Table 37: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to agent availability.   
 
 
Figure 11: Illustration of a modern Co-60 telepathy machine [168]. 
Co-60 CS-137 Ir-192 Sr-90 Am-241 Weights
Co-60 1 1 1/3 7 5 0.2167
Cs-137 1 1 1/3 7 5 0.2167
Ir-192 3 3 1 9 7 0.4723
Sr-90 1/7 1/7 1/9 1 2 0.0504
Am-241 1/5 1/5 1/7 1/2 1 0.0439
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Ir-192, on the other hand, stands out in terms of availability and ease of obtaining 
due to its usage in portable industrial radiography. Ir-192 has been employed in 
several portable gamma radiographic examinations for inspection of castings, 
welded assemblies and other structures for internal defects [169]. It is extremely 
portable as this machine is used in replacement of bulky x-ray apparatus for the 
non-destructive testing. Figure 12 provides an idea of the size of a typical 
radiographic inspector that perpetrators could easily obtain. 
 
Figure 12: Illustration of a portable Ir-192 carrier used in gamma radiography of 
copper alloy castings [170]. 
One of the most abundant uses of Sr-90 is in Radioisotope Thermoelectric 
generator (RTG) as a power generator for lighthouses along the coast of Russia 
[171]. Such RTG were often not guarded and there were several incidents of 
break-ins to steal the value metal shielding. Similarly, a perpetrators group could 
gain access to the RTG core, exposing the radioactive isotopes. However, the 
location is isolated, and it may be logistically taxing to retrieve the RTGs from the 
location, and furthermore, time and effort have to be spent to decipher the exact 
location of the source within the bulky RTG. Am-241 has been extensively 
employed in well-logging practises for elemental and neutron porosity analysis 
[172]. This is especially applicable for oil and gas industry in search of potential 
area with access to hydrocarbon. There is no reason to exert high levels of 
security for such industries because of its secluded location and often at times, 
offshore, limiting access to perpetrators to steal the loggers. 
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6.5.5 Comparison of options with respect to total source availability 
Table 38 shows the pairwise comparison for the options with respect to the total 
number of source available. The derivation of the estimated total number of 
sources is detailed in Table 39, and the pairwise judgement is performed by direct 
comparison of the derived total number of sources. For an example, Co-60 is 

 
as available as Cs-137. 
Table 38: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to total source 
availability. 
 
 
Table 39: Derivation for the estimated number of sources. 
Radioactive 
Sources 
Total Activity in 
U.S. Inventory 
(Ci)31 
Typical Activity 
(Ci)32 
Estimated number 
of sources33 
Co-60 198 x 106 24,000 8,250 
Cs-137 2.8 x 106 2,000 1,400 
Ir-192 146,922 100 1,469 
Sr-90 1.73 x 106 20,000 86 
Am-241 6482 20 324 
                                            
31
 Information retrieved from [211] 
32
 Information retrieved from [211] 
33
 Estimated number of sources = Total activity / Typical activity 
Co-60 CS-137 Ir-192 Sr-90 Am-241 Weights
Co-60 1 5.89 5.62 95.93 25.46 0.7156
Cs-137 0.17 1 0.95 16.28 4.32 0.1214
Ir-192 0.18 1.05 1 17.08 4.53 0.1274
Sr-90 0.01 0.06 0.06 1 0.27 0.0075
Am-241 0.04 0.23 0.22 3.77 1 0.0281
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6.5.6 Comparison of options with respect to aerosol dispersibility 
To be an effective inhalation threat, the raw material (radioisotope) must be 
grinded into minute metal particles of size 1 to 5 microns in order to be an effective 
inhalation threat. Cs-137 inherently exists as caesium chloride powder in its 
industrial application, and thus reducing the need for further complicated 
processing. The others either exists as metal oxide or solid metal and alloy forms, 
and sophisticated precision machines must be employed to process the minute 
amount of radioactive material obtained, to even smaller micron sized particles. 
In addition, the danger and thus additional protection resources required for 
processing gamma emitting radioisotope (Co-60, Cs-137 and Ir-90) is much 
higher compared to beta emitting isotope (Sr-90) and alpha emitting Am-241. 
Table 40 shows the pairwise comparison for the options with respect to aerosol 
dispersibility, taking into account the effort and protection requirement for the 
aerosolisation process. 
Table 40: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to aerosol dispersibility.  
 
6.5.7 Comparison of options with respect to toxicity 
Unlike chemical and biological agent, radioisotopes do not possess any unique 
ability to affect the human anatomy in different manners. Instead, all 
radioisotopes inflict injury by emitting radiation, and the hazard associated with 
each isotope is closely related to the amount and type of radiation that it emits. 
When inhaled or ingested, different type of radiation affects the biological tissues 
in different manners, with alpha radiation producing more severe effect than 
gamma or beta radiation, and this is represented by a quality factor to derive the 
equivalent dose. Ultimately, the equivalent dose that a victim receives will 
determine the health impact on the receiver. 
Co-60 CS-137 Ir-192 Sr-90 Am-241 Weights
Co-60 1 1/3 1 1/3 1/4 0.0834
Cs-137 3 1 3 1 3/4 0.2500
Ir-192 1 1/3 1 1/3 1/4 0.0833
Sr-90 3 1 3 1 3/4 0.2500
Am-241 4 1 1/3 4 1 1/3 1 0.3333
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In this comparison, the author examines the mass of each radioisotope required 
to achieve 4Sv, a dose that would cause 50% of the exposed population to die in 
60 days [173]. The concentration of isotope required is calculated from the 
following equation: 
Equation 2: Effective dosage of radiation received in the body 
E=Cair I ei T 
Where 
- E is the effective dosage received in the body [Sv] 
- Cair,i is the average air concentration of isotope I [Bq/m3] 
- I is the inhalation speed 
- ei is the committed effective dose coefficient34 of isotope I [Sv/Bq] 
- T is the time for plume passage  
The inhalation rate of an average adult with mild activity is assumed to be 
0.000033 m3/s, while the time for plume passage is assumed to be 10 minutes in 
an outdoor release scenario. The concentration in Bq/m3 can be easily converted 
to mass concentration (g/m3) by relating to the specific activity of the isotope 
(Table 41). This mass concentration corresponds to the mass of the specific 
isotope required to cause 50% of the population to die in 60 days, after exposure 
for 10 minutes. 
Table 41: Details of mass concentration of isotope in air to achieve LD50. 
Radioisotope Committed 
Effective Dose 
Coefficient 
(Sv/Bq) 
Air 
Concentration of 
isotope (Bq/m3) 
Typical 
Specific 
Activity (Ci/g) 
Mass 
concentration of 
isotope in air 
(mg/m3) 
Co-60 7.1 x 10 -9 2.85 x 1010 150 5.126 
Cs-137 6.7 x 10 -9 3.02 x 1010 20 40.746 
                                            
34
 Committed effective dose coefficients for inhalation intakes of radionuclides by workers are 
compiled in Annex A of ICRP Publication 119 [224] 
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Ir-192 2.2 x 10 -9 9.183 x 1013 500 4.963 
Sr-90 3 x 10 -8 0.673 x 1010 140 1.300 
Am-241 2.7 x 10 -5 0.748 x 107 3.5 0.0578 
 
Table 42 shows the pairwise comparison of the options with respect to the 
isotope’s toxicity, based on the calculations above. 
Table 42: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to toxicity.  
 
6.5.8 Comparison of options with respect to antidote availability 
The treatment to radiation poisoning lies in excreting the radioisotope from the 
body with chelating agents. Different chelating agents aim to bind to ingested 
radioactive material, thus effectively removing them from the body. While some 
of them are FDA approved, not all are FDA approved for the public. For instance, 
DTPA35 is FDA approved for the treatment of internal contamination of Co-60 and 
Am-241 for adults’ usage, and it is not yet approved for children [174, p. 1249]. 
Oral calcium and Prussian Blue tablets are FDA approved for all ages, in 
treatment against internal contamination of Sr-90 [175] and Cs-137 [176, p. 14] 
respectively. Table 43 shows the pairwise comparison for options with respect to 
antidote availability. 
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 Diethylenetriaminepentaacetate  
Co-60 CS-137 Ir-192 Sr-90 Am-241 Weights
Co-60 1 7.95 0.97 0.25 0.01 0.0106
Cs-137 0.13 1 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.0013
Ir-192 1.03 8.21 1 0.26 0.01 0.0109
Sr-90 3.94 31.34 3.82 1 0.04 0.0415
Am-241 88.84 706.17 86.02 22.53 1 0.9357
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Table 43: Pairwise comparison for options with respect to antidote availability. 
 
6.5.9 Selection of the radiological agent – Results  
As seen in Table 44, the weights of the options are consolidated to derive the 
summated score of each biological agent. Co-60 receives the highest score for 
the matrix multiplication between Table 35 and Table 44 and thus will be selected 
as the representative of the radiological domain.  
Table 44: Matrix of options vs elemental criteria to derive quantitative score. 
 
6.6 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter defines the need to select a chemical, biological and radiological 
agent from the respective classes as a representation for the class’s sensing 
capability demonstration, in terms of the elemental criteria for the sensing 
comparison. This step is crucial as it bounds an initially unconstrained problem 
of comparison with different performances within an option to the elemental 
criteria. AHP is selected over SMARTS for the comparison due to the availability 
of the literatures of agent properties, providing the decision maker with 
prerequisites on the comparisons. The agents selected as a representation are 
Sarin, Bacillus anthracis, and Co-60 for chemical, biological and radiological 
respectively. A meaningful evaluation can thus be analysed against the criteria 
identified to determine the current capability rankings of C, B and R detection.  
Co-60 CS-137 Ir-192 Sr-90 Am-241 Weights
Co-60 1 1/3 1 1/5 1 0.0988
Cs-137 3 1 3 1 3 0.3243
Ir-192 1 1/3 1 1/3 1 0.1081
Sr-90 5 1 3 1 3 0.3607
Am-241 1 1/3 1 1/3 1 0.1081
X
Availability Total Sources
Aerosol 
Dispersability Lethalithy
Antidote 
Availability Weights
Co-60 0.2167 0.7156 0.0834 0.0106 0.0988 Availability 0.3639
Cs-137 0.2167 0.1214 0.2500 0.0013 0.3243 Total sources 0.2933
Ir-192 0.4723 0.1274 0.0833 0.0109 0.1081 X Aersol Dispersability 0.2034
Sr-90 0.0504 0.0075 0.2500 0.0415 0.3607 Lethality 0.0729
Am-241 0.0439 0.0281 0.3333 0.9357 0.1081 Antidote availability 0.0665
Score
Co-60 0.3131
= Cs-137 0.1870
Ir-192 0.2342
Sr-90 0.0984
Am-241 0.1675
Matrix of Elemental CriteriaMatrix of Options
 99 
7 SCENARIO PLANNING AND ANALYSIS OF SCENARIO 
 
7.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter details the analysis and derivation of the target performance value 
for each KPC in the four frames of the stipulated scenario. In each frame, the 
KPCs of a detection system are analysed and rationalised to create an upper 
boundary for the scale of comparison, allowing the decision maker to effectively 
perform his interval rating. It is emphasised (refer to Section 5.4) that only the 
KPCs of the detection system that will bring about meaningful comparison will be 
discussed.  
The scenario stipulated sits within a tropical country (80% humidity) with relatively 
low wind (5m/s) wind conditions. It depicts a major sports event happening during 
sun set period (6pm) but sensors (early warning) and security screening 
checkpoints were fully deployed before the event. The actual release takes place 
at around sun-set, where the agent is delivered via drone-spraying. Additional 
pertinent information would be discussed at length in each section.    
 
7.2 Chapter Introduction 
Detection architecture spans across various stages of the overall counter-CBRN 
strategies. It is not feasible to perform an analysis to encompass every detection 
scenario and stage within the research period. The deliberate scoping of a 
realistic scenario encapsulates the necessary detection phases and ensures that 
comparisons are performed on a similar platform to instil objectivity. This scenario 
accommodates the four frames described in Chapter 3. The hypothetical scenario 
created in this dissertation facilitates comparison of the different KPCs of the 
detection systems. Although in most cases, scenarios planned may not mimic the 
future events in an exact manner, they are required to envisage plausible 
consequences as a result of numerous complex interactions among the 
unknowns [177, p. 4]. To ensure an effective and meaningful comparison, the 
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scenario must accommodate equal possibility of C, B and R incident occurrences 
without prejudices to any single domain. 
This scenario is set on the context that a high profile sports event will be staged 
in a tropical country. This is the first time the country is holding such an event, 
and several dignitaries will be attending, including visiting presidents and prime 
ministers. With the global media coverage, a group of perpetrators have noted 
this event as a potential medium to spread their propaganda, and they have 
decided to leverage on their expertise to convey the message.  
In lieu of the potential threat the country is facing, the government has tasked a 
team to provide a full spectrum of counter CBR terrorism plans to deny any threat 
that will jeopardise the event. Based on the Intel provided, there are equal 
chances of the perpetrators utilising C, B or R agents as the means of attack.  
The planned detection architecture consists of both detect-to-warn and detect-to-
treat mechanisms. The detect-to-warn systems include early warning and 
security screening capabilities, while the detect-to-treat system includes initial 
response capabilities and definitive identification capabilities as mentioned in 
Section 3.2. 
 
7.3 Analysis of Frame 1: Early Warning Capability 
As mentioned in Section 3.3, early warning exists as standoff and remote 
detection, and the standoff capability is often used in military or urban settings. In 
this scenario, CBR release intents must be discovered early through means of 
standoff warning capabilities for contamination avoidance. C, B and R standoff 
sensors are deployed on top of the stadium pointing at strategic directions where 
threats are most likely to be deployed. Figure 13 shows a schematic of the CBR 
early warning system deployed.  
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Figure 13: Schematic of possible deployment of early warning capability. 
The C, B and R standoff sensors are deployed in anticipation of C, B and R 
aerosols or vapours respectively. This mode of sensing tracks plumes of aerosols 
or vapours proceeding towards the target, within the line of sight of the sensor. 
This is to counter any possibility of remote detonation or covert actions that 
releases huge amount of contaminants brought with the wind towards the target. 
This scenario assumes equal chances of C, B or R releases.  
7.3.1 Sensitivity 
7.3.1.1 Sensitivity for chemical standoff sensor 
The sensitivity of a chemical sensor is defined by the product of the average 
concentration and the pathlength of the plume (unit mg/m2). The larger the total 
length of the plume within the line of sight, the smaller the average concentration 
required to be detected.  
To derive the required sensitivity of the chemical standoff sensor, there is a need 
to model the dispersion of the plume from the source. In this dissertation, the 
desired dose administered at the target is assumed to be at least LCT50, which 
causes 50% of the population to die upon receiving the dose. The LCT50 of Sarin 
is estimated to be 75mg-min/m3 [178, 179, 180], and with 10 minutes of 
estimated exposure time, the concentration to be delivered to the target is 
estimated to be 7.5mg/m3. An equation suggested by Hanna et al [181] 
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suggested that the worst case concentration downwind of a point source can be 
estimated by the following equation: 
Equation 3: Worst Case Downwind Concentration 
C =
10Q
UHW
 
 
Where  
- Cwc= Worst case concentration, taken to be 7.5mg/m3, based on LCT50 of Sarin 
for 10 minutes exposure. 
- Q = Source strength in kg/s 
- U = Wind speed, taken to be 5m/s 
- Wwc= Worst case cloud width, assumed to be 10% of the distance from the 
source, taken to be 2km 
- Hwc= Worst case cloud depth, taken to be 50m. 
 
Therefore, the calculated source strength is 0.375 kg of Sarin in 1 second. This 
is a feasible release, where perpetrators can easily acquire or produce a total 
mass of 5kg to be disseminated.  
With the source strength and the assumed minimum distance from the target 
being 2km, the estimated concentration (worst case) at 100m36 from the source 
is estimated at 150mg/m3 using Equation 3 (Wwc = 0.1 x 100m). In order to detect 
the cloud immediately upon release, the pathlength of the cloud within the line of 
sight is assumed to be 10m, and thus the sensitivity required is 15mg/m2.  
7.3.1.2 Sensitivity for biological standoff sensor 
As with the chemical agent release, the expected concentration of Bacillus 
anthracis is much less than the source release because of the dispersion of 
plume downwind towards the target. Taking this into account, a realistic target 
exposure dosage (a distance away from the source) should be 10,000 spores so 
                                            
36
 100 meters is chosen as a guide to understand the concentration of sarin near the source.  
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as to kill 50% of the exposed population (ID50) [182]. Alexandra et al [183] 
suggested that the concentration of the aerosol spores in the air can be derived 
from the following equation: 
Equation 4: Concentration of Aerosol Spores 
C =
− ln1 −   !50
D$%W&'(2
 
 
Where  
- C= Concentration in spores/m3 
- P = Probability of infection, taken to be 0.5 in this case (50% chance of infection) 
- ID50 = 10,000 spores of Bacillus anthracis 
- Dv= Fraction of viable organism, taken to be 0.2537 
- T = time of exposure, taken to be 10minutes 
- Wh= Respiration rate, assumed to be 0.014m3/min 
As such, the concentration of the spores in the air exposed to the target is 
estimated to be 286,000 spores/m3. Since each spore is estimated to be 10-12g 
[184], the concentration is 0.286 µg/m3. This is then modelled as a Gaussian 
distribution and by Equation 3, the source strength, and thus the ideal sensitivity 
of a biological standoff detector is 0.005714mg/m3. This is equivalent to 5.7 x 106 
ppl (particles per litre of air), and assuming 10% [185] ratio between ACPLA 
(Agents Containing Particles per Litre of Air) and ppl, the required sensitivity is 
5.7 x 105 ACPLA. Assuming an average concentration pathlength of 10m, the 
sensitivity required is 5.7 x 106 ACPLA-m.    
7.3.1.3 Sensitivity for radiological standoff sensor 
To date, there is no dedicated standoff sensor for radiological detection. As 
mentioned in Section 3.3.3, the early warning capability is taken to be in the form 
of a generic aerosol tracker using LIDAR. The derivation of the required sensitivity 
of the LIDAR is similar to that of the UV-LIF used in biological standoff detection. 
                                            
37
 Assuming that 25% of Bacillus anthracis spores released are less than 5µm is diameter [233, 
p. 84]. 
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To achieve a “LD50” effect, a total radiation dosage of 4Sv is required [173]. The 
inhalation concentration required to derive the required dosage is derived by the 
following equation:  
Equation 5: Inhalation Concentration of Aerosol 
C =
!*
%W&!+
 
 
Where 
- C = Concentration of radioactive isotope 
- Di= Inhaled dose, 4Sv in this case 
- T = Time of plume, taken as 10 minutes 
- Wh= Respiration rate, taken as 0.014m3/min 
- De= Committed Dose Equivalent, for Co-60, 7.1 x 10-9 Sv/Bq [186] 
 
The concentration of Co-60 aerosol required is derived in units of Bq/m3 from 
Equation 5, and with a specific activity of approximately 120 Ci/g [187, p. 7], the 
concentration of Co-60 aerosol required to be inhaled is calculated as 0.91mg/m3. 
From Equation 3, the required source strength is 0.046 kg/s. This is achieved by 
releasing 15g worth of radioactive Co-60 aerosols in 5 minutes. It can also be 
estimated from Equation 3, the approximate concentration of aerosol near (100m) 
the source (18.39 mg/m3). Assuming an average density of 2.2g/cm3 of Co-60 
[188], and a 10% purity [189] of Co-60 in a spherical aerosol particle, the 
concentration is derived to be 9.237 x 107 ppl. Assuming an average 
concentration pathlength of 10m, the sensitivity required is 9.3 x 108 ppl-m.    
7.3.2 Selectivity 
7.3.2.1 Chemical Selectivity 
As a detect-to-warn capability, an ideal chemical standoff detector must be able 
to detect plume from all chemical warfare agents and TICs, amongst the 
hundreds of gases present in the outdoor environment. Although a precise 
quantitative analysis of the agents is not required at this point, a semi-qualitative 
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display of the plume will guide the responder in making a crucial decision for 
contamination avoidance. Such decisions are often low regret decisions with less 
undesired consequences in the event of a false alarm. These false alarms are 
due to the problem of interference rejection from the overlap of target absorption 
spectrum with the interferent features. As these problems are already 
accommodated into the decision making process, it is thus not critical for the 
standoff sensor to achieve an extremely low false alarm rate. However, false 
negative alarms are severely detrimental to the mission success of the early 
warning capability, and will not be tolerated.  
7.3.2.2 Biological Selectivity 
An ideal biological early warning capability, similar to the chemical counterpart, 
is required to detect all possible biological agents in the presence of biological 
interferences in the air. In addition, it must be able to discriminate harmful and 
harmless particles of biological origins, while maintaining a decent level of false 
alarm rate.  
7.3.2.3 Radiological Selectivity 
A radiological early warning capability, on the other hand, is required to exhibit 
discrimination ability from radiological and non-radiological plume. There is no 
requirement to distinguish between alpha, beta or gamma emitting particles, as 
this piece of information does not aid in the decision making process at this point 
in time. In addition, the ideal sensor must have an acceptably low false alarm rate 
to instil confidence in the detection.  
7.3.3 Response time 
Response time is the essence of early warning capability. The aim of the early 
warning capability is to provide ample time for the decision makers in executing 
plans and orders to avoid the contamination to as much extent as possible. While 
all aspects of an ideal detector play an important role in this, deploying a detector 
with fast response time has a direct influence on the amount of time the decision 
maker has to impact the avoidance effort.  
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In general, the response time required from a standoff detector is dependent on 
the type of action required, and the time for the plume travel, as shown in the 
equation below.  
Equation 6: Relationship between Response Time, Plume Travel Time and 
Reaction Time. 
Response	time > Plume	travel	time + Reaction	time  
The plume travel time can be determined by the range of the sensors and the 
speed of the agent travel. The maximum distance that a C and B standoff detector 
can sense is assumed to be 3km, while that of a radiological standoff detector is 
assumed to be 5km due to the inherent properties of the detector. The wind speed 
on a typical evening is assumed to be 5m/s. The reaction time depends on the 
type of action that is required for successful contamination avoidance. As the 
actions are all of low regret and low burden actions, the required time for such 
actions is generally shorter, as shown in Table 45. These responses assume that 
the contamination to the spectators in the stadium can be avoided by shutting the 
retractable roof of the stadium. Aligning with the context of the specific scenario, 
detection of all C, B and R releases from afar results in the closure of the 
retractable roof, which is considered as a low regret and low logistical burden 
action in countering a system with high inherent false alarm. While the false alarm 
rate for C and B can be considered on the same magnitude, R standoff detector, 
due to its inability to discriminate the nature of the plume, requires an additional 
step to increase the confidence of the detection. Once the responders are alerted 
to a potential plume towards the target, the environmental agencies and fire 
departments are contacted for updates to the environmental condition to sieve off 
potential plumes due to fire or haze.  
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Table 45: Responses required following an alert from the standoff sensor. 
Actions Required C B R 
Alerting HQ 1 minute 1 minute 1minute 
Communication with other Agencies --  --  5 minutes 
Decision Making 1 minute 1 minute 1 minute 
Retraction of Roof 7 minutes 7 minutes 7 minutes 
Standby of CBRN Responder 3 minutes* 3 minutes* 3 minutes* 
Total Time Required 9 minutes 9 minutes 14 minutes 
*Could potentially be conducted in parallel to the retraction of roof, thus not included in the 
calculation of the total reaction time required.  
The ideal response time can be calculated from Equation 6 and defined as 
follows: 
Target response time for chemical early warning capability: 1 minute 
Target response time for biological early warning capability: 1 minute 
Target response time for radiological early warning capability: 2 minute 
7.3.4 Range 
The earlier the operators are alarmed, the more time can be set aside for remedial 
actions. The detectable range should ideally be as far as possible, so that it can 
detect the source at any distance from the target38.  In order to establish such a 
baseline, the C, B and R response time is assumed to be 5 minutes, which 
includes the scanning and target acquisition time. The required reaction time is 
referenced from Table 45. As referenced from Equation 6, the plume travel time 
and consequently the ideal range is defined as:  
                                            
38
 It must be noted that as the distance goes beyond a threshold, the marginal benefit of having 
such a range decreases because the possibility of attacks from extreme distances is low in an 
urban setting. 
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Target detectable range for chemical early warning capability: 4km 
Target detectable range for biological early warning capability: 4km 
Target detectable range for radiological early warning capability: 5km 
 
7.4 Analysis of Frame 2: CBR Personnel Security Screening 
The need for CBR detection capability has been under-emphasised in personnel 
security screening points. This is also evident in the aviation security. The UK 
aviation security screening approved equipment list provides evidence that 
screening methods are mostly geared towards trace explosive detection, and not 
focused on CBRN [190].  The process of human security screening for illicit CBR 
material is elaborated in Section 3.4.  
This section highlights the ideal requirements of a C, B and R human screening 
detector capability to be installed at such sites where a huge crowd is expected.  
7.4.1 Sensitivity 
In order to fully appreciate the required sensitivity of an ideal C, B or R human 
screening capability, there is a need to perform a risk analysis to understand and 
predict the intention of the perpetrators, which is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. However, in general, in order to produce widespread fear and attract 
the attention of mass media publicities, the act of violence must impact a 
substantially wide group of people, and even better if the harm continues to 
propagate and transmit when the spectators return back to their country of origin. 
As such, the expected amount of CBR agents to be brought across the security 
screen should be sufficient to kill at the minimum, a small group of people, or at 
least incapacitate them. There is no added incentive to carry any agents that do 
not deliver sufficient dosage to cause harm of significant concern. As such, 
detection devices at the security screening point are not required to detecting 
minute traces of agents, but should rather aim to provide detection against a 
substantial amount of deadly agents.  
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7.4.1.1 Chemical Sensitivity 
For a chemical screening device, the minimum anticipated amount of Sarin 
detected is assumed to be at least 10mg/m3, which is equivalent to a 50% chance 
of death in an exposure of 10 minutes. This is likely to come in a form of bottled 
liquid, likely to be disguised as drinking water.  
7.4.1.2 Biological Sensitivity 
The minimum amount of Bacillus anthracis required for a meaningful attack is 
10,000 spores (LD50), which merely amounts to micrograms of powder, easily 
disguisable as cosmetic powders or simply placed in areas out of sight for the X-
ray devices.  
7.4.1.3 Radiological Sensitivity 
Assuming an exposure time of 1 hour, radiological releases are expected to be a 
point source with an activity that could create an exposure of approximately 1Sv 
(onset of acute radiation symptoms). However, this radiation must be carefully 
shielded by inches of lead or other densely packed metal, so that the radiation is 
attenuated and minimised to prevent injuries to the attacker. Firstly, the 
radioisotope must be shielded to prevent injury to the attacker prior to the release. 
Logically, the shield must be thick enough to attenuate substantial amount of 
radiation from the source, yet realistic enough to pass the screening test. The half 
value thickness (HVL)39 of lead for Co-60 is 12mm [191]. To ensure a smooth 
and undisruptive passage across the checkpoint, a shield of 48mm on each side 
can be assumed to be the maximum thickness, beyond which would arouse 
suspicions. Working backwards, the emitted radiation would equate to 
62.5mSv/hr from the source. Assuming that the sensing unit of the detector is 
20cm away from the source, the attenuation due to air severely reduces the signal 
to approximately 0.2mSv/hr40. Therefore, this equates to the minimum sensitivity 
required of a radiological detector in this frame. 
                                            
39
 HVL refers to the thickness of shielding material required to reduce the radiation emission to 
half its original value.  
40
 Inverse square law. 
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7.4.2 Selectivity and false alarm rate 
With a detect-to-warn capability, an ideal screening capability must be able to 
pick up all possible kinds of C, B and R threats. This is difficult because of the 
exposure to a large number of possible interferents found in the bags of the 
spectators that may mask the identity of the agent. The screening capability must 
thus be able to sieve out all possible agents amongst the interferents, and provide 
accurate readouts. There may be legitimate reasons that a spectator may carry 
with them chemicals, biological and even radiological material41, and thus adding 
on to the difficulty of sieving out the illicit ones. While false negative reading is 
absolutely unforgivable, there is very little room for accommodation of false 
positive detection. The main aim of the human security screening capability is to 
deny possible threats from crossing the boundary, whilst not compromising on 
the throughput of the screening point. This is exceptionally paramount because 
a choke will unnecessarily cause the build-up of human traffic, which indirectly 
provides an additional platform for perpetrators to act.  
For ideal chemical screening capabilities, there is a need to encompass the entire 
suite of toxic industrial chemicals and chemical warfare agents at low false 
positive alarm rates, and zero false negative alarm rates. For biological 
capabilities, while the false alarm rates required are similar to that of the chemical 
capabilities, the spectrum of detection is narrower as the scope is limited by the 
availability of the biological agents to be misused. In a radiological scenario, being 
of the nature of the penetrating power and the subsequent harm to the public, a 
release that would cause substantial harm to the public would be that coming 
from a gamma source42. Thus, the radiological screening only needs to be 
selective towards particles emitting gamma radiation at low false alarms.  
                                            
41
 For instance, a person may have medical conditions that require radioactive tracer implants. 
Medicine containing methyl salicylate can also cause false alarms to the chemical detectors.   
42
 Alpha and Beta particles have low penetrating power, and could be stopped or attenuated easily 
through few centimetres of air. 
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7.4.3 Response time 
In order not to amplify the already existing problem of bottlenecking at security 
checkpoints, the response time of the CBR screening capabilities must be kept 
to a minimum. Realistically, based on currently technology, there is no means to 
achieve an instantaneous response (except for R). However, if such detection 
can function in parallel to the existing inspection of X-ray machines, it would not 
exert additional stress to the security threat. Such parallel inspections would 
increase the quality of the security check without increasing the time spent on the 
checks. A typical X-ray inspection can be assumed to be 1 minute, including a 
thorough full body inspection, X-ray scrutiny, and additional secondary human 
intervention at occasional incidents. As such, the target response time of the C, 
B or R screening capability is capped at 1 minute, provided it is incorporated into 
the existing inspection procedures.  
 
7.5 Analysis of Frame 3: Initial Response to CBR Incident Capability 
This scenario assumes that the first two frames are unable to detect any CBR 
agents, and the perpetrators attempt to disperse the C, B or R agent outside the 
stadium via drone technology (just one of many methods that can escape from 
the detect-to-warn architecture). This method of aerosol dispersion has been 
widely used in agriculture to survey crops, disease monitoring and irrigation. It 
has also been used extensively in both perpetrators and counter terrorist 
operations in Pakistan [192]. Although usage of drone technology has never 
surfaced in CBRN attacks, this is a robust method of dispersing the agents into 
security-tightened areas. The flight path could be pre-programmed via waypoint 
settings to avoid frequency jamming and the aerosols could be timed to be 
released at precise location. In furtherance, in 2014, the Pentagon responded to 
the threats by issuing a Request for Information (RFI) [193] to solicit 
countermeasures for drones armed with chemical or biological agents. 
The latency effects to the victims are dependent on the class of agent used. Upon 
a chemical attack, the effect is observed almost immediately, where the victims 
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experience pain and discomfort to their eyes and throat area, and in severe 
cases, the victims may collapse in signs of breathlessness or seizures43. In such 
an attack, anxiety affects the crowd, and soon turns the scene into chaos with 
abled victims running away in all directions. Upon a biological or radiological 
aerosol dispersion, generally the symptoms are delayed and the dispersion may 
go unnoticed for a brief moment. Suspicion will arise with the hovering of the 
drone around the release point. In both paths, the turmoil within the crowd starts 
to rise and police and first responders can be seen arriving at the scene to 
investigate.  
The detection response to such a scenario can be more challenging than one of 
a larger scale, as the relatively small and camouflaged attack brings about less 
signs and symptoms for initial confirmation of an attack. While the casualty rate 
may be lower, the response protocols are almost similar (but on a smaller scale), 
Alarms and alerts to the incident may arrive much slower, and by the time the 
responder reaches the scene, the agents may have already dispersed to a 
substantially low concentration for effective sampling and subsequent 
identification. While this brings good news, it also complicates the initial detection 
process, and the race against time to confirm the agent’s identity becomes an 
increasingly uphill task.  
At this initial stage of an incident, it must be noted that the main purpose of the 
detector is to provide confirmation of the nature of the attack. No quantitative data 
is required of the detector to make a decision on performing subsequent 
responses. The task force commander decides on the need for cordoning and 
medical triage based on whether the attack is of a chemical, biological, 
radiological or hoax nature. The classification of the agents can aid the 
commander in assessing the need for immediate hospitalisation and subsequent 
decontamination procedures. The magnitude of the release (if available) would 
allow the commander to assess the need for full evacuation. Without exact 
identification and quantification, the initial response force can still be fully 
                                            
43
 This is a generalisation of a typical chemical attack. However, dependant on the agent used, 
the latency and symptoms may vary.  
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deployed to introduce risk reduction strategies soon after the initial detection of 
the agents.  
7.5.1 Sensitivity 
An ideal C, B or R detector responding to such a situation should have extremely 
low sensitivity, so that it can pick up any residual traces of agents. This is crucial 
in many situations like the specific scenario depicted, where the concentration of 
non-persistent agents can get diluted severely in neutral or stable atmospheric 
stability conditions [194]. 
7.5.1.1 Chemical Sensitivity  
As inferred in the report published by DSTO [194], the initial estimation of the 
diluted concentration can be much less than 0.1 mg/m3. Therefore, to err on the 
side of caution, an ideal chemical detector should target to detect a minimum 
concentration equivalent to the short-term exposure limit (STEL)44 of 0.0001 
mg/m3 [195].  
7.5.1.2 Biological Sensitivity  
Such derivation of airborne exposure limits is rare for biological warfare agents, 
due to the apparent lack of scientific data on infectious doses [196]. However, 
Alexandra et al [183] has suggested that the STEL value of Bacillus anthracis can 
be derived from Equation 4, where the risk of infection (P) is assumed to be 0.001 
(0.1% risk of getting infected), viability of aerosol (Dv) to be 0.25, exposure time 
(t) 10 minutes and respiration rate (Wh) 0.014m3/min. As such, the derived STEL 
for Bacillus anthracis is estimated to be 400 spores/m3. 
7.5.1.3 Radiological Sensitivity  
In the case of radiological dispersion, it is most empirically challenging. Many 
subscribe to the Linear no Threshold (LNT) theory, whereby there are no safe 
limits of radiation, and any increase in radiation doses accumulated over long 
exposure to increase the stochastic risk of cancers. Others [197] dispute that 
                                            
44
 An airborne exposure limit designed to address short-term upward deviation in exposure. 
Typically, such exposure should not last longer than 15 minute, and not more than 4 times a day.  
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such a threshold exists based on experimental data. However, due to lack of 
validation, clinical practitioners and responders tend to rely on the former theory 
in minimising exposure.  
With LNT, any amount of radiation above background level is considered harmful. 
It is thus relevant to relate the sensitivity of the detector to the background 
radiation level for alpha, beta and gamma exposure. Figure 14 shows the annual 
radiation dose to the UK population. The main source of alpha and beta radiation 
in the atmosphere comes from the progenies of Radon, and can be averaged at 
an annual background intake of 1.3mSv, approximately 26 Bq/m3 [198, p. 18]. 
There are equal numbers of alpha and beta progenies, thus for both alpha and 
beta detectors, the ideal target sensitivity should be 13 Bq/m3. 
In 2014, the average background gamma radiation in UK is tabulated to be 0.11 
µSv/hr [199].  
 
Figure 14: Average annual dose to the UK population [198, p. 71]. 
7.5.2 Selectivity and False Alarm 
The motivation of the initial response is twofold: the confirmation of an attack and 
identifying the nature of the attack. In order to achieve these outcomes, the 
system must be able to accommodate the detection of all possible chemical 
agents, including warfare and industrial related agents. At this stage, it is not 
useful that the detector only targets specific agents, because of the vast 
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possibility of a wide range of chemicals being deployed. While the same concept 
applies to biological and radiological terrorism acts, it is more apparent for the 
chemical sector because of the wider spectrum of available dangerous chemical 
agents. However, ideally the false alarm rate for a chemical system is more 
tolerable than the biological one because of the rate of manifestation of 
symptoms. For instance, the symptoms of inhaled Sarin is felt within 15 minutes 
or less, and with the manifestation of the symptoms, the responders are able to 
predict the nature of the attack, which initiates first aid treatment, and buys time 
for more sophisticated detection. The false alarm rate of biological detection is 
intolerable because of the prolonged latency period of Bacillus anthracis, inferring 
a huge reliance on the detector for accurate results.  
In an airborne radiological contamination situation, there are possibilities of 
finding all alpha, beta and gamma emitting particles, unlike that of a security 
screening frame (Section 7.4.2). Although alpha particles possess low 
penetrating power and are assessed to be useless in a point source release, 
these particles are highly favourable for aerosol attacks due to their high 
ionization power, where they transfer a large amount of ionising energy to the 
surrounding tissues, damaging the DNA and other cellular material. As a result, 
there is thus a need for the ideal radiological detector to pick up all three forms of 
emitters. As with other radiological scenarios, there is not a big concern for false 
positive alarms due to the absence of interference after background calibration.   
7.5.3 Response time 
In order to provide the promptest response to the required victims, the response 
time of the C, B or R detection system must be close to immediate. This is 
especially true to chemical scenario, where the agents are relatively fast acting, 
and require immediate medical attention. For the case of biological and 
radiological dispersion, the confirmation of such an attack gives enough 
justification for the first responder to initiate cordoning and evacuation. Many 
literatures [200, 201] have suggested that the ideal response time of such a 
detect-to-treat C, B and R system is 1 minute, starting from the initial exposure of 
the system to the contamination of air.  
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7.6 Analysis of Frame 4: CBR Laboratory Confirmation Capabilities 
In order to provide a definitive confirmation of the agent released, samples are 
sent to the national laboratories for confirmative identification. In pursuit of a 
prompt and decisive answer, samples are usually collected onsite to be delivered 
directly to the accredited laboratory. Further tests are supplemented by body fluid 
samples from the suspected victims. It must be noted that samples collection, 
however, are not the main priority of the incident management, and performed 
only after primary life-saving missions are under control. High resolution of agent 
identification is required for the initiation of higher order treatment of victims, 
declaration of state of emergency and subsequent prosecution and recovery 
missions.  
7.6.1 Sensitivity 
In the scenario where covert attacks are performed, they are normally scaled 
down to affect a smaller population when compared to state-sponsored attacks. 
The sample collection task is made difficult with the unpredictable wind conditions 
and the chaos expected on the scene. Many literatures have suggested different 
priorities in a mass-casualty event [202, 203, 204], but none have mentioned 
sampling as one of them. It is thus inferred that collection of air samples or sample 
swipes only occur after the main task of crowd control and medical triage is 
performed. With time and unforgiving weather conditions, the concentration of the 
agents in the sample reduces drastically.  
Having a good sampling kit aids in preserving and concentrating the agents but 
such equipment may not be on site or in some cases, the samples collected 
cannot be concentrated. In order to maintain the competency of definitive 
identification with minimal concentration, the detector (identifier) will thus have to 
process at extremely low sensitivity.   
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7.6.1.1 Chemical Sensitivity 
For chemical confirmative identification, the system must have a sensitivity lower 
than that provided in the initial response capability. A representative sensitivity 
can be taken as the worker population limit (WPL)45 of 0.00003 mg/m3 for Sarin.  
7.6.1.2 Biological Sensitivity 
For biological confirmative identification system, the minimum sensitivity of 40 
spores/m3 is derived from Equation 4, where the risk of infection (P) is assumed 
to be 0.0001 (0.01% risk of getting infected), viability of aerosol (Dv) to be 0.25, 
exposure time (t) 10 minutes and respiration rate (Wh)) 0.014m3/min to be 40 
spores/m3, assuming a 0.01% risk of infection.  
7.6.1.3 Radiological Sensitivity 
As already mentioned, the background radiation should be taken as the 
benchmark for all alpha, beta and gamma radioactivity detection, and this applies 
to confirmative identification systems as well. The same set of ideal targets (as 
the initial response scenario for radiological attack) is applied. 
Sensitivity of Alpha particle identification system: 13 Bq/m3 
Sensitivity of Beta particle identification system: 13 Bq/m3 
Sensitivity of Gamma radiation identification system: 0.11 µSv/hr 
7.6.2 Response Time 
Although it is crucial for the results of the definitive identification is be delivered 
to the authority as quickly as possible, there is no widely discussed acceptable 
analysis time. The target for the response time of all C, B and R definitive 
identification system is set to be 1 hour, to allow post incident management to be 
carried out as smoothly as possible in a time-efficient manner.  
 
                                            
45
 It is defined by CDC as the airborne exposure limit designed to protect workers, expressed as 
a time-weighted average (TWA) for exposure over an 8 hour shift. The long hours reflect on the 
estimated time of exposure a general public may face outdoor.  
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7.7 Chapter Conclusion 
The chapter deliberates target setting of the KPCs in the frames within the 
scenario. The targets are chosen with a suite of rationale thinking and logics that 
frames the entire performance ratings to ensure effective comparisons. These 
target values of the KPCs are used as the upper boundary for the SMARTS 
comparison analysis in Chapter 8. 
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8 RESULT GENERATION 
 
8.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter analyses the performances of the options (C, B and R detection 
capabilities) with respect to each KPC (Tier 1 comparison), consequently deriving 
the weight importance of each KPC within a scenario (Tier 2 comparison), and 
ultimately, the importance of each scenario in the overall defence strategy (Tier 
3 comparison). This bottom up approach develops the analysis in a holistic 
manner. The operational analysis tool used in this analysis is the SMARTS 
method (Section 4.2.2) and is an intermediate between the demanding AHP 
process and the generic active brainstorming method.  
In this study, ‘1’ denotes the highest desire of a detection system to swing from 
the current performance (with respect to the specific KPC) to the target 
performance level, while ‘0’ denotes no desire to swing to the target level. It is 
important to emphasise that this section generates results based on the Author’s 
perception of the deviation of current performances (Chapter 3) from the target 
performances (Chapter 7) of the C, B and R detection capabilities.   
This analysis is performed with the author’s inherent knowledge on the CBR 
agents and their properties. The author has been working in the CBR community 
for seven years under a government organisation, in charge of the engineering 
procurement and subsequent operation support of selected CBR equipment in 
his country. During his course of work, he has performed studies on CBR agent 
characteristics and technology outlook in anticipation for adversary attacks. He 
attended several courses, including the basic CBR commander training in his 
country, and the CBRN Defence Course conducted in Cranfield University. His 
knowledge about CBR agents has granted him adequate credibility to perform 
the analysis, and the views are purely the Author’s perception based on his 
knowledge in the field, and other supporting literatures. 
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8.2 Tier 1: Comparison of Early Warning Capability 
8.2.1 Sensitivity 
Table 46 summarises the performance comparison of the options with respect to 
sensitivity requirement of the systems in the early warning capability. As seen, it 
is perceived that the current B and R performance surpass the performances of 
the target B and R detection capability in terms of sensitivity requirement. Both B 
and R standoff detectors currently have the capacity to detect lower concentration 
of aerosols than what is required, and as such, there is no immediate need to 
improve the biological and radiological system from a sensitivity aspect.  
For chemical early warning capability, it is evident that the sensitivity is at best 
approaching the target requirement. The minimum detectable concentration of an 
early warning capability system depends highly on wind speed, source 
concentration, source location, release rate, and weather conditions, many of 
which are not within the operator’s control. The lack of control implies a need to 
improve the sensitivity for a C detection system, in comparison with B and R 
detection systems.  
Table 46: Summary of performance comparison of options with respect to 
sensitivity of the systems in the early warning capability. 
Option Target Performance Current Performance Ranking 
C 15 mg/m2 150mg/m2 1 
B 5.7 x 106 ACPLA-m 3 x 103 ACPLA-m 0 
R 9.3 x 108 ACPLA-m 1 x 103 ppl-m 0 
 
8.2.2 Selectivity 
Table 47 summarises the performance comparison of the options with respect to 
selectivity requirement of the systems in the early warning capability. The highest 
level of desire for improvement is given to R early warning capability in this 
aspect. Firstly, the stipulated technology for R early warning capability is a 
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generic aerosol counter as elaborated in Section 3.3.3. With such a rudimentary 
system, R early warning system is perceived to have the highest deviation away 
from ideal because of its inability to even provide the basic level of discrimination 
between a radiological plume and non-radiological plume. Without this ability, the 
system alarms to any form of plume, increasing the false alarm possibility. This 
is highly unacceptable and thus has the highest desire to swing from current to 
target performance level. 
Comparing chemical and biological, the perceived desire to improve the B 
systems in terms of selectivity (and false alarm) requirements is higher compared 
to C systems due to several reasons. Firstly, the physical amount of Bacillus 
anthracis required is less46 compared to that of Sarin, implying that if an attack 
were to take place, the release of Bacillus anthracis would most likely be less 
compared to Sarin in terms of mass and physical size in order to achieve the 
same effect. This alludes to the postulation that the biological aerosol may have 
higher potential to be masked within the abundance of particulates in the 
atmosphere, leading to false negative readings in the detection system. In 
addition, there are more background biological47 interferences than chemical48 
ones, leading to a higher potential for false positive alarms.  The improvement for 
B systems is thus interpreted to be more critical to improve the selectivity 
requirements in an attempt to reduce or overcome the false alarm potential. In 
addition, improving the selectivity of B systems compared to C is of the higher 
calling because the implication and consequences of a non-ideal selectivity often 
leads to high false alarm, and false alarm towards a biological incident commands 
a much higher cost of recovery compared to chemical incident. It is valid to relate 
this argument to a higher need to reduce the false alarm rate of the B system, 
which in turns exemplifies the need to improve the selectivity of the system.   
                                            
46
 In terms of mass, not ACPLA. 
47
 In a report, Cheryl Et Al claimed the presence of close relative of B. anthracis in soil samples 
and urban aerosols in 14 of the US cities surveyed [287].  
48
 H. Lavoie Et Al performed experiments to conclude that obscurants in the background do not 
significantly affect the detection capability of a passive standoff detector because they lack the 
spectral signature typical of the specific gaseous target in the LWIR range [288]. 
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Table 47: Summary of performance comparison of options with respect to 
selectivity range of the systems in the early warning capability. 
Option Target Performance Current Performance Ranking 
C To be able to detect all 
forms of chemical plume. 
Acceptable to some false 
alarm. 
Unable to detect certain 
chemical agents. False 
alarm rates present. 
0.3 
B To be able to detect all 
forms of biological plume. 
Acceptable to some false 
alarm. 
Unable to discriminate 
between living biological 
and non-living biological 
plumes. High false alarm 
rates. 
0.7 
R To be able to discriminate 
between radiological plume 
from other plumes. 
Acceptable to some false 
alarm. 
Unable to discriminate 
between alpha, beta and 
gamma radiation plumes 
from other aerial 
particulates. Extremely high 
false alarm rates.  
1 
 
8.2.3 Range 
Table 48 summarises the performance comparison of the options with respect to 
range requirements of the systems in the early warning capability.  As seen, 
currently C and B standoff detection has a typical standoff distance of maximum 
3km, and this is 25% away from the target of 4km. There is thus an equal desire 
to swing from current to target performance level to ensure sufficient time catered 
for contamination avoidance actions. On the other end, the R standoff capability 
is able to meet the target performance requirement and thus no incentive to 
improve the capability in this aspect. 
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Table 48: Summary of performance comparison of options with respect to range 
requirements of the systems in the early warning capability. 
Option Target Performance Current Performance Ranking 
C 4 km 3 km 1 
B 4 km 3 km 1 
R 5 km 5 km 0 
 
8.2.4 Response Time 
Table 49 summarises the performance comparison of the options with respect to 
response time requirement of the systems in the early warning capability. As 
seen, all three capabilities currently have not met the target requirement, with B 
and R having the largest deviation from target performance. Response time is 
one of the most important aspects of early warning capability because it directly 
influences the critical action after a successful alert. With ample response time, 
the users would have more than sufficient time to perform actions of 
contamination avoidance. It is highly likely that without any improvement, the B 
and R system may have very little use in the early warning capability with such 
long response time, and thus it is perceived that there is equal motivation in 
improving both systems at least close to the target performance. This is not for 
the case of C systems, where the response time of the current C systems takes 
an additional 2.5 minutes to the time for contamination avoidance. This means 
that drills and responses can still be carried out, and that there is still a possibility 
of partial if not complete avoidance. As such, there is less desire to swing the C 
detection system capability from current to target performance level in terms of 
response time requirement. 
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Table 49: Summary of performance comparison of options with respect to 
response time requirement of the systems in the early warning capability. 
Option Target Performance Current Performance Ranking 
C 1 minute 3 minute 20 sec 0.3 
B 1 minute 21 minutes 1 
R 2 minute 25 minutes 1 
 
8.3 Tier 1: Comparison of Security Screening Capability 
8.3.1 Sensitivity 
Table 50 summarises the performance comparison of the options with respect to 
sensitivity requirement of the systems in the security screening capability. As 
seen, C and B systems require drastic improvement from current performance. 
X-ray and secondary visual inspection do not have the means to detect the 
presence of any illicit chemical or biological agent with quantifiable sensitivity. 
Manual intervention applies for both primary and secondary methods of detection 
in such chemical and biological security screening, where the security officer calls 
for secondary manual checks on the suspected baggage. The lack of surety in 
sensitivity generates very little confidence. Under scrutiny, the desire to swing the 
B capability is ranked higher compared to C because of the smaller physical size 
of the biological agent to create the impact similar to the chemical agent (based 
on the mass of agents required for incapacitating 50% of the population exposed), 
which heightens the possibility of perpetrators attempting to smuggle biological 
agents across the checkpoint.  On the other end of the spectrum, the R detector 
serves the security screening well by being able to detect low levels of gamma 
radiation (recall in Section 3.4.2, alpha and beta emitters are unlikely to be a 
concern in this frame), beyond the target requirements.   
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Table 50: Summary of performance comparison of options with respect to 
sensitivity of the systems in the security screening capability. 
Option Target Performance Current Performance Ranking 
C 10 mg/m3 No capability 0.8 
B 10,000 spores No capability 1 
R 0.2 mSv/hr (γ)  0.1 mSv/hr 0 
 
8.3.2 Selectivity 
Table 51 summarises the performance comparison of the options with respect to 
selectivity requirement of the systems in the security screening capability. With 
the same rationale as Section 8.3.1, B and C capabilities is perceived to require 
drastic improvement towards the target value, with B having a higher perceived 
desire to swing from current to target performance. On the other hand, currently, 
there are dedicated gamma sensors that detect the presence of gamma radiation. 
In addition, there are very few interferents around the security screening area, 
and few legitimate reasons for having radiation source on the body and bags 
(except for medicinal purpose), reducing the false alarm possibility. With the low 
possibility of interference and false alarms, it seemed apparent that the current 
performance for R capability is close to the target performance level, and thus no 
added desire for swing. There is no apparent need to detect alpha and beta 
sources at the security screening area, with justifications elaborated in Section 
3.4.2.  
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Table 51: Summary of performance comparison of options with respect to 
selectivity range of the systems in the security screening capability. 
Option Target Performance Current Performance Ranking 
C To be able to detect all 
forms of chemical threat, 
and discriminate from 
interferents. Acceptable to 
very low false alarm. 
No capability 0.8 
B To be able to detect all 
forms of biological threat, 
and discriminate from 
interferents. Acceptable to 
very low false alarm. 
No capability 1 
R To be able to pick up 
sources that emits gamma 
radiation. Acceptance to 
very low false alarm. 
Selective towards gamma 
radiation. Few interferents 
to initiate false alarms. 
0 
 
 
8.3.3 Response Time 
Table 52 summarises the performance comparison of the options with respect to 
response time requirement of the systems in the security screening capability. 
With the same rationale as Section 8.3.1, B and C capability is perceived to 
require drastic and immediate improvement towards the ideal target, with B 
having a higher perceived rating. On the other hand, the immediate response of 
the R detection system exceeds the target requirement, and thus no added 
incentive to swing.  
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Table 52: Summary of performance comparison of options with respect to 
response time requirement of the systems in the security screening capability. 
Option Target Performance Current Performance Ranking 
C 1 minute No capability  1 
B 1 minute No capability 1 
R 1 minute Instantaneous 0 
 
8.4 Tier 1: Comparison of Initial Response Capability 
8.4.1 Sensitivity 
Table 53 summarises the performance comparison of the options with respect to 
sensitivity requirement of the systems in the initial response capability. B 
detection system is perceived to require immediate improvement towards ideal 
based on the following rationale: 
(i) B system has the largest deviation (a factor of 6,250 times) away from 
ideal in terms of sensitivity. 
(ii) B is more lethal in terms of damage per mass 
(iii) It is likely that perpetrators employ biological agents in such a scenario. 
On the other hand, relative to B, C has a perceived rating of 0.5, based on the 
following rationale 
(i) C system has smaller deviation (a factor of 370 times) from ideal, 
compared to B. 
(ii) C is less lethal in terms of damage per mass.  
(iii) It is likely that perpetrators employ chemical agents in such a scenario. 
Lastly, R systems currently surpass the target performance of the ideal detector 
in terms of sensitivity. In addition, such a radiological dispersal is less likely 
compared to chemical and biological because additional steps are involved to 
aerosolise the metal isotope, making it less attractive for perpetrators 
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deployment. Instead, it may be more straightforward for the perpetrator to hide 
the source among the crowd for radiation exposure.  
Table 53: Summary of performance comparison of options with respect to 
sensitivity of the systems in the initial response capability. 
Option Target Performance Current Performance Ranking 
C 0.0001 mg/m3 0.03 mg/m3 0.5 
B 400 spores/m3 2.5 million spores/m3 1 
R 13 Bq/ m3 (α) 
13 Bq/ m3 (β) 
0.11 µSv/hr (γ) 
8.33 Bq/ m3 (α) 
1.53 Bq/ m3 (β) 
0.1 µSv/hr (γ) 
0 
 
8.4.2 Selectivity 
Table 54 summarises the performance comparison of the options with respect to 
selectivity requirement of the systems in the initial response capability. B 
detection system is the most desired to be improved from its current performance 
as it is unable to detect all the possible biological agents within one detector 
system, and there is a wide spectrum of biological substances that will introduce 
false alarms. While the situation is very similar to C, the latency onset period for 
biological agents are much longer compared to chemical agents, and thus in a 
chemical attack, victims often show symptoms within minutes, implying that 
preliminary deduction of the chemical nature can be done possibly without the 
use of a detection system For biological and radiological incidents, there are no 
visible signs of attack, thus the added reliance on the detector to provide an 
accurate (low false alarm) result amongst the interference in the surrounding air. 
When comparing C and R detector systems, R requires more attention to improve 
from the current to the target performance due to challenge of detecting airborne 
alpha and beta particles. (Refer to Section 3.5.3.). As such, current R capability 
in an initial response capability can be described as selective only towards 
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gamma. In such a scenario, alpha and beta particles are likely to be used 
(compared to gamma) due to their higher inhalation risk, and thus command the 
need for enhanced selectivity of the current R system to improve the selectivity 
for alpha and beta detection.   
Table 54: Summary of performance comparison of options with respect to 
selectivity range of the systems in the initial response capability. 
Option Target Performance Current Performance Ranking 
C To be able to detect all forms 
of chemical threat, and 
discriminate from interferents. 
Not acceptable to any false 
alarm. 
Unable to detect all possible 
chemical threats with one 
single detector. Problems 
cannot be fully solved with 
complementary detectors. 
Experiences high false alarm 
rates. 
0.5 
B To be able to detect all forms 
of biological threat, and 
discriminate from interferents. 
Not acceptable to any false 
alarm. 
Able to detect most possible 
biological agents. Experiences 
high false alarm rate. 
1 
R To be able to pick up sources 
that emits all alpha, beta and 
gamma radiation. Not 
acceptable to any false alarm. 
All in one detector not 
sensitive to alpha and beta 
radiation. Switching to 
different probes is required. 
Low false alarm rates due to 
low presence of interferents. 
0.7 
 
8.4.3 Response Time 
Table 55 summarises the performance comparison of the options with respect to 
response time requirements of the systems in the initial response capability. 
There is a perceived need to swing the current performance of B detection system 
to the target requirement because of the huge deviation, and a faster response 
time is evident for a swift decision to the subsequent responses. In the case of C 
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detection system, the need to improve from current to the target performance is 
apparent because a fast response time is critical in a chemical scenario for life 
threatening situations, where antidotes are required almost instantly. 
Furthermore, in a chemical situation, it is definitely more chaotic and uncontrolled 
as there are collapsed victims and panicked worried-wells. A quicker response 
time would exert less stress to the police and first responders when providing 
preliminary explanation to the root cause of the attack. The R system does not 
require any improvement in this aspect as it has surpassed the target 
performance requirement for response time.  
Table 55: Summary of performance comparison of options with respect to 
response time requirements of the systems in the initial response capability. 
Option Ideal Performance Current Performance Ranking 
C 1 minute 5 minutes 1 
B 1 minute 15 minutes 1 
R 1 minute immediate 0 
 
8.5 Tier 1 – Comparison of Definitive Identification Capability 
8.5.1 Sensitivity 
Table 56 summarises the performance comparison of the options with respect to 
sensitivity requirement of the systems in the definitive identification capability. 
Both C and B system performance in terms of sensitivity deviate away from the 
target performance. However, while the value depicted for C system is 
representative for Sarin, Sarin remains one of the most lethal and highly possible 
threats for a chemical attack. For biological incident, while Bacillus anthracis is 
highly possible, it is not the most lethal threat. There are other biological agents 
such as Francisella tularaemia which has toxicity approximately 1,000 times 
lower (Table 4). In this instance, the target sensitivity performance for a B system 
detecting Francisella tularaemia shifts drastically, and renders the current B 
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system ineffective for definitive identification. In situations like that, the need to 
improve the B system arises sharply. The R system does not require any 
improvement in this aspect as it has surpassed the target performance 
requirement for sensitivity. 
Table 56: Summary of performance comparison of options with respect to 
sensitivity of the systems in the definitive identification capability 
Option Target Performance Current Performance Ranking 
C 3 x 10-5 mg/m3 5.7 x 10-4 mg/m3 0.7 
B 40 spores/m3 49 spores/m3 1 
R 13 Bq/ m3 (α) 
13 Bq/ m3 (β) 
0.11 µSv/hr (γ) 
5.6 Bq/ m3 (α) 
5.6 Bq/ m3 (β) 
0.1 µSv/hr (γ) 
0 
 
8.5.2 Response Time 
Table 57 summarises the performance comparison of the options with respect to 
response time requirements of the systems in the definitive identification 
capability. Both B and R detector systems are able to meet the target response 
time, but R system is able to perform the definitive identification on site, reducing 
the time for information transfer. C system has the highest desire to improve from 
its current performance, as it deviates away from the target. Relative to C, there 
is little desire to improve the current performance of B system in terms of 
response time.  
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Table 57: Summary of performance comparison of options with respect to 
response time requirements of the systems in the definitive identification 
capability. 
Option Target Performance Current Performance Ranking 
C 1 hour 1 hour 30 minutes 1 
B 1 hour 1 hour 0.2  
R 1 hour 0.5 hour 0 
 
8.6 Tier 2: Weightages of KPCs 
8.6.1 Frame 1: Early warning capabilities 
The options with the highest desire to be improved from the current performances 
to the ideal target in Frame 1 are placed in comparison, with the results tabulated 
in Table 58.  
In such an early warning capability, the most critical KPC in contributing to the 
successful detection is perceived to be that of response time. The purpose of 
early warning capability is to provide ample time for contamination avoidance, 
and thus the shorter the response time, the more time allocated for actions to be 
performed in anticipation of the incoming plume. The response time for the 
current B detection system is insufficient for the scenario stipulated, where at 
least 9 minutes (Table 45) are required for all the required responses to be 
performed to successfully protect the key infrastructure and VIPs. As such, 
immediate improvement for the response time of B system is required.  
On the other hand, selectivity of the R system is as critical when compared to 
response time. In an early warning scenario, it is inherently difficult to pick up 
signals of chemical, biological or radiological attacks in the sea of numerous 
interferents, leading to high false alarm rates. The response towards an alert has 
thus been calibrated such that they are low-regret and low-burden. The 
acceptance for the higher false alarm rate of the detector implies a more forgiving 
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system towards selectivity. However, the current R system does not exhibit any 
inherent selectivity, and relies on human intervention via checkback with other 
ministries for updates. The desire to improve such a manual and inefficient 
process is thus as assessed to be as important as improving the response time.  
At the other end, the need for sensitivity in the early warning capability is minimal 
due to the potential high concentration of agents present at release site for a 
standoff release. In addition, it has been argued (see Section 8.2.1) that the C 
system merely requires slight improvements to better its performances to cater 
for worst case scenario.  
The need to swing from the current to the target requirement for range in C 
system is as minimal as that for sensitivity requirement. Although there is a 
deviation from the target performance requirement, the possibility of a small-scale 
terrorist attack of such nature from a long range is rather isolated. The constantly 
fluctuating weather conditions and the unfavourable urban conditions make it 
difficult for the perpetrators to accurately predict the actual dispersion pattern of 
the aerosols at long ranges from the target, and it is likely that they would choose 
to minimise the distance from the target to improve the precision of the attack. 
Table 58: Comparison of options with highest desire for improvement in Frame 1. 
KPC Option Updated Ranking 
Sensitivity C 0.3 
Selectivity R 1 
Response Time B 1 
Range C 0.3 
 
With the above comparison, the rest of the results from Tier 1 comparison of KPC 
performances in Frame 1 are normalised and the interim result is tabulated in 
Table 59. 
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Table 59: Summary of interim results for Frame 1 after normalisation. 
Sensitivity Selectivity Range Response Time 
C B R C B R C B R C B R 
0.3 0 0 0.21 0.49 0.7 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 1 1 
 
8.6.2 Frame 2: Security Screening Capability 
The options with the highest desire to be improved from the current performances 
to the target value in Frame 2 are placed in comparison, with the results tabulated 
in Table 60.  
Selectivity is perceived to be the most critical requirement of a biological detector 
in a CBR security screening scenario. The need to discriminate and distinguish 
biological agents from other innocent sources brought across the security 
checkpoint is important since minute physical quantity of Bacillus anthracis 
contributes to high potent dosage. In addition, there are a wide range of powders 
and liquids with fully legitimate usages inside a spectator bag. The current B 
system is not selective enough to pick up the traces of biological agents from the 
legitimate sources, and will cause false alarm at almost every case. This lack of 
selectivity is a critical failure point of the entire security screening system, as the 
consequence of a mission failure will lead to the agent dispersal.  Similarly, the 
lack of sensitivity in a B detector system is a critical failure for the mission, as the 
consequence of a failed detection due to lack of sensitivity almost certainly results 
in a successful attack. However, the desire to improve from current level of 
sensitivity to the target level is not as high compared to that of selectivity, the 
quantity of biological agents that the perpetrator would smuggle through the 
custom would be relatively high enough for common biological detection system.  
Comparatively, the deviation from target performance in terms of response time 
is not a critical failure for the entire mission because it does not contribute to an 
affirmative attack by the perpetrators. Instead, it heightens the possibility of a 
secondary attacked on the queue of spectators. In another words, without 
 135 
meeting the ideal performance of response time, the system can still function, 
albeit at a lower efficiency and increased risk.  
Table 60: Comparison of options with highest desire for improvement in Frame 2. 
KPC Option Updated Ranking 
Sensitivity B 0.7 
Selectivity B 1 
Response Time B 0.4 
 
With the above comparison, the rest of the results from Tier 1 comparison of KPC 
performances in Frame 2 are normalised and the interim result is tabulated in 
Table 61. 
Table 61: Summary of interim results for Frame 2, after normalisation. 
Sensitivity Selectivity Response Time 
C B R C B R C B R 
0.56 0.7 0 0.8 1 0 0.4 0.4 0 
 
8.6.3 Frame 3: Initial response capability 
The options with the highest desire to be improved from the current performances 
to the target value in Frame 3 are placed in comparison, with the results tabulated 
in Table 62. 
For such an initial response capability, sensitivity is perceived to be of paramount 
importance. The sensitivity of the current B system has performance 6,000 times 
worse than the target required sensitivity, implying that the current B detector will 
be unable to detect the minute concentration expected in such a scenario, where 
the first responder may not be present at the scene during the release. A swing 
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for the B detector in sensitivity requirement is crucial for the overall mission 
success for this scenario.  
On the other hand, the requirement to swing to target value in both selectivity and 
response time aspects is not as apparent as that for sensitivity. The response 
time requirement of the B detector is not the mission critical determinant in this 
frame. While a detector with an ideal response time is able to provide timely 
classification, a longer response time does not constitute a consequence as 
catastrophic as having a poor sensitivity. The desire to improve the selectivity is 
assessed to be similar to that of improving the response time. The current 
performance of B capability is adequate in detecting most lethal bioagents with a 
single system. 
Table 62: Comparison of options with highest desire for improvement in Frame 3. 
KPC Option Updated Ranking 
Sensitivity B 1 
Selectivity B 0.5 
Response Time B 0.6 
With the above comparison, the rest of the results from Tier 1 comparison of KPC 
performances in Frame 3 are normalised and the interim result is tabulated in 
Table 63. 
Table 63: Summary of interim results for Frame 3, after normalisation. 
Sensitivity Selectivity Response Time 
C B R C B R C B R 
0.5 1 0 0.3 0.6 0.42 0.3 0.3 0 
8.6.4 Frame 4: Definitive identification 
The options with the highest desire to be improved from the current performances 
to the ideal target in Frame 4 are placed in comparison, with the results tabulated 
in Table 64.  
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As consistent with the rationale in Section 8.6.3, sensitivity is perceived to be 
more important than response time. A detector with highest order of sensitivity is 
much valued because this is often the final confirmative step to identify the 
species of the suspected agent. Improvement from current response time to the 
target level is not as desired because the current response time does not cause 
a critical failure in the overall mission.  
Table 64: Comparison of options with highest desire for improvement in Frame 4. 
KPC Option Updated Ranking 
Sensitivity B 1 
Response Time C 0.3 
With the above comparison, the rest of the results from Tier 1 comparison of KPC 
performances in Frame 4 are normalised and the interim result is tabulated in 
Table 65. 
Table 65: Summary of interim results for Frame 4, after normalisation. 
Sensitivity Response Time 
C B R C B R 
0.7 1 0 0.3 0.06 0 
 
8.7 Tier 3: Importance of Frame 
The options with the highest desire to be improved within each frame after the 
weight allocations (Tier 2) are listed down for comparison, to derive the 
importance of each frame in the overall detection architecture.  
The sensitivity of a B system in the initial response capability (Frame 3) is 
perceived to have the most desire for improvement. The initial response capability 
is perceived to be extremely important in the overall detection architecture 
because of its direct relevance in critical life-saving countermeasures. In addition, 
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the deviation away from ideal sensitivity for the B system is alarming, and should 
require high attention. Similarly, the lack of capability in a security screening 
frame requires a high level of attention in improving the current performance level. 
Furthermore, the lack of attention to providing adequate chemical and biological 
detection in such a setting unveils a security loophole that must be addressed.  
Improvement for response time for B systems in an early warning capability is not 
perceived as highly valued because the possibility of perpetrators executing an 
urban attack via long-range release is low. With a specific target as in this frame, 
the perpetrators would more likely be focused on bringing the source closer to 
the target so that the attack would not be affected drastically by atmospheric 
turbulence vertical dilution of the agents.  
Similarly, the improvement for sensitivity for B system in a definitive identification 
is not perceived to be important, when compared to that in the initial response 
capability. Firstly, the current performance for the former is closer to its target 
performance standards. Secondly, definitive identification does not have direct 
influence to the main response actions towards the attack. Rather, the positive 
identification provides an affirmative answer to the authority of the agent, its 
identity, and source and concentration, which is not primarily useful in keeping 
the attack under control. While this capability is critical for specific medicinal and 
antidote therapy aid, there are other clinical tests that can identify the agent based 
on stool, urine or blood samples, with the compromise of a longer analysis time.  
Table 66 shows the relative rating of the options placed in comparison in this 
section.  
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Table 66: Comparison of options with highest desire for improvement. 
Frame KPC Option Updated Ranking 
1 Response Time B 0.4 
2 Selectivity B 1 
3 Sensitivity B 1 
4 Sensitivity B 0.3 
The rest of the results from the Tier 2 comparison are then normalised with the 
compared option in their respective frames. The overall results are tabulated in 
Table 67. 
 
8.8 Chapter Conclusion 
Table 67 concludes the overall results (after normalisation) of the CBR detection 
capabilities comparison with the SMARTS methodology.
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Table 67: Overall results of comparison derived from the SMARTS methodology. 
 Early Warning Capability Security Screening Capability 
Ranking of C, B 
and R 
capability after:  
Sensitivity Selectivity Range Response Time Sensitivity Selectivity Response Time 
C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R 
- Tier 1 Analysis  1 0 0 0.3 0.7 1 1 1 0 0.3 1 1 0.8 1 0 0.8 1 0 1 1 0 
- Tier 2 Analysis 0.3 0 0 0.21 0.49 0.7 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 1 1 0.56 0.7 0 0.8 1 0 0.4 0.4 0 
- Tier 3 Analysis 0.12 0 0 0.08 0.2 0.28 0.12 0.12 0 0.12 0.4 0.4 0.45 0.56 0 0.64 0.8 0 0.32 0.32 0 
 
 Initial Response Capability Definitive Identification Capability 
Ranking of C, 
B and R 
capability after:  
Sensitivity Selectivity Response Time Sensitivity Response Time 
C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R 
- Tier 1 Analysis  0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0.7 1 1 0 0.7 1 0 1 0.2 0 
- Tier 2 Analysis 0.5 1 0 0.3 0.6 0.42 0.3 0.3 0 0.7 1 0 0.3 0.06 0 
- Tier 3 Analysis 0.5 1 0 0.3 0.6 0.42 0.3 0.3 0 0.21 0.3 0 0.09 0 0 
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9 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
9.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduces the concept of sensitivity analysis and validation 
processes. The results of the comparison are briefly analysed in support for the 
proof of concept. These results highlight the different aspect of concerns that 
should be addressed in future, and brings about proposal of potential stop gap 
solutions to bridge the current inequality in the relative rankings. Limitations of 
the framework are discussed and further studies are recommended. 
9.2  Chapter Introduction 
The SMARTS method allows prioritization of our ideas according to the situational 
perception of both tangible and intangible KPCs. The interpretation of our 
perception towards the various criteria is limited by both the inherent knowledge 
of the fields and the cognitive challenges faced in organising the knowledge into 
tangible and sense-making measurements.  
While the SMARTS method is capable of decision making involving conflicting 
intangibles, it may not necessarily pack the required confidence and robustness 
[205]. This is especially true when decisions must be based on competing factors 
at different tiers based on the hierarchy, and it may be cognitively demanding 
even for a subject matter expert to fully digest all the relevant factors to make a 
conscious decision.  
Section 9.3 describes the additional layer of sensitivity analysis adopted in a 
systematic fashion to capture the judgements from various angles, to ensure an 
overall robust decision. 
The remaining sections validate the result from the verified framework, and 
discuss the framework from different perspectives to instil the required 
confidence in making accurate decisions.  
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9.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
9.3.1 Problem with the initial framework 
As seen in the proposed model (Figure 7, reattached below), hereinafter referred 
to as Framework 1, there is a strong inter C, B and R capability comparison at 
the base level, as each C, B and R capability is measured with respect to each 
KPC within individual frames in the first tier of comparison (k=1). The second tier 
of comparison (k=2) analyses the importance of each KPC within a specified 
frame. The third tier (k=3) concludes by analysing the importance of each frame 
in the overall detection architecture. A matrix of Cijk, Bijk and Rijk can be generated 
for every set of comparison, generalised in Figure 15, where i denotes the 
different frames (1 to 4) and j denotes the KPC of the detector that contributes to 
the success of each frame i. An example is placed alongside the matrix to 
illustrate the point. In this example, the selectivity of detectors in the early warning 
frame (i = 1) is illustrated.  
 
Figure 7: Framework 1 
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 Comparison with 
respect to each 
KPC 
Example: Selectivity 
in Frame 1 (Table 67) 
Base comparison Cij1 Bij1 Rij1 0.3 0.7 1 
Second tier comparison Cij2 Bij2 Rij2 0.21 0.49 0.7 
Highest tier comparison Cij3 Bij3 Rij3 0.08 0.2 0.28 
Figure 15: Matrix representing the three tiers of comparison in the model. 
This method of categorising has flaws. As the comparison progresses into the 
next tier, it must be noted that the ratio of C, B to R values within each level of 
comparison is kept constant, as illustrated in the equations below: 
<=>?
@=>?
=
<=>A
@=>A
=
<=>B
@=>B
     ,     
<=>?
C=>?
=
<=>A
C=>A
=
<=>B
C=>B
     &     @=>?
C=>?
=
@=>A
C=>A
=
@=>B
C=>B
 
This is further illustrated using the figures in the example given in Figure 15. 
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This implies that the first level of comparison between the C, B and R detection 
capabilities must be extremely robust, taking into account not only the 
performance differences within the said KPC, but should also accord the relative 
differences in the importance of the different KPCs within a chemical, biological 
and radiological incident (frame), and the disparity in emphasis of the different 
frames towards the success in different chemical, biological and radiological 
detection architectures. While these may not be entirely impossible, the 
increased cognitive requirement tends to lead the decision maker into 
overlooking certain aspects. For instance, in the midst of determining the 
difference in KPC comparison within each frame, critical criteria such as 
importance of the KPC in determining the success of the frame or the role of each 
frame in contributing to the success of the overall CBR defence may be neglected 
as the secondary concern. In order to uphold the intended integrity of the 
comparison model, additional models focusing on different aspects are proposed 
to be implemented in the sensitivity analysis phase.  
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9.3.2 Framework 2: Focus on comparison of KPC within a domain 
Figure 16 shows the illustration of the proposed Framework 2. Framework 2 
focuses on the baseline comparison of the KPC within the individual domain 
detection system at the bottom tier to derive the relative importance of each KPC 
in their respective environment, before comparing the relative weights of each 
detection system within a frame. Ultimately, the importance of each frame 
towards the success of the overall detection architecture is defined.  Similar to 
Framework 1, the ratio of each pair of base comparison is maintained as the 
comparison progresses through the different tiers. The difference from 
Framework 1 lies in the arrangement of the hierarchy elements, where in this 
case, the main emphasis resides in the investigation of the KPC within the 
individual C, B and R domain as the base comparison. 
 
 
Figure 16: Proposed Framework 2. 
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9.3.3 Framework 3: Focus on domain capability performances 
The hierarchy is then remodelled to Framework 3, as shown in Figure 17, where 
in Framework 3, the performance of each domain detection capabilities in terms 
of their individual KPC are first compared.  
The different KPCs of each domain detection capability are compared in terms of 
their importance in each frame. Next, the importance of each KPC towards the 
success of detection in each domain is measured, before the individual domains 
are finally compared at the final stage.  
 
 
 
Figure 17: Proposed Framework 3. 
9.3.4 Framework iteration  
As seen, the three frameworks complement each other in the pursuit of an 
accurate C, B and R detection capability ranking. The original Framework 1 is 
designed to provide the most comprehensive inter C, B and R capability 
 146 
comparison at the base comparison, explicitly relating the decision maker to the 
main objective. Framework 2 scopes the comparison to focus on the importance 
of the KPC performance in the individual domain environment. Lastly, Framework 
3 bases the discussion on the importance of each frame in different domain 
environments. Although the three framework targets the comparison from three 
different facets, the output converges towards the same C, B and R detection 
capability ranking, relying on the same experts’ judgements. Since all three 
framework leverages on the opinion of the same set of experts with the same set 
of scenario, it is implied all three framework should narrow to the same results. 
However, by phrasing the analysis in a different manner, it leaves the experts 
open to approach the comparison from different facets, and thus, initial answers 
may have slight variations.       
For the comparison to be fully encompassing, a sanity check based on iterative 
approach is adopted, as shown in Figure 18. It is proposed that the decision 
maker attempts all three frameworks. Once the first attempt is performed, the 
finalised individual weightages of each KPC should be reconciled with the 
corresponding weightage values in the other two frameworks.  
The comparison of the individual weightages across the three frameworks 
encourages the decision maker to pick up disparities and to revisit the initial 
rationalisations and alter the base comparisons with a clearer perception. Such 
iterations are performed until the following is satisfied:  
- The ranking from the three frameworks converge to a common answer. 
- The individual weightages in each framework, derived after the three tiers 
of comparisons, are within acceptable deviation from their corresponding 
values in the other two frameworks. 
- The decision maker is convinced that the weightages in the three 
frameworks are representative of his final perception from various facets 
 147 
 
Figure 18: An iterative approach is adopted to derive at a robust solution. The 
approach relies on three frameworks that are derived to draw perceptions from 
different facets.  
9.3.5 Updated Results 
The initial results obtained in Table 67 were compared alongside the initial results 
from Framework 2 and 3. Collectively, they formed the first iteration in attempts 
to arrive at an undisputed conclusion. The details of the various iterations are 
deliberately left out in this dissertation. The iterated results from three frameworks 
are appended in Appendix A. The final result from Framework 1 after the iteration 
is placed in comparison with the original Framework 1 (Chapter 8), and the 
comparison is depicted from Table 68 to Table 76. The overall updated result 
after the sensitivity analysis is summarised in Table 77.  
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Table 68: Comparison of results before and after sensitivity analysis for Frame 1. 
 Frame 1: Early Warning Capability 
 Sensitivity Selectivity Range Response Time 
 Ranking 
Before 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
Before 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
Before 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
Before 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
C 1 1 0.3 0.3 1 1 0.3 0.3 
B 0 0 0.7 0.6 1 1 1 1 
R 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Table 69: Comparison of results before and after sensitivity analysis for Frame 2. 
 Frame 2: Security Screening Capability 
 Sensitivity Selectivity Response Time 
 Ranking 
Before 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
Before 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
Before 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
C 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 1 1 
B 1 1 1 1 1 1 
R 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 
As seen in Table 69, the desire to swing the selectivity of the current R detection 
system in Frame 2 changes from 0 to 0.2 after the sensitivity analysis. The 
change was reflected as a result of analysis from Framework 2 (Refer to 
Appendix A, Table A-2), where selectivity was perceived as one of the most 
critical area of improvement when compared to sensitivity and response time of 
a R detection system within the personnel security screening capability. The 
change of perspective from a different facet brought attention to the initial 
perception in Framework 1. 
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Table 70: Comparison of results before and after sensitivity analysis for Frame 3. 
 Frame 3: Initial Response Capability 
 Sensitivity Selectivity Response Time 
 Ranking 
Before 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
Before 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
Before 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
C 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.8 
B 1 1 1 1 1 1 
R 0 0 0.7 0.7 0 0 
From Table 70, the response time of the chemical detection capability was initially 
perceived to be as desired to be improved as that for the biological detection 
capability in an initial response frame. However, as seen in Appendix A, Table A-
2 (Tier 2 comparison), when the chemical response time in the initial response 
frame was compared with the biological sensitivity in the same frame, it was 
perceived that the desire to improve the chemical response time is only 0.5 that 
of the desire to improve the biological sensitivity. However, when the biological 
response time was compared to the biological sensitivity (Tier 1 comparison), it 
was desire to improve was perceived to be 0.6. This alluded to the misalignment 
of perception from the two different frameworks49, and triggered the need for re-
evaluation of the perception in Framework 1.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
49
 In framework 1, chemical response time: biological response time = 1: 1. In framework 2, 
chemical response time: biological response time = 0.5: 0.6.   
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Table 71: Comparison of results before and after sensitivity analysis for Frame 4. 
 Frame 4: Definitive Identification Capability 
 Sensitivity Response Time 
 Ranking Before 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Ranking After 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Ranking Before 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Ranking After 
Sensitivity Analysis 
C 0.7 0.7 1 1 
B 1 1 0.2  0 
R 0 0.1 0 0 
 
As seen in Table 71, the desire to swing the selectivity of the current R detection 
system in Frame 2 changes from 0.2 to 0 after the sensitivity analysis. The 
change was reflected as a result of analysis from Framework 3 (refer to Appendix 
A, Table A-3, Framework 3) where response time of biological detection systems 
for all four frames were placed in comparison. In this comparison, it was then 
perceived that all three biological response times from frame 1, 2 and 3 deviates 
from the ideal, and require improvements. However, it was perceived that the 
biological response time in the definitive identification frame (1hr) is similar to the 
target value (1hr) and thus no requirement for improvements.  The differences in 
perception between Framework 1 and Framework 3 after the first iteration leads 
to another analysis and thus brought about the change of perception in the 
biological response time in frame 4, under Framework 1. 
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Table 72: Comparison of results before and after sensitivity analysis for 
alternatives with highest desire for improvement in Scenario 1 (early warning 
capabilities). 
KPC Alternative Ranking Before 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Ranking After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Sensitivity C 0.3 0.3 
Selectivity R 1 1 
Response Time B 1 1 
Range C 0.3 0.3 
 
Table 73: Comparison of results before and after sensitivity analysis for 
alternatives with highest desire for improvement in Scenario 2 (personnel 
security screening). 
KPC Alternative Ranking Before 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Ranking After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Sensitivity B 0.7 0.7 
Selectivity B 1 1 
Response Time B 0.4 0.4 
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Table 74: Comparison of results before and after sensitivity analysis for 
alternatives with highest desire for improvement in Scenario 3 (initial response 
capability). 
KPC Alternative Ranking Before 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Ranking After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Sensitivity B 1 1 
Selectivity B 0.5 0.5 
Response Time B 0.6 0.6 
Table 75: Comparison of results before and after sensitivity analysis for 
alternatives with highest desire for improvement in Scenario 4 (laboratory 
confirmation capability). 
KPC Alternative Ranking Before 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Ranking After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Sensitivity B 1 1 
Response Time C 0.3 0.3 
 
Table 76: Comparison of results before and after sensitivity analysis for 
alternatives with highest desire for improvement in each frame. 
Scenario KPC Alternative Ranking Before 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Ranking 
After 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
1 Response Time B 0.4 0.35 
2 Selectivity B 1 1 
3 Sensitivity B 1 1 
4 Sensitivity B 0.3 0.3 
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Table 77: Updated overall results of comparison, after sensitivity analysis. 
 Early Warning Capability Security Screening Capability 
Ranking of C, B 
and R capability 
after: 
Sensitivity Selectivity Range Response Time Sensitivity Selectivity Response Time 
C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R 
- Tier 1 Analysis  1 0 0 0.3 0.6 1 1 1 0 0.3 1 1 0.6 1 0 0.8 1 0.2 1 1 0 
- Tier 2 Analysis 0.3 0 0 0.3 0.6 1 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 1 1 0.42 0.7 0 0.8 1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0 
- Tier 3 Analysis 0.11 0 0 0.11 0.21 0.35 0.11 0.11 0 0.11 0.35 0.35 0.42 0.7 0 0.8 1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0 
 
 Initial Response Capability Definitive Identification Capability 
Ranking of C, 
B and R 
capability after:  
Sensitivity Selectivity Response Time Sensitivity Response Time 
C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R 
- Tier 1 Analysis  0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0.7 0.8 1 0 0.7 1 0.1 1 0 0 
- Tier 2 Analysis 0.5 1 0 0.25 0.5 0.35 0.48 0.6 0 0.7 1 0.1 0.3 0 0 
- Tier 3 Analysis 0.5 1 0 0.25 0.5 0.35 0.48 0.6 0 0.2 0.3 0.03 0.09 0 0 
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9.4 Results 
Through the iterative process, the comparison of C, B and R detection capabilities 
can be decomposed and quantified. This section aims to verify the rigour of the 
framework by analysing and validating its derived results.  
Table 78 is derived from the rearrangements of the final tier analysis (Tier 3) from 
Table 77, in descending order. These figures are termed as Desire Ratings (DR) 
as they signify the Author’s perceived desire for the KPC to be improved from the 
current performance level to the target performance level. As seen, the sensitivity 
and selectivity of a biological detection system in the CBR security screening and 
initial response capability have the highest DR. The highest DR for the chemical 
domain is the selectivity in the CBR security screening frame, while that for the 
radiological domain is the selectivity of the initial response phase. Seen in Table 
78, the results are conveniently categorised into three distinct categories. The 
first category (DR > 0.4) lists the different KPCs that must be addressed to obtain 
a visible improvement in the detection capability. The next category (0.4 > Dr > 
0.1) lists the KPCs that do not need to be improved urgently, although 
improvements will enhance the overall capability. The last category (DR < 0.1) 
shows the KPCs that are already performing relatively at the peak, and no further 
improvements are required. There are a total of 7 KPCs for a radiological domain 
that has a DR of 0, while 2 for biological and 0 for chemical domains.  
Table 78: Results of subjective analysis after iteration, presented in descending 
rank order. 
 
Domain Scenario KPC Rating Domain Scenario KPC Rating Domain Scenario KPC Rating
B 2 Selectivity 1 R 1 Selectivity 0.35 C 4 Response time 0.09
B 3 Sensitivity 1 B 1 Response time 0.35 R 4 Sensitivity 0.03
C 2 Selectivity 0.8 R 1 Response time 0.35 B 1 Sensitivity 0
B 2 Sensitivity 0.7 R 3 Selectivity 0.35 R 1 Sensitivity 0
B 3 Response Time 0.6 B 4 Sensitivity 0.3 R 1 Range 0
C 3 Sensitivity 0.5 C 3 Selectivity 0.25 R 2 Sensitivity 0
B 3 Selectivity 0.5 B 1 Selectivity 0.21 R 2 Response time 0
C 3 Response Time 0.48 C 4 Sensitivity 0.21 R 3 Sensitivity 0
C 2 Sensitivity 0.42 R 2 Range 0.2 R 3 Response time 0
C 2 Response Time 0.4 C 1 Sensitivity 0.105 B 4 Response time 0
B 2 Response Time 0.4 C 1 Selectivity 0.105 R 4 Response time 0
C 1 Range 0.105
B 1 Range 0.105
C 1 Response time 0.105
Desire rating > 0.4  0.4 > Desire rating > 0.1 Desire rating < 0.1
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The statistical results are organised in Figure 19 as a stacked plot of DR against 
the KPCs for the four distinct frames. This graph provides a clear comparison of 
the C, B and R detection capabilities improvement desires in terms of the specific 
KPC in each frame. The data is re-arranged in Figure 20 as a comparison within 
each domain, emphasising on the trend of frame dependant importance of each 
domain in achieving success in the overall CBR detection architecture. The two 
different plots yield specific findings targeted to different groups of professionals. 
Specific findings on Figure 19 and Figure 20 are depicted in the preceding 
subsections. 
 
Figure 19: Plot of Desire Ratings (DRs) against KPCs within each frame. 
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Figure 20: Plot of DRs vs KPCs within each domain. 
9.4.1 Findings on early warning capability 
In the early warning capability, it is implied from Figure 19 that there is the 
strongest perceived desire to improve the radiological capability, based on the 
fact that the current R standoff detection system is fundamentally rudimentary 
and not specific enough for any response actions. There is a strong desire to 
incorporate the ability of detecting all three alpha, beta and gamma radiation 
dispersion in aerosol form, at a response time fast enough for any response 
initiations. In contrast, chemical standoff detection system is relatively efficient 
and useful in all aspects to enable an acceptable level of contamination 
avoidance actions. However, when compared to the overall scheme, it was 
shown in Figure 19 that although within the early warning frame comparison there 
were indications to improve the radiological standoff (early warning) capabilities, 
the desire was less pronounced when compared to other frames. The success of 
long range attacks via aerosol dispersions is highly reliant on the plume 
dispersion pathways, which are dependent on the meteorological conditions and 
urban architecture layout, amongst many other factors. Such dispersions towards 
a specified target also require a huge amount of agents depending on the 
distance to the target, and can be easily detected. The battery of constraints adds 
logistical burden to the planning, and hinders the success of the attacks. With a 
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lower possibility of long-range attacks, the reliance on standoff detection 
capabilities reduces. The relative high tolerance of false alarm may also be the 
reason for the lower desire to improve the current standoff capabilities.  
Except for the need to improve the response time, generally the desire to improve 
biological standoff capability is low, and this lack of desire is postulated to the 
nature of the standoff detection capability, which generally generate high false 
positive alarms to deny significant actions (such as full evacuation or full 
response). This shifts the reliance onto the other 3 frames in the overall scheme 
of detection architecture.  
9.4.2 Findings on CBR personnel security screening capabilities 
From Figure 19, in the CBR security screening capabilities, the biological 
capability is perceived to require the most attention to improve to the target 
performance level due to a myriad of factors revolving around the currently limited 
biological screening capability. Although the chemical screening capabilities are 
limited to the same extent, Figure 19 shows a lesser desire for chemical 
improvements, possibly due to the lower perceived consequences50 of chemical 
agents relative to biological agents. Radiological detection capabilities, on the 
other end, are less required for improvements in all aspects with the prevalent 
technological capabilities displayed in current security arenas. Figure 20 revealed 
that such a capability in the chemical and biological domains generally require a 
higher relative attention, implying the lack of focus and the importance as the last 
layer of the detect-to-warn mechanism.  
9.4.3 Findings in initial response capability 
Figure 19 shows a strong desire (1) to improve the current biological sensitivity 
and response time. This is attributed to the inability to detect biological agents at 
realistically low concentration within the required time, causing problems to the 
operator onsite. Comparatively, chemical detection capabilities in such a frame 
                                            
50
 Threat analysis is not within the scope of the dissertation. There is a further need to study the 
consequence and likelihood of C, B and R attacks to better encompass the threat element.  
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are more effective, possibly due to the higher focus developers and procurers 
have placed in dealing with the more probable threat. Chemical threats are 
generally fast-acting and thus a finer response protocol coupled with better 
detection mechanism is required to tackle its imminent problem. Again, 
radiological detection capability is comparatively ranked lowest in the 
improvement desire, indicating that it is generally accepted as a good performer 
amongst the C, B and R detector in the initial response phase.  
9.4.4 General trend of C, B and R detection capability 
It is implied in Figure 20 that both the C and B domains show similar trends in the 
areas of improvements in the security screening and initial response capabilities. 
While the inherent technologies to equip both domains with the necessary 
capabilities are different, the trend is promising to synergise research findings 
from chemists and microbiologists in attempt to uncover potential improvement 
measures from different perspectives.  
However, the desire to improve the KPC in radiological detection is fundamentally 
different. As seen in Figure 20, there are several KPCs that are not required for 
any improvements from the current performance levels. However, almost all 
radiological scenarios prompt for the improvement in selectivity, which in specific 
terms, refers to the need to detect all forms of radiation amidst the background 
interference. It defies the hypothesis that radiological detection systems are 
adequate in detecting all forms of radiation threat effectively. Capability 
improvements in the form of standoff detection and alpha-beta detection in 
response to post incident management are required for an all-round solution 
against radiological incidents.   
9.4.5 Comparative Analysis 
To improve the comparative analyses required from first responders, the results 
can be rearranged and displayed as a comparison between two capabilities (X-Y 
plot) or all three capabilities (X-Y-Z) plot, the former having the ability to provide 
analysis in a clearer view. Figure 21 shows the comparative analysis for C & B, 
C & R and B & R detection systems in a clockwise fashion, and highlights the 
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important ways in which one domain differs in its KPC capability from another 
domain. Each graph can also be segregated into four quadrants to indicate the 
maturity of the KPC traits for each domain. The X=Y line distinctly displays the 
superiority of one domain capability over the other, and gives the first responders 
an idea of their current capability at a glance. As an example, the first graph 
shows that in general, most of the KPCs for biological detection capability require 
more improvements compared to chemical detection capability as most of the 
data is skewed above the Y=X line. The graph also identified two data points 
(selectivity in security screening and sensitivity in initial response) at the upper 
right quadrant, which indicates strong desires to improve in both chemical and 
biological capabilities. The overall aim is to understand the various KPCs and 
their weaknesses, in attempt to improve them towards the lower left quadrant. 
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Figure 21: Comparative analysis of B vs C (top left), R vs C (top right) and R vs B 
(bottom left). 
9.4.6 Validation of overall results 
9.4.6.1 Validation of results with literature 
Table 79 shows the summation of the individual weightages for C, B and R 
(extracted from Table 77) for all domains. It can be seen that the overall desire to 
improve biological systems is much higher compared to that for radiological 
detection systems, inferring a highest level of challenge faced in biological 
detection, followed by chemical, and radiological detection.  
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Table 79: Overall summated results for CBR detection comparisons. 
Domain Score Percentage 
Biological 5.17 51.6% 
Chemical 3.57 35.63% 
Radiological 1.28 12.77% 
This result is well reflected in real world research and report findings performed 
by many official bodies, as depicted in this paragraph. Dr. Price [206] 
consolidated the contracts51 for CBRN equipment for FY2009, as depicted in 
Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22: Pie chart for US CBR contracts by category in FY 2009 [206]. 
The data from Figure 22 that are of direct relevance to the dissertation are the 
CBR R&D spending, as they imply the amount of emphasis placed on improving 
the capabilities. These data are extracted and normalised, and placed in 
comparison with the dissertation findings as shown in Figure 23.  
                                            
51
 It is documented by Dr. Price that the consolidated listing is imperfect due to the difficulty faced 
in gathering the resources.  
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Figure 23: Comparison of dissertation findings vs FY2009 CBR spending. 
It is noted that in FY2009, US had spent 14% out of the total CBR contract 
expenditure (66.67% out of the total R&D spending) on R&D for biological 
defence, compared to 1% (4.76% out of the total R&D spending) for chemical 
and 6% (28.57% out of the total R&D spending) for radiological and nuclear 
(R&N). This has implied the acknowledgement of heavy investment required for 
B over C and R defence capabilities. The disparity in the C and R research 
expenditure with the dissertation findings (as seen in Figure 23) could possibly 
be accounted by the addition of nuclear research investment in the overall R&N 
spending, where enormous efforts are often placed in countering nuclear threats 
due to the high consequential effects of a nuclear attack.   
In another report, US Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a 
review [207] in 2008 to assess the limitations of CBRN detection equipment for 
first responder use. The report started with the aim of addressing concerns in all 
aspects of C, B, R and N detection deficiencies, but concluded with the results 
that C and B detection systems are highly ineffective in supporting the roles of 
the first responders. A short section was dedicated to the deficiency of 
radiological and nuclear detection system in the detection of dispersed releases 
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in the atmosphere. This is consistent with the dissertation findings, where 
capability in radiological systems is ranked to require the most improvement in 
terms of early warning capabilities (Refer to Figure 19).  
In another finding, the GAO also reported that their findings from the National 
Institute of Justice (NIST) [208] that it takes generally 3 to 5 years for a C and B 
detector standard to achieve full consensus, while it only takes 12 to 18 months 
for the same process in R detector standards to achieve similar recognition. This 
is postulated to the matured knowledge inherited in radiation technology and 
relatively well established protocols to the responses for incidents of such nature.  
Lastly, the GAO summarised a report to the National Security on the nuclear and 
radiological capabilities for emergency responses [209]. The technology of the 
physical radiological detection systems were not mentioned within the 
investigation findings, instead the outcome of the capability investigated focused 
on the underutilisation of aerial background radiation survey systems. GAO 
suggested the allocation of funds to the equipping of more integrated logistic 
supports for more radiation surveys to be performed, without mention of 
technology research focus. This resonates with the dissertation, where 
radiological capabilities are perceived to be established and well defined for many 
applications, including the defence industry [210]. 
9.4.6.2 Validation of results with focus group discussions 
Two focus group discussions were also held in Cranfield Shrivenham Campus. 
The participants covered the main group of first responders, CBR combatants, 
scientists, procurers and researchers from the CBR field. The main issue 
discussed during the first meeting revolved around the participants’ perception of 
the current C, B and R detection capabilities specific to the four frames mentioned 
throughout the dissertation. This was complemented in the second meeting with 
the introduction of the SMARTS framework and the derivation of the results based 
on the Author’s perception of the characteristic performance of the KPC relating 
to each domain capability.  The discussions provided real life insights to detection 
capability deficiencies and welcomed feedbacks to the validation of the results. 
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The outputs are scattered over this dissertation, but the supporting points to the 
results validation are summarised below. 
1. Radiological capabilities are perceived as a well-balanced capability. This 
resides well among the results from the methodology. Most of the participants 
agreed that relative to the C and B capabilities, the R capability received few fine-
tunings in terms of the specified KPCs in the respective frames.  
2. Chemical and biological capabilities must be improved. There were mixed 
responses to identifying the capability that require the most improvements. The 
debate on this arises from the diversified background of the participants. The 
chemists believed that chemical detection capabilities are insufficient to tackle 
the highly probable attacks compared to biological agents. The biologists, on the 
other hand, focused on the magnitude of deviation away from ideal capability 
performances in every aspect of a biological scenario. However, the armed forces 
and first responders generally have a common consensus that they face a larger 
challenge in ensuring the success of a biological incident compared to a chemical 
incident, and they generally faced little issues with radiological incidents 
compared to the former two.   
 
9.5 Discussions 
9.5.1 Reliance of the Study on a Single Decision Maker 
Utilising the author’s perception towards C, B and R detection capabilities as the 
basis of this work made it possible to examine the complex relationship between 
each of these domain capabilities in the timeframe for this project. The author’s 
perceptions were to some extent supported by both subject matter experts and 
volunteers with knowledge in the field of CBRN. However, the strength of the 
conclusion from these studies is limited mainly to the accuracy of the author’s 
judgement of the input and parameters of the framework, and such a method has 
often been scrutinised for its solidarity view and the extent of generalisability to 
other decision makers’ viewpoint. Regardless of how objective and specific an 
individual believes he conduct the research, it remains to be subjected to 
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interpretation of influence by personal background, experiences and biases. 
However, while the results may be questionable to some, the framework is built 
in a modular manner to accommodate perceptions from a larger pool of decision 
makers to derive a more comprehensive and robust output. In anticipation of a 
robust comparison, the output of the comparison is validated with numerous 
literatures and reports, as well as consensus from focus group discussions. The 
framework is also subjected to intensive sensitivity analysis to pick up conflicting 
perceptions from the author’s perception. Amidst the checks in place, this method 
is still contentious to objectivists whom require facts and figures to substantiate 
the claim. To mitigate the subjectivity of personal influences, future research 
would thus benefit more from the use of a larger sample of participants from 
different aspects of the industry, for instance, the government agencies, 
operators, researchers and the industry manufacturers.    
9.5.2 Selection of the Representative Agents 
In Chapter 6, one agent from each of the C, B and R domain is selected as a 
representation in studying the performance of the CBR detection capabilities with 
respect to specific KPCs. On a wider scheme, such a representation may 
undermine the full potential of the comparison methodology, failing to capture 
other aspects of the system that is not exposed when compared to the non-
selected agent. For instance, the dominant chemical early warning capability 
(FTIR) functions well with chemicals that responds only to the selected 
bandwidth. Although the selected agent (Sarin) is detectable, there are other 
common agents such as Chlorine and Phosgene, which cannot be detected. 
Similarly, flame photometry cannot be used in identifying toxic industrial 
chemicals without phosphorous or sulphate groups. On the other hand, the 
selection of radiological agent results in the use of a gamma source in the 
comparison, which limits the comparison to only one type of radiation detector.  
Next, the selections in this report are based on a method that works adequately 
to predict agents that are likely to be utilised by the perpetrators. This method, 
similar to the SMARTS, required the careful decomposition of criteria that reflects 
the thought process of the perpetrators. However, no one can accurately predict 
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their next move, as the psychology of terrorism is marked more by theory and 
opinion than good science [211]. As such, the prediction and evaluation based 
on the criteria selection are seldom 100% accurate. Criteria relating to intent, shift 
of motivation, psychology, capability and vulnerability are explicitly left out in a 
deliberate attempt to simplify the model. Full research on risk and threat warrants 
a separate study and thus does not fall within the scope of this dissertation.  
9.5.3 Limitations due to Assumptions 
In order to perform comparison based on swing method, several assumptions are 
made to establish the current and target performance of the CBR detection 
systems. These assumptions are direct contributors to potential sources of error, 
which may affect the decision makers’ judgement.  
Some conditions stipulated in an attempt to derive the target value (Chapter 7) 
for the detection criteria are posed to challenge the limits of the detection 
systems. For instance, in a CBR personnel security screening frame, the 
minimum sensitivity required of any detection system is based on the notion that 
the perpetrator is smuggling a minimum quantity of agents sufficient to only harm 
a small group of people. In most situations, the detection criteria could be more 
relaxed if the intent of the perpetrator is to target a larger pool of people. In yet 
another example, the sensitivity of the early warning capability may not be 
required to be challenged to the limit as the scenario is stipulated as such that 
the source concentration is higher, or the source is released nearer to the target. 
Such assumptions tend to err on the side of caution, but by doing so, may 
inevitably increase the deviation from the target performances of the detection 
system, affecting the decision maker’s judgement in the swings. 
Next, in deriving the target performance (Chapter 7), complex theories are 
deliberately substituted with simpler logic or worst-case scenarios. An obvious 
example is the stipulation of sensitivity requirement for detection systems under 
the initial response capability. The target is set to STEL for chemical and 
biological environment, and background values for radiological environment. 
These values are realistic, yet demanding. They are several magnitudes lower 
than the potential release concentration to anticipate the dilution effect as a result 
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of atmospheric conditions. Such a simplistic approach, however, yields 
considerable limitations in terms of accuracy and validation, but it provides the 
answer in the quickest manner.  To derive the most precise answer, usage of 
complex physical theory is required. In the former example, the aerosol must be 
modelled statistically to understand its behaviour under specific temporal and 
spatial fluctuations of wind velocity, temperature, moisture content and many 
other weather conditions. In addition, the size distribution, density, viscosity, 
collision efficiency, geometrical shape and other physical traits are required to 
understand the molecular diffusion rate in the atmosphere. Lastly, the 
resuspension rate may also affect the overall concentration at the time of 
response, as particles that have settled may rise again due to wind and wake of 
any moving person beyond 0.2m/s [212]. There are other instances where more 
attention to scientific theories and calculation could improve the accuracy of the 
derived values, such as determining the required sensitivity in early warning and 
definitive identification frames. The compromise of detail to enable speed allowed 
more effort to be allocated other areas of the study, increasing the overall breadth 
of the research.  However, the overarching framework was created in a 
transparent and robust manner, so that new input data or new concept that is of 
value can replace components in the current framework as they become 
available. 
9.5.4 KPCs Used in the Comparison of C, B and R Detection 
Capabilities 
The comparisons are performed with the assumption that the KPCs selected as 
a common performance indicator are representative and adequate. The rationale 
of selecting these KPCs is elaborated in Section 5.4, where the number of KPCs 
is minimised to mitigate comparison bandwidth. However, it has been contested 
that there are several more KPCs that are worth exploring to generate a more 
robust comparison. One of these KPCs is the training requirement of the systems 
in all four frames. First responders and CBR militants in the discussions have 
pointed out that their main ergonomic barrier with the detection systems are the 
sophistication of the equipment and their user-friendliness, affecting their ability 
to efficiently utilise the equipment. Another KPC capable of influencing the results 
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is the total life cycle cost of the equipment, where cost influences the unit 
procurement, hence spatial distribution, and practical response times. 
The potential of more KPC inclusions to improve the results are acknowledged, 
but each inclusion must be weighed against the impact in the overall analysis to 
maintain the integrity of the comparison.   
 
9.6 Recommendations 
9.6.1 Further Studies 
Section 9.5 revealed several limitations of the study, many arising due to the time 
constraints within an MSc timeframe. In order to maximise the potential of this 
research, it is recommended to allocate the relevant expertise to focus efforts in 
fine-tuning the research in the areas identified with limitations.  
In addition, to achieve more insights based on the methodology proposed, further 
research is recommended to incorporate multifaceted inputs from relevant 
subject matter experts. For example, scientists can compare the detection 
systems from a scientific and technological angle, and the end users can provide 
feedback on the ergonomics comparison of the various detection systems. 
Industrial manufacturers can then contribute by discussing the difficulties in 
miniaturising the technologies into field-able capabilities, while the government 
intelligence can compare the urgency of improving the current systems from a 
political angle.  
The research is only targeted at understanding the detection limitation, which is 
a small subset of the entire CBR defence framework. In order to fully appreciate 
the different segments of CBR defence architecture, further studies on protection, 
medical countermeasures and decontamination should be performed, leveraging 
on the same methodology protocol in the studies. 
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9.6.2 Interim solutions to capability gaps 
The analysis in Section 9.4 leads to the understanding of the current capability 
limitations. While the CBR community acknowledges these limitations and is 
actively developing solutions through technological researches, capability gaps 
are still evident in many sections.  Leveraging on the results from this analysis, it 
is possible to identify weak spots that must be addressed in the interim period, 
while the community continues in search for the required breakthroughs.  The 
interim solutions should be implemented to improve the capability without the 
need to invest more effect than the current technological research. 
9.6.2.1 Raman technology for security screening  
At security screening points, the need for high throughput and a non-intrusive 
identification has pushed the limits of many chemical and biological agent 
detection technologies, rendering most of them unsuitable for such usages. The 
need to improve these capabilities is evident and urgent. Many European airports 
[213] utilises Raman spectroscopy at border security, but such capabilities are 
rarely seen in other border controls and security screening areas. One of the 
plausible explanations is for the overwhelming concern for conventional and 
homemade explosive security requirements in air transport, coupled with the 
stigma of CB detection being slow and intrusive, such that they are relegated to 
only the secondary line of defence. Such thoughts and actions generate 
vulnerability to CB agents and knowledgeable perpetrators. Mending this 
loophole in security against C and B defence may not require leaps and bounds 
of technology innovations, but deploying the right equipment to do the right job.  
Ramen spectroscopy has been studied extensively and used as a laboratory tool 
for analytical chemistry for many years, reaching a level of maturity that transit 
from laboratory use to several field applications. The in-depth discussion of the 
theory behind Raman spectroscopy is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Raman Spectroscopy targets the molecules of chemical agents and amino acids 
that make up proteins of biological agents, and do so without physical contact 
with the sample, preserving sample integrity and poising it as a suitable candidate 
for many homeland security applications [214].  
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Relating to Figure 19, the C and B detection capabilities in the security screening 
frame requires improvement in terms of selectivity (DR = 1.0 for B, DR = 0.8 for 
C), sensitivity (DR = 0.7 for B, Dr = 0.42 for C) and response time (DR = 0.4 for 
C and B). The introduction of Raman technology into personnel security 
screening capability will reduce the desire for improvement with the enhancement 
of the detection capability.  
Raman technologies fit in airport security like it does in most other personnel 
security processes. It is fast and versatile, and does not interfere with the current 
screening procedures. It has the potential to detect trace amount of chemical and 
biological agents without contact. At the entry border of a major event, Raman 
spectroscopy either as a point detector or a man-portable table equipment could 
be deployed alongside conventional X-ray equipment, where liquid and powders 
can be surrendered separately to undergo screening processes. A typical scan 
takes seconds and the entire automated analysis process can be achieved in 
under a minute, comparable to the X-ray analysis time.  
The disadvantages and potential blind spot of Raman Spectrometry to security 
screening will not be covered in this dissertation. For a start, it will bring about 
immediate improvement in terms of sensitivity, selectivity and response time to 
the chemical and biological detection capability, without the need for hefty 
research investment. A mere off the shelf purchase or resource re-deployment 
would yield significant shift in the improvement desires throughout the 
comparison of the overall CBR detection capabilities. 
9.6.2.2 Improving sampling efficiency for biological detection 
One of the obstacles to an effective biological detection capability at an initial 
response to a suspected biohazard is the current sensitivity limitation (DR = 1.0, 
referenced from Table 78). There are two direct methods of overcoming this 
obstacle. The most obvious method is the continual indulgence in research on 
newer and better state-of-the-art technology to lower the detection limit. However, 
the return of investments in terms of sensitivity improvements have been marginal 
compared to the amount of emphasis placed. As seen in the analyses, the current 
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sensitivity (DR = 1.0) remains inadequate for individual protection, especially in 
the biological domain.  
The second avenue to venture is the improvement in sampling efficiently. The 
improvement in bio sampling does not directly improve the sensitivity of the 
detection capability, but presents a potential larger concentration of analyte to the 
detector, which reduces the need for sensitivity improvement.  
The current approved [215] sampling method involves surface sampling by form-
based swabs. The residual powder on hard surfaces are wiped down with swabs 
(or wipes) of moisture with buffered solutions such as potassium phosphate and 
presented to detectors. This method of agent recovery does not currently provide 
statistical confidence to the responder. A study [216] has revealed that the 
recovery yield for common swab based sampling is 24 to 32% for non-lab 
incidents, a figure that is not favourable for response to biohazards.  
A more efficient method deployed in point detection sampling technique is to 
direct large volumes of air through a HEPA filter to disperse the agent particles 
into small volumes of buffer solutions to form a concentrated mixture. This 
method is limited by the efficiency of the pump, low doses of agents and electrical 
power constraints of hand-held samplers in the field.  
From a different perspective, the overall desire to improve the sensitivity of the 
biological detection capability could be reduced by improving the efficiency of the 
sampling method. 
The shift of research effort into sampling technology may result in a more cost-
effect solution for the overall detection capabilities at a fast time, and the result is 
the potential overall reduction in improvement desire in terms of sensitivity. By 
deriving a better sampler, the current detection systems that cannot detect the 
biological agents in low doses have a better chance to detect them in the higher 
concentrated mixture.  
An interim solution is to deploy higher powered HEPA samplers with greater 
pump efficiency to collect the analyte in a shorter amount of time. Although this 
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shifts the strain towards the logistical and electrical burden, it greatly reduces the 
need for a more efficient sensor.  
On the other hand, a more easily deployable solution is to implement a longer 
sampling time, which shifts the burden towards the overall response time of the 
biological incident. While such a procedure will result in a longer response time 
for biological detection capability (DR for response time may potentially increase), 
the commander must be able to weigh his game and derive at a compromise 
between sensitivity and response time, but theoretically, the latter is deemed less 
important as biological agents have delayed effects and thus are more forgiving 
towards a ‘slower’ response.  
 
9.7 Chapter Conclusion 
It is implied from the results in Section 9.4 that biological detection capability is 
the weakest link in the overall CBR detection architecture, especially selectivity 
in the personnel security screening frame and sensitivity in the initial response 
frame. However, referenced to Figure 19 and Figure 20, there are other areas of 
the chemical and radiological detection capabilities that should be improved to 
attain an overall enhancement to the defence capability. For instance, the 
selectivity of the chemical detection capability in security screening is limited due 
to the lack of deployment of a functional solution. These enhancements, however, 
do not need to be derived from technological breakthroughs, but simple and 
implementable procedural adjustments to reduce the desirability of 
improvements. The framework could also benefit in its depth through future 
involvements of subject matter experts from the CBR field. 
The methodology proposed pinpoints the capability gaps in the CBR detection 
architecture. The researcher and designer could leverage on the outputs of the 
framework to work towards enhancing the detection architecture, but trade-off 
analysis must be performed. For instance, it is generally understood that an 
improved sensitivity often results in a longer response time of the detector. Before 
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any enhancement is proposed, the capability should be re-evaluated against the 
framework to ensure that other attributes are not compromised.   
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10 CONCLUSION 
 
10.1 Chapter Introduction 
The study was set up to explore the comparison of the current C, B and R 
detection capabilities. While it is not common for such inter-comparison to be 
performed, it brings about new insights to the understanding of our current 
limitations.  
To achieve the aims, the study sought to complete the following tasks:  
1. Derivation of methodology to provide a platform for successful comparison 
2. Leveraging on discussed framework to perform preliminary analysis 
 
10.2 Comparison Methodology 
Several decision analysis tools were evaluated in search of a robust model for 
such multifaceted comparison.  
The AHP method was assessed suitable for the selection of a representative C, 
B and R agent for the comparison. While AHP comprises tedious pairwise 
comparisons of criteria to arrive at a conclusion, these comparisons were heavily 
supported by the vast availability of literature on the inherent properties of the 
various agents, enhancing the ability of the decision maker in performing 
informed comparisons. The AHP analysis revealed that the agents that are most 
likely to be used in a CBR attack are Sarin (C), Bacillus Anthracis (B), and Cobalt-
60 (R). These agents were selected as the representative agents for the 
capability comparison. 
SMARTS was chosen for the capability comparison due on its simplicity in 
capturing the author’s judgement into quantitative outputs for an objective 
comparison. A realistic scenario non prejudicial to C, B or R was created and 
decomposed into four distinct frames – early warning frame, personnel security 
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screening frame, initial response frame and definitive identification frame. The 
four frames are created to represent the chronological progression of detection 
mechanism across the timeline of the scenario, where all four frames contributed 
to the success of the overall detection architecture. The C, B and R capabilities 
were then analysed with respect to the KPCs most applicable to the frames.  The 
SMARTS framework constructed applied both published CBR detection 
capabilities and the author’s judgement of the target requirement to derive the 
relative ranking of the C, B and R capabilities.  
However, the sensitivity analysis (Section 9.3) revealed that the original 
framework set out lacked the ability to sufficiently capture the required information 
processed in the decision maker’s mind. The comparison of detection capabilities 
is multi-dimensional, and under each node or criteria, there are different 
considerations in a chemical, biological or radiological environment. A single 
framework was thus assessed to be inadequate in accommodating such a multi-
dimensional problem.  
Such a shortcoming was overcome by the introduction of several similarly 
structured frameworks that drew the focus to other aspects that was not apparent 
from the original framework. These frameworks together formed a pyramid of 
iterations that greatly enhanced the credibility of the results with cognitively less 
demanding strategies.    
 
10.3  Comparison Analysis 
The extreme toxicity of biological agents and the ease of acquisition (amongst 
many other concerns) made biological agents favourable for small scale attacks 
by non-state organisation. Coupled with the lack of distinctive detection features, 
biological detection systems have been concurred by many literatures to be the 
‘weakest link’ of all CBR detection systems. The findings of this dissertation 
resonated with these literatures, indicating that in general, biological detection 
system ranked the highest for need to be improved to ideal conditions (Table 79). 
Such a finding echoed the huge disparity between the current performance and 
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ideal conditions, especially in point detection technologies. Firstly, bio-threats are 
prevalent and harmful, compared to chemical and radiological counterparts, and 
this leads to the need (DR = 1.0, from Table 78) for the highest sensitivity for the 
biological detection system. The presence of numerous background 
interferences echoed the need for a selective detection system with lowest false 
alarms. Coupled with the fact that naturally, biomolecules possess few properties 
that are distinguishable by handheld detection systems, it is a challenge for 
current technology to progress by quantum leaps to reach its ideal conditions. 
The large disparity between current and ideal target performances was 
postulated to be the reason behind its weak link. 
This dissertation complemented the real-world findings by analysing the problem 
into different frames within the detection architecture. In this manner, the different 
layers of detection was examined between domains, and the study revealed that 
biological detection system may require more urgent attention on specific 
portions of detect-to-warn and detect-to-treat scenarios. For the detect-to-warn 
phase, personnel security screening for illicit CB material should be improved 
from the current capability that is almost non-existent. It was also proposed to 
improve the point detection technologies under the initial response phase for a 
more sensitive and faster preliminary identification of attacks. The early warning 
capabilities against biological and chemical threats were perceived effective 
compared to radiological early warning capability. There is currently no fielded 
true radiation standoff detection system that can detect particulate radiation at 
distance long enough for full contamination avoidance purposes, as most 
radiation detection technology can only sense the radiation upon ‘contact’.   The 
radiological standoff detection technology for early warning capability is definitely 
one area that is severely lacking for an encompassing protection against 
radiological attack.  
 
10.4 Recommendations on Further Research 
This study presented like-minded researchers with a leveraged starting step in 
attempt to quantify detection capabilities from a multi-faceted level. Due to time 
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constraint, it was not as extensive as intended, and thus further exploration in the 
research strategies would aid in crystallising the ultimate goal of CBR detection 
capability comparison. The overarching aim of fine-tuning the CBR defence 
framework could also be achieved by similar methodology, with the inclusion of 
much higher level of operational, situational, technological and political thinking.  
 
10.5 Summary 
To sum up, this dissertation provided an encompassing method for comparing 
chemical, biological and radiological detection capability, and presented a 
preliminary result based on the author’s judgement. The imperative to improve 
biological detection in all aspects featured strongly within the findings, while 
radiological detection did not. To develop a well-rounded CBR sensing capability 
for a major event, it was recommended for emphasis to be placed on radiological 
detection in early warning capability, chemical and biological detection in 
personnel screening capability and lastly, chemical and biological detection in 
initial response capability.   
The ability to perform such inter-comparison based on the modular and 
transparent methodology also brought about a new world of possibility in deeper 
research regarding the wider CBR operations.  
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Appendix A DETAILS OF COMPARISON RESULTS 
AFTER ITERATION APPROACH IS ADOPTED 
 
A.1 Chapter Summary 
As summarised in Section 9.3, the introduction of self-checks enhance the 
accuracy of decision making. In this dissertation, three different frameworks are 
proposed, allowing the decision maker different avenues to crystallise the 
perceptions from different facets. The iteration approach then provides a platform 
for reconciliation of the outputs as an additional means of sanity check.   
 
A.2 Derivation of three frameworks 
The first framework is modelled in Figure A- 1. The first (lowest) tier focuses on 
the comparison of C, B and R detection capabilities in terms of the respective 
KPCs in each frame. The second tier of comparison defines the importance of 
each KPC to the success of the respective frame, while the third (highest) tier 
discusses the importance of each frame to the overall success of the detection 
architecture.  
 
Figure A- 1: Hierarchy for Framework 1. 
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The second framework is modelled in Figure A- 2. The first (lowest) tier focuses 
on the importance of each KPC to each domain detection capability. The second 
tier compares the relative importance of each domain in the respective frames. 
The last (highest) tier discusses the importance of each frame to the overall 
success of the detection architecture.  
 
Figure A- 2: Hierarchy for Framework 2. 
The third framework is modelled in Figure A- 3. The first (lowest) tier focuses on 
the performance of each domain detection capabilities in terms of the individual 
KPCs. The second tier compares the relative importance of each KPC within each 
domain. The last (highest) tier discusses the importance of each domain to the 
overall success of the detection architecture.  
 
 
Figure A- 3: Hierarchy for Framework 3. 
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A.3 Output of iteration 
A sanity check based on the iterative approach is adopted. Once the first round 
of iteration is completed, the finalised individual weightage of each criterion is 
reconciled with the corresponding weightages in the other two frameworks. The 
process of iteration continues until the results converge to an acceptable value. 
Table A-1 to A-3 shows the output from the three frameworks after the final 
iteration. In each table, the normalised output from the three tiers of comparisons 
is shown. 
The scores after the final iteration are presented in Table A-4. As a benchmark, 
the original output of Framework 1 is placed in comparison.  
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Table A- 1: Output from Framework 1 after iteration. 
 
Table A- 2: Output from Framework 2 after iteration. 
 
Table A- 3: Output from Framework 3 after iteration. 
 
 
C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R C B R
1st Tier 
Comparison 1 0 0 0.3 0.6 1 1 1 0 0.3 1 1 0.6 1 0 0.8 1 0.2 1 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0.7 0.8 1 0 0.7 1 0.1 1 0 0
Second Tier 
Comparison 0.3 0 0 0.3 0.6 1 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 1 1 0.42 0.7 0 0.8 1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0 0.5 1 0 0.25 0.5 0.35 0.48 0.6 0 0.7 1 0.1 0.3 0 0
Third Tier 
Comparison 0.105 0 0 0.105 0.21 0.35 0.105 0.105 0 0.105 0.35 0.35 0.42 0.7 0 0.8 1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0 0.5 1 0 0.25 0.5 0.35 0.48 0.6 0 0.21 0.3 0.03 0.09 0 0
Ranking
Early Warning Capability Security Screening Capability Initial Response Capability Definitive Identification Capability
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Time
Sensit
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Time
Sensi
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Resp
onse 
Time
1st Tier 
Comparison 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 0 0.6 0.3 1 0 1 0 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.7 1 0.4 0 1 0 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.6 0 1 0 1 0.6 1 0 1 0
Second Tier 
Comparison 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.3 0 0.6 0.3 1 0 1 0 1 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.7 1 0.4 0 0.2 0 0.5 0.25 0.5 1 0.5 0.6 0 0.35 0 0.7 0.42 1 0 0.1 0
Third Tier 
Comparison 0.0945 0.095 0.095 0.105 0 0.21 0.105 0.35 0 0.35 0 0.35 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.7 1 0.4 0 0.2 0 0.5 0.25 0.5 1 0.5 0.6 0 0.35 0 0.21 0.126 0.3 0 0.03 0
Ranking
Early Warning Capability Security Screening Initial Response Capability Definitive Identitication
Radiological 
EnvironmentChemical Environment Biological Environment
Radiological 
Environment
Chemical 
Environment
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Environment
Radiological 
Environment
Chemical 
Environment
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Environment
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Environment
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Environment
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Frame Frame Frame
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 1
1st Tier 
Comparison 0.2 0.9 1 0.4 0.15 1 0.3 0.2 0.8 1 0.2 1 0 0.7 1 0.3 0.2 1 0.5 0.6 0.7 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 1 1 0 0 0 1
Second Tier 
Comparison 0.12 0.54 0.6 0.24 0.15 1 0.3 0.12 0.48 0.6 0.12 0.15 0 0.7 1 0.3 0.2 1 0.5 0.36 0.42 0.6 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 1 1 0 0 0 0
Third Tier 
Comparison 0.096 0.432 0.48 0.192 0.12 0.8 0.24 0.096 0.384 0.48 0.096 0.12 0 0.7 1 0.3 0.2 1 0.5 0.36 0.42 0.6 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.35 0.175 0.35 0.35 0 0 0 0
Chemical Biological Radiological
Sensitivity Selectivity Response Time Sensitivity Selectivity Response Time
Ranking
Frame Frame Frame Frame Frame FrameFrame Frame Frame
Sensitivity Selectivity Response Time
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Table A- 4: Illustration of output comparison from the three frameworks. The 
original output of Framework 1 before iteration is presented on the left. 
 
*Description is written as frame-KPC-domain. 
 
  
 
 
*Description Score *Description Score *Description Score *Description Score
3-sen-b 1 2-sel-b 1 2-sel-b 1 3-sen-b 1
2-sel-b 0.8 3-sen-b 1 3-sen-b 1 2-sel-b 1
2-sel-c 0.64 2-sel-c 0.8 2-sel-c 0.8 2-sel-c 0.8
3-sel-b 0.6 2-sen-b 0.7 2-sen-b 0.7 2-sen-b 0.7
2-sen-b 0.56 3-rt-b 0.6 3-rt-b 0.6 3-rt-b 0.6
3-sen-c 0.5 3-sen-c 0.5 3-sen-c 0.5 3-sel-b 0.5
2-sen-c 0.45 3-sel-b 0.5 3-rt-c 0.5 3-sen-c 0.48
3-sel-r 0.42 3-rt-c 0.48 3-sel-b 0.5 3-rt-c 0.48
1-rt-b 0.4 2-sen-c 0.42 2-sen-c 0.4 2-sen-c 0.432
1-rt-r 0.4 2-rt-c 0.4 2-rt-c 0.4 2-rt-c 0.384
2-rt-c 0.32 2-rt-b 0.4 2-rt-b 0.4 2-rt-b 0.42
2-rt-b 0.32 1-sel-r 0.35 1-rt-b 0.35 1-sel-r 0.35
3-sel-c 0.3 1-rt-b 0.35 1-sel-r 0.35 3-sel-r 0.35
3-rt-c 0.3 1-rt-r 0.35 1-rt-r 0.35 1-rt-r 0.35
3-rt-b 0.3 3-sel-r 0.35 3-sel-r 0.35 4-sen-b 0.3
4-sen-b 0.3 4-sen-b 0.3 4-sen-b 0.3 1-rt-b 0.36
4-rt-c 0.3 3-sel-c 0.25 3-sel-c 0.25 3-sel-c 0.24
1-sel-r 0.28 1-sel-b 0.21 1-sel-b 0.21 1-sel-b 0.2
1-sel-b 0.2 4-sen-c 0.21 4-sen-c 0.21 4-sen-c 0.192
4-sen-c 0.2 2-sel-r 0.2 2-sel-r 0.2 2-sel-r 0.175
1-sen-c 0.12 1-sen-c 0.105 4-rt-c 0.126 1-sel-c 0.12
1-rt-c 0.12 1-sel-c 0.105 1-rt-c 0.105 1-ran-c 0.12
1-sel-c 0.08 1-ran-c 0.105 1-ran-b 0.105 1-ran-b 0.1
4-rt-b 0.06 1-ran-b 0.105 1-sen-c 0.0945 1-sen-c 0.096
1-sen-b 0 1-rt-c 0.105 1-sel-c 0.0945 1-rt-c 0.096
1-sen-r 0 4-rt-c 0.09 1-ran-c 0.0945 4-rt-c 0.096
1-ran-c 0 4-sen-r 0.03 4-sen-r 0.03 1-sen-b 0
1-ran-b 0 1-ran-r 0 1-ran-r 0 1-ran-r 0
1-ran-r 0 1-sen-b 0 1-sen-b 0 1-sen-r 0
2-rt-r 0 1-sen-r 0 1-sen-r 0 2-rt-r 0
2-sel-r 0 2-rt-r 0 2-rt-r 0 2-sen-r 0
2-sen-r 0 2-sen-r 0 2-sen-r 0 3-rt-r 0
3-rt-r 0 3-rt-r 0 3-rt-r 0 3-sen-r 0
3-sen-r 0 3-sen-r 0 3-sen-r 0 4-rt-b 0
4-rt-r 0 4-rt-b 0 4-rt-b 0 4-rt-r 0
4-sen-r 0 4-rt-r 0 4-rt-r 0 4-sen-r 0
Framework 1 Framework 2
Final
Framework 3
FinalOriginal Final
